The Consolidation of Democracy

Comparing Europe and Latin America

Carsten Q. Schneider

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This book investigates the successes and failures in consolidating those democratic regimes that emerged in Europe and Latin America in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

The theoretical approach developed combines the most prominent political–institutional and socio–structural approaches to explaining the Consolidation of Democracy (CoD). Reinterpreting conventional claims, Schneider's comparative analyses of 32 countries indicates that the driving force behind CoD is the fit between the institutional type of democracy and the societal context in terms of power dispersion. This book:

- presents new data measuring dimensions of regime transition processes in Latin America, the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as some former Soviet Republics;
- reassesses some core assumptions of the dominant transition paradigm;
- discusses general methodological issues involved when investigating causally complex claims in comparative social research and presents fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as a valuable addition to the methodological tool kit of comparative social scientists.

This innovative and important volume will be of interest to political scientists, particularly those with an interest in democracy, democratization, comparative politics, and social science methodology.

Carsten Q. Schneider is Associate Professor and Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Imperfections in Democracy (DISC) at the Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary.

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Preface and acknowledgements

In the early 1990s, just after my civilian service and before starting university, I had decided to spend my first own money traveling for half a year through South America. Despite the many pleasant distractions one certainly finds there, it struck me how different political life was compared with what I was used to in West Germany, my home country in the 1980s. In Chile, ex-dictator General Pinochet still heavily influenced political life. In Argentina, President Menem set out to change the constitution in order to gain himself a third term in office, despite widespread rumors of large scale corruption partly fueled by stories about the president occasionally cruising the city with his red Ferrari. Brazil was in the midst of hyperinflation while Argentina had pegged the peso to the US dollar, transforming me from a poor to a wealthy person every time I crossed the border from Argentina to Brazil with my few dollar notes … and a poor person again when coming back to Buenos Aires. These were exciting places compared to the boring political scene of the Bonner republic, which in those years always saw the same man winning every national election. I found it difficult to imagine Helmut Kohl in a Ferrari speeding through the streets of Bonn. All this made me start wondering why these glaring differences were there. In the second half of the 1990s I moved to Spain, another young democracy, and studied political science. It was there that I got my hands on a Spanish version of Guillermo O'Donnell's passionate critique on the concept of the consolidation of democracy. Back in Germany, during my time as a research assistant at the Social Science Center (WZB) in Berlin, I started trying to figure out in a more structured way how, despite O'Donnell's disillusionment with the then current consolidation literature, one can nevertheless say more about why democracy in some countries is becoming the norm while in others it is not. This question turned into my dissertation project which got its final shape while I was a doctoral student at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence.

At this marvelous place I was lucky to meet Philippe C. Schmitter. Philippe became my thesis supervisor and, in later years, even co-author and part-time colleague at my current institution, the Central European University (CEU) in Hungary, yet another place that had just lived through a transition to democracy. I am heavily indebted to Philippe for all I learned, and still learn, from his knowledge and unspeakable energy. Working with him has shown me that doing social research can be a lot of fun. Office hours were spent in Philippe's marvelous

1 Introduction

Experience in modern times teaches us that democracy is frequently breaking down, especially when this form of government is tried out for the first time in a country. Europe learned this lesson in the interwar period and for Latin America throughout the last century a cyclical movement between autocracy and democracy has long been the rule rather than the exception. All the more surprising is what we have seen happening since the early 1970s. Around the globe, autocracies in Latin America, Europe, and elsewhere broke down and gave way to different forms of democracy. Even optimistic scholars of democracy nowadays admit that back in those days they did not expect transitions away from autocracy towards democracy to turn into a truly global phenomenon (Schmitter 2007).

Even more surprising than the geographical scope is the temporal persistence of democracy's victory. Nowadays, few people believe that democracy in Central and Eastern European will go away in the foreseeable future. In Southern Europe, the issue of mortal threats to democratic survival has long been off the agenda of political scientists, practitioners, and citizens alike. Even in most of Latin America, democratically elected governments can focus on solving social and economic problems rather than being busy trying to keep the military in the barracks. For sure, not in all countries that ventured into a democratic era by holding founding elections can democracy be expected to persist in the foreseeable future. That is, democracy has not consolidated in all places, to use the terminology of this book, but it has done so in many.

The concept of consolidation of democracy (CoD) as it is commonly used is far from unproblematic – and this book is very clear about it. But the questions of whether democracy will survive in many different countries and on what factors that survival depends are simply too important to be left uninvestigated. Aside from the normative quest for securing democracy, whether or not a country is a democracy and likely to remain so in the future affects the lives of millions, if not billions, of citizens in (neo-) democracies around the world. Even if people in young democracies in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere are increasingly disenchanted with the way their political systems nowadays work, still the majority prefer democracy over the alternative autocratic rule to which they were subjected less than three decades ago. Only if we as scholars and citizens come to understand better how and why democracy consolidated in some countries, such as Spain,

Slovenia, Mongolia, or Uruguay, while it failed to do so in others, such as Belarus, Bolivia, or Russia, will we be better prepared for a potential future wave of democracy and to give advice to decision makers that is more than educated guesswork. Even the mere identification of democracies that are more consolidated and those that are less consolidated (something that might sound easy but which, in fact, is generating heated disputes among scholars and citizens alike), has enormous benefits – if done properly. Particularly close attention should be paid to unconsolidated democracies, where there is a tendency towards the development of new forms of diminished democracy subtypes with nasty consequences for the citizens living there. At the same time, young democracies unequivocally identified as consolidated can finally be treated both by citizens and academics as 'normal' democracies with all the flaws, challenges and potential for improvement that they share with old and established democracies.

This book deals with the process of consolidation – and also, to a limited extent, democratization in a broader sense – that took place during the last quarter of the twentieth century in South and East Europe and in Latin America. The main goal of this book is to find out *under which configurations of societal-structural and political-institutional conditions young democracies in Latin America and Europe consolidate, and under which configurations they do not consolidate.* In a nutshell, the claim is that if the institutional type of democracy chosen fits to a country's societal context conditions in the degree and type of power dispersion, then politically relevant actors obey the rules of the game dictated by the democratic political institutions and thus consolidate their type of democracy. The details of this claim become clearer once I have outlined how I define and measure CoD and how I separate different types of causally relevant conditions for CoD.

Much has been written on the topic of CoD ever since the Carnation Revolution successfully swept away autocracy in Portugal more than three decades ago. Despite the various important insights that have been gained into what makes democracy endure, one cannot but notice a growing dissatisfaction with the present state of 'consolidology' (Schmitter and Karl 1994). Apart from the fact that there is no commonly agreed notion of what CoD means and, as a consequence of this, a lack of appropriate data measuring CoD in an encompassing way, the core concern is that theoretical progress in explaining CoD has stagnated for years now. Some scholars go as far as to recommend that the concept of CoD – and with it all research endeavors – should be abandoned altogether. These criticisms are well founded and need to be taken seriously, all the more so because most of them are expressed by outstanding scholars working within the CoD paradigm or who are even among the founding fathers of the field (e.g. O'Donnell 1996). This book can be seen as an attempt to restore the analytic usefulness of the CoD concept. Rather than abandoning the concept of CoD – and with it perhaps the attempt of securing the future of democracy – I try to fix it. This is done by responding to several shortcomings in the CoD literature and by suggesting alternative modes of conceptualizing, measuring, and explaining the phenomenon that some democracies consolidate while others do not.

The line of argumentation

In order to answer the main question of this book on which factors cause CoD, and in order to go beyond the already existing answers to this question, several shortcomings in the CoD literature must be tackled. This book and its line of argumentation are structured by addressing each of these shortcomings in turn and by offering solutions.

First, there is no common agreement about what kind of phenomena we are actually referring to when we use the term 'consolidation of democracy'. This is partly caused by the fact that the concept includes one of the most, if not *the* most contested concept in political science: democracy. Hence, scholars working on CoD often talk past each other simply because they do not share the same definition of democracy, of CoD, or – in the worst case – of both terms. There is no doubt that this is not a good basis for making progress in explaining CoD. This book therefore offers a detailed discussion of the concept of CoD. I argue that a minimal definition of CoD in terms of actors' behavior towards democratic rules avoids various analytic pitfalls of more demanding and complex CoD concepts and is most fitting for my attempt to investigate CoD in more than a handful of cases from different world regions.

The second shortcoming in the CoD literature is the lack of data especially tailored to measure, across different world regions, the core concepts of the democratization literature – mainly liberalization of autocracy and the consolidation of democracy. The emergence of democratic regimes in virtually all parts of the world – and especially in Europe and Latin America – provides legitimate reasons to apply a comparative research design that tries to capture most of the relevant cases. Such an inter-regional comparative approach requires comparable, reliable, and valid data on CoD that adequately represents the concept of CoD as defined in this book. Until now, the literature on CoD has suffered from a lack of such data and scholars have been forced to use readily available indicators, such as Freedom House, which are not meant to measure CoD and have their well-known problems (e.g. Munck and Verkuilen 2002). On the other hand, studies based on a smaller number of cases certainly offer richer measures of CoD but rarely attempt to extend their data collection efforts to a more comprehensive set of cases. In this book, a new time-series, cross-sectional data set is presented that includes more than 30 countries from different world regions over a period of 25 years. The descriptive analysis of this data reveals some interesting findings that partially challenge some core assumptions of the mainstream democratization literature based on O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and claims about the impossibility of sustainable democracy in former communist societies.

Third, and most importantly, it is often argued that theoretical progress in explaining CoD is stagnating (e.g. Munck 2001). Rather than scarcity, the problem seems to be an oversupply of determinants for CoD. These different competing, mutually not exclusive, causal accounts of CoD exist next to each other, though without major efforts at linking them. Some studies focus on country characteristics, such as the ethnic composition or economic development, as the driving force for CoD (e.g. Lipset 1959 or Fish 2001). Others claim that it is features of the

political regime type, such as the party system or the governmental format, that ultimately matters (e.g. Linz 1990a and 1990b). While the former approach leaves the translation of social structures into political phenomena inside a black box, the latter approach suffers from a tendency to postulate one-size-fits-all institutional arrangements that should work everywhere, regardless of the societal context in which they are embedded. Most of those empirical analyses that include both societal and institutional types of factors do so not to combine them but to find out which of them is the stronger predictor for CoD. What is needed in order to better understand the causes for CoD, though, is not a competition between single variables, but efforts at integrating these various explanatory factors into a more coherent set of propositions and to test which *different combinations* between them produce CoD in different countries. The need for such an integrative approach has been repeatedly addressed by various scholars.[1] So far, this quest has not been followed by many and the modal empirical comparative approach is still based on the assumptions that CoD, probabilistically speaking, is the product of the same causes, regardless whether it happens in, say, Spain or Slovenia, and that single case characteristics in isolation, say, the party system, have decisive explanatory power for CoD on their own.

These are quite strong assumptions. My hunch is that few social science lay-persons with a common-sense understanding of how complex social realities are would find them particularly plausible. It is much more intuitive to expect that there are different ways of getting to the CoD and that these pathways inherently consist of mixes of different factors rather than just one of them. In this book, I follow this intuition and significantly depart from mainstream comparative approaches to explaining CoD. I offer a theoretical framework capable of integrating different approaches to explaining CoD. This approach explicitly allows for what can be called causal complexity rather than straightjacketing the explanation by assuming causal simplicity from the outset.

My key claim is that CoD is the result of a fit in terms of power dispersion between the type of democracy, on the one hand, and the societal context in which it is embedded, on the other. This argument rests on the distinction between two types of CoD factors: societal features of the country, and political-institutional characteristics of the democratic regime. The way to integrate these two types of factors is by making use of the notion of power dispersion. Societies with different characteristics differ with regard to their degree of power dispersion. Societal characteristics shape different politically relevant collective actors, their relative size, their rights, resources, and needs, and their position in relation to one another. This, in turn, defines their 'need' for a specific degree of dispersion of opportunities for participating in the process of making collectively binding decisions and in distributing public goods. Hence, certain contexts require more concentration of political power than others in order to achieve CoD. As an example, just think of an ethno-linguistically heterogeneous society compared with a homogeneous society. In the former there are clearly defined collective actors with high-stake interests who demand their share of participation in the political decision-making process. Furthermore, following the literature I claim that within the generic regime type

of liberal democracy there is substantial variation as to how much political power is dispersed or concentrated. Some types of democracy concentrate power in the executive and/or a few political groups, while other types disperse public authority across different institutions and/or groups. Again, as an example, just think of the contrasts between a parliamentary democracy with a strong prime minister and few parties and a presidential system with a weak president and high levels of party fragmentation.

Political power can be dispersed or concentrated in two dimensions of the political system: the *horizontal* dimension, which refers to the degree of power dispersion at the national level of the political system, and the *vertical* dimension, which refers to the degree of power dispersion between the national and subnational units. Any configuration of remote context conditions can be classified as to whether it creates the need (and/or possibility) for power dispersion or concentration and whether it does so predominantly in the horizontal or the vertical dimension. Equally, any configuration of proximate political institutions – or democracy type – can be classified as to whether it disperses or concentrates power predominantly in the vertical or horizontal dimension.

From all this follows that some political institutional configurations fit better than others into given societal structures. A good fit between the type of democracy and the societal context in which it operates is expected to lead to CoD because the politically relevant actors are more likely to agree to play according to the rules established in that specific type of democracy. If context and institutions mismatch, democracy does not consolidate. While operating at a high level of generality, in this book I show that this general cause for CoD empirically manifests itself in different configurations of conditions that all lead to CoD. The explanation offered in this book not only covers by now obvious success stories such as Spain or Portugal, but also encompasses unexpected cases of consolidated democracies like Mongolia.

A fourth phenomenon that hinders theoretical progress towards causally complex hypotheses can be found in the methodological predominance of standard statistical techniques. When analyzing more than a dozen cases, the default choice is some form of multiple regression analysis. The great virtue of this method lies in summarizing complex empirical information into probabilistic statements based on the starting assumption that the relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable is linear, additive, and unifinal. This is the opposite of what I, together with many in the literature, claim the causes for CoD look like. More advanced statistical techniques can do away with some of these simplifying assumptions, but they are only available under certain favorable circumstances that are rare in macro-comparative social research. In the very common situation of a mid-sized number of cases based on which causally complex hypotheses should be tested, the application of advanced regression analysis is heavily impaired while the application of simple regression models creates a tendency to represent existing theories of CoD in a simple – some claim even 'caricatured' (Munck 2001) – manner. In this book, my suggestion to avoid the pitfall of analyzing a medium-sized N data set under the starting assumption that the causal patterns are simple

is to make use of the relatively new method of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008b; Schneider and Wagemann 2007; Rihoux and Ragin 2008). This approach is based on fuzzy set theory and Boolean algebra and allows the investigation of complex causality in terms of necessity and sufficiency – and thus equifinal, conjunctural, and asymmetric claims like the one proposed in this book – based on a medium-sized number of cases.

Fifth, many long, heated, and still inconclusive debates are fought over whether the mode in which a country transits from autocracy to democracy matters at all for the future of democracy. Among those who claim that it does, there are severe splits about exactly which mode of transition has a positive effect. The theoretical approach at explaining CoD that I develop in this book allows for a new perspective on these entrenched debates. If it is correct that democracy consolidates if the institutions chosen fit the societal context in terms of power dispersion, then much depends on what type of institutional setting is chosen. As these institutions, by definition, are chosen at the end of the transition period when democracy is installed, a lot, in turn, depends on the circumstances – i.e. the transition type – under which actors choose these institutions. Solving the conundrum of which mode of transition works best for CoD is far from just of academic interest. It also has important practical implications, for transitions, by definition, are highly contingent moments, or critical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991), at which well informed decisions and advice can help put countries on a path towards a democratic future.

Plan of the book

Chapter 2 contains a conceptual clarification of the term CoD and presents the device for measuring CoD in around 30 countries from six world regions. Chapter 3 presents some descriptive inferences disaggregating the democratization process into the liberalization of autocracy (LoA) and the consolidation of democracy (CoD) and shows some unexpected links between these two concepts. In Chapter 4, the main hypothesis is developed. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the topic of causal complexity and the comparative methodological implications it has. QCA is presented as the adequate method for analyzing the core research question of this book. Chapter 5 also contains a short overview of the core principles of QCA in order to familiarize the reader with this rather new method and to ease an adequate reading of the empirical findings presented in Chapter 6. Readers not particularly interested in comparative methodology might just want to skim through this chapter and those already familiar with configurational comparative methods (Rihoux and Ragin 2008), in general, and fsQCA, in particular, can go directly to the following chapter. In Chapter 6, I test the consolidating effects of various configurations of political institutions (the governmental format, the party system, and the degree of decentralization) embedded in socio-structural contexts and interpret these findings in the light of the claim that a fit between institutions and contexts in terms of power dispersion provides a sufficient path towards CoD. Chapter 7 is dedicated to the question of whether there are superior modes of

transiting from autocracy to democracy if the aim is to achieve CoD and, in case there are such superior transition modes, what needs to be done in methodological terms in order to detect them in a static comparison of countries. The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, draws the debate together and highlights some implications of my findings for competing explanations of CoD.

2 Meaning and measure of the consolidation of democracy

At present, there is no consensus on what CoD actually means. Scholars conceptualize the term CoD in many different ways; many different indicators of CoD – some of them in stark contradiction – are applied, and often the connection between meaning, concept, and indicators of CoD is far from coherent (Schedler 2001c). It is thus not uncommon that different scholars starting out with different definitions of CoD, end up using the same indicators. Sometimes scholars fail to provide a basic definition of CoD at all, and thus commit the 'fallacy of operational definitions' (Schedler 1997) by wrongly labeling their systematized concept of CoD, or, even worse, their (list of) indicators as the basic definition of CoD. And, finally, mostly due to weak conceptualization, one can find a "strange tendency to conflate definitions and explanations, to mix up defining features with causal variables" (Schedler 1997: 8). No doubt, all this acts as a serious barrier for better understanding the causes and consequences of CoD.

Fortunately, over the last decade or so, the importance and intricacies of concept formation in the social sciences have received growing interest. Based on the seminal writings by Giovanni Sartori (1970, 1984), this debate has been considerably influenced by David Collier and his collaborators.[1] Researchers can now make use of a coherent set of tools and a reasonably unified language that go well beyond Humpty Dumpty's a posteriori rules (Gerring 1999: 361) of concept formation. Key to understanding concept formation à la Sartori, Collier, and collaborators is that it is taking place at different 'levels of abstraction' (Sartori 1970, 1984), or 'levels of generality' (Collier and Mahon 1993). Crudely summarizing this sophisticated literature, these levels are: (1) the background concept at the highest level of generality, comprising the task of choosing one of the different basic meanings of the term to be conceptualized; (2) the systematized concept for which the task is to choose the realm(s) of social reality one must look at in order to find the most appropriate indicators for the background concept; and (3) further down on the ladder of generality the systematized concept is operationalized by empirically measurable indicators. Throughout the following discussion, I use these tools in order to form the concepts of CoD.

As is made obvious by the term itself, "the concept of democratic consolidation is double-barreled – it joins two distinct concepts that must be assessed separately in analyzing the status of political regimes" (Gunther et al. 1995: 5). Hence, clarifying

what is meant by the term consolidation of democracy implies a discussion of two terms: *democracy* and *consolidation of democracy*. I start with a brief clarification of the meaning of the term democracy and then I proceed by specifying what is meant by CoD.

The concept of democracy

Scholars working in the field of comparative democratization very quickly reached consensus on a procedural definition of liberal democracy, mainly based on the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1976, [1943]) and further elaborated by Robert Dahl (1971, 1989). The common denominator amongst consolidologists is the basic understanding of democracy as a *type of political regime* in procedural, or better, processual (Schmitter and Karl 1991) terms because, rather than to substantive policy outcomes, it refers to *democratic procedures* derived from normative democratic theory (Collier and Levitzky 1997: 433; see also Schmitter and Karl 1991; Schmitter 2004; Huntington 1991: 5–13).

Behind this apparent consensus among comparativists working on the topic of democratization at the most abstract level – i.e. that of the background concept – there is considerable disagreement when it comes to specifying the systematized concept of democracy. The systematized concept of democracy used in the literature can be ordered along the dimension of 'thickness' (Coppedge 1999). This dimension reflects the degree of 'intension'[2], that is, the number of characteristics attributed to the word. Over the last decade, plausible arguments supported by empirical evidence have been made in favor of including additional dimensions into the concept of democracy.

The expansion, or thickening, of the democracy concept is not always warranted, for it may lead to severe analytical pitfalls. The arguments in favor of employing Dahl's systematized concept of democracy without major additions can be summarized as follows. Because it is the most commonly used concept, using it minimizes the risk of 'unsettling the semantic field' (Collier and Levitzky 1997). With thinner concepts (e.g. Przeworski 1999; Przeworski *et al*. 2000), more cases can be captured, yet thin concepts also tell us less about these cases and, consequently, create the risk of mis-classifying autocracies as democracies, a mistake labeled as the 'electoral fallacy' (Karl 1986; Schmitter and Karl 1991: 78; Linz and Stepan 1996: 4). With regard to thicker concepts, "[t]here is yet no scholarly consensus on a thicker definition and no one has produced indicators that convincingly incorporate components such as the rule of law, the autonomy of elected officials, decentralization, or national sovereignty" (Coppedge forthcoming: 10).[3] Furthermore, thickening of concepts is often analytically hazardous because the more criteria are included, (a) the fuzzier the concept becomes, (b) the less cases fulfill the criteria, (c) the more difficult it becomes to theoretically explain and empirically test if and how the different parts of the concept relate to each other, and (d) the less possible it becomes to use the concept for any causal analysis because most of the possible and plausible causes and consequences of the 'thing' are already included in the concept *qua definitionem* (Schedler 1997).

Therefore, I opt for conceptualizing democracy in processual terms as a liberal democracy in a relatively independent geographic unit with an existing state. A political regime can be regarded as liberal democratic

> when it allows for the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of associations, information and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claims to rule … without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference.
>
> (Linz, quoted in Gunther *et al*. 1996: 152)

What CoD should … and should not mean

Many of the shortcomings and complaints about the term CoD can be resolved by making explicit which elements belong to the definition of the background concept, which dimensions to the systematized concept, and which aspects to the indicators. Hence, in the following, each of these levels of generality are systematically addressed in order to see where the disagreements in the literature lie and to come up with the most appropriate conceptual solutions within the framework of this book.

The basic meaning of CoD – back to the roots

Over the last decade or so, scholars have produced a vast array of definitions of CoD, many of which attribute diverse meanings to the term.[4] Instead of examining individual definitions, I shall try to install some order to the bulk of the literature by starting with a model of different CoD meanings developed by Schedler (1998b). He identifies five different background concepts of CoD that exist in the literature, which can be separated by introducing four different types, or stages of a political regime: autocracy, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and advanced democracy. The first two meanings of CoD – preventing democratic breakdown and erosion, or 'sudden and slow death' (O'Donnell 1994) – are *negative* meanings of CoD for they highlight an event that should *not* happen. The next two meanings, in contrast, are *positive*, as they state that CoD consists in completing and deepening existing democracies. The fifth understanding of CoD may be labeled *self-referential*, as it neither claims further progress in a liberal democracy, nor underlines concerns over possible democratic breakdown. Instead, "liberal democracy serves as its point of both departure and arrival" (Schedler 1998b: 101). Which of these meanings are the most appropriate for my research, and why?

I hold that CoD is most fruitfully understood as the *expected persistence of liberal democracy*. I prefer to use the term *persistence* as proposed by Easton (Easton 1965: 84) rather than *stability*. Stability implies an overly static notion (Fuchs and Roller 1998: 38f.) and thus contradicts one of the unique capacities of

democratic systems, namely, to "change their norms and institutions consensually in the face of changing conditions." (Schmitter and Guilhot 2000: 139). The lexical change from stability to persistence resolves the putative paradox or oxymoron between constant change as the defining feature of democracy on the one hand, and the notion of non-change linked to stability on the other. Persistence explicitly allows for the kind of changes and adaptations of parts of a regime which are necessary to save the regime as a whole (Easton 1965). In addition to this, the word 'expected' introduces a forward-looking perspective, that is, CoD understood as a rational expectation of future conformity to the democratic rules by the most relevant political actors. Unlike Schedler (1998a), I suggest that it is the expectations of outside observers and not of actors within the political regime on which the degree of CoD is based. The forward looking perspective is an important issue that I discuss in greater detail when dealing with the systematized concept of CoD.

If one follows the development of the different meanings of CoD since its growing popularity in the second half of the 1980s, one can say that the negative notion of CoD represents the original meaning of the background concept. Back then, the major concern of those who developed the term was the question of whether recently born democracies had any chance of survival or whether, instead, they would slip back into some form of non-democracy. In addition to this, the negative meaning of CoD is the 'thinnest' (Coppedge 1999) one can attribute to the term. As time passed, more demanding – or 'thick' – meanings of CoD were developed. In my view, however, this expansion of the basic meaning of CoD beyond the 'expected persistence of a liberal democracy' has serious flaws. Most importantly, also the more demanding, thick definitions of CoD are primarily concerned with the persistence of democracy, i.e. the initial, thinner meaning. This might not be immediately obvious because thick definitions are implicitly based on a *causal* chain that runs from issues like 'good performance of a liberal democracy' or 'functioning of democracy' to the persistence of democracy, i.e. CoD. To me, this is a case of *etiological fallacy*. The meaning of CoD is defined by its plausible causes, such as the good performance of democracy.

Given the aim of this book to explain success and failure in CoD, there are good reasons for omitting everything that exceeds the minimal notion of the expected persistence of liberal democracy from the background concept of CoD. In doing so, I do not claim that the issues addressed by thicker background concepts of CoD are irrelevant – quite the contrary. Yet, these additional meanings are better captured with other concepts. One such candidate for this is the concept of Quality of Democracy, which is receiving growing interest, and which will most likely replace CoD as the main interest of scholars concerned with young (and even old) democracies in the next decades.[5] Nor do I agree that a focus on the minimal requirements for democracy in a political regime necessarily leads to the absurd effort of establishing the degree of CoD in non-democratic regimes (O'Donnell 1996). This obvious fallacy is easily avoided simply by checking whether the regime under study is a democracy or not. If the regime is a democracy, then its type and composition of formal and informal institutions is an interesting and

worthy topic of study. However, it is analytically different from the question of whether a democracy is more or less consolidated. In other words, the concept of CoD reflects the question of *if* democracy is likely to persist. In contrast, the question of *what kind of* democracy is likely to persist will be at the core of my subsequent *causal* analysis.

Having said this, the most convincing choice is to opt for a negative and thin background concept of CoD (see also Schedler 2001b; Munck 2001). A formal definition of CoD, expressing its meaning at the level of the background concept, then runs as follows: a liberal democracy is consolidated if it is expected that it will persist (static notion of CoD). And, the consolidation of a liberal democracy is the process by which the time horizon of its expected persistence is extended (dynamic notion of CoD).

Notice that "defining [CoD] in probabilistic terms is less eccentric or original than it may seem at first sight. Indeed, it fully concords with much of the literature on democratic consolidation." (Schedler 1997: 2).[6] Hence, including the notion of forward-looking expectations into the meaning of CoD brings the connotations of its common usage to the fore.[7] Once CoD is understood in terms of expected persistence of democracy, it is no longer a dichotomous phenomenon but a scale on which both endpoints are utopian (Schedler 1997: 4). "Neither the persistence nor the demise of a political regime can be a matter of absolute certainty." (Schedler 1998a: 9).[8] Democracies differ in the degree to which a breakdown can be expected, though. The analyses in subsequent chapters are devoted to measuring and eventually explaining these differences in CoD among neo-democracies.

The systematized concept of CoD – actors' behavior

At which realm of social reality should one look in order to find factual evidence of the level of CoD? This is the guiding question at the level of the systematized concept. The CoD literature provides at least four competing answers to this question. In the first, CoD is conceptualized in terms of the *rules* and the *institutional* setting in which the democratic regime is embedded; in the second in terms of the *attitudes* held by actors; in the third by the *behavior* of these actors; and in the fourth as different combinations of the previous three aspects.[9] In the following section, I explain why I opt for a concept of CoD understood in *behavioral* terms.

The vices of multi-dimensional concepts of CoD

One prominent way of conceptualizing CoD is through multi-level concepts. Influential authors such as Linz and Stepan (1996), Diamond (1999), and Merkel (1999) opt for combining institutions, attitudes, and behavior and thus come up with comprehensive and complex conceptual models of consolidated democracies in which (almost) every factor believed to foster democratic persistence is subsumed. While useful for descriptive purposes, there are reasons to argue that this type of CoD concept suffers from too much complexity and an inherent risk

of theoretical under-specification.[10] Multi-level models of CoD that combine behavioral, attitudinal, and institutional features have a strong tendency to assume that these aspects of social reality, by definition, belong together. This assumption of a 'bounded whole' (Collier and Adcock 1999) seems hazardous, as even in the most established democracies there is little empirical evidence of this. In addition, and apart from theoretical under-specification and empirical under-investigation, complex CoD models also cause analytical problems when used as dependent or independent variables in broader research agendas. This is because many of the possible and plausible causes and consequences are already present in the systematized concept of CoD. In addition, the further the concept of CoD is extended, the greater the danger that it will be confounded with other phenomena (Bollen 1990). Finally, on a more practical level, it is difficult to gather data on *all* dimensions, especially if a larger number of cases are to be compared.

Hence, it seems reasonable to claim that complex multi-level CoD concepts are more useful when applied to in-depth case studies, where data on all dimensions is available and their inter-relation can be analyzed in depth and over time. For comparative analyses based on more than a handful of cases, complex conceptual models of CoD are neither analytically desirable nor practically achievable. Thus, a decision must be made between the attitudinal, the behavioral, and the institutional conceptionalization of CoD.

Pitfalls of backward-looking concepts of CoD

In order to justify why in the context of my research the *behavioral approach* is the most appropriate way of conceptualizing CoD, it is important to explain why the word 'expected' is crucial to the basic definition of CoD.[11] The alternative to the 'forward-looking' conceptualization of CoD in terms of the expected persistence of a liberal democracy is that of the 'durability of democracy'. Systematized concepts specified as such inevitably lead to the realization that the extent of CoD can only be empirically assessed *ex post*. Such a 'backward-looking' conceptual notion of CoD in terms of the *post factum* assessment of democratic stability is not without problems. In the following, I list five of them.

First, and perhaps most importantly, conceptualizing CoD in backward-looking terms as the survival of democracy leads to an analytical trap. All democracies that survive for long enough are, by definition, consolidated, whilst all young democracies, again by definition, are not. From this follows that, by definition, it is impossible to find either young consolidated democracies or unconsolidated old democracies. No doubt, this clashes with common sense and scholarly insights. The deeper reasons behind this empirically questionable and analytically undesirable classification are that in the case of backward-looking systematized concepts of CoD, the indicators for CoD are identical to those for democracy, namely the non-compliance of actors with democratic rules and the resulting breakdown of democracy. Scholars favoring the approach of the survival of a democracy in backward-looking terms have yet to give a satisfactory answer to the question of how it is possible to analytically and empirically separate, on the one hand, whether

country A in year x is democratic and, on the other hand, whether the same country in the same year is a consolidated democracy.

Second, the notions of durability and stability unavoidably conceptualize CoD as an attribute of the entire political regime and, hence, may obscure important information on partial (de)consolidations – that is, changes below the regime level – that are theoretically insightful (Munck 1996; Munck 2000: 32ff.).

Third, the concept of CoD as a retrospective view on durability lends itself to dichotomous operationalization – a democracy is either fully consolidated or entirely unconsolidated.[12] Different degrees of CoD are, thus, difficult to capture.

Fourth, the forward-looking perspective also seems to be preferable if one looks at the genesis of the CoD concept. From the beginning, scholars have been concerned about the viability of recently emerged democracies and their future – not about their past.

Fifth, backward-looking concepts of CoD focus on the moment of the breakdown of democracy. As Lieberson (1998, see also Kitschelt 2003) cogently shows, in the social sciences at large, point events are hard to deal with, because they are highly determined by contingent, and sometimes erratic, events. Admittedly, this is less of a problem in large-N studies in which the probabilities of breakdown are estimated and contingent factors can often be assumed to be randomly distributed. Nor is it necessarily a problem in small-N analyses where the peculiar and contingent events leading to democratic breakdown can be unraveled and made part of the causal narrative. In a medium-N comparative study such as the one in this book, however, predicting point events is inappropriate. Instead, it is more adequate to perceive of CoD as a trend in certain features of a democratic regime, rather than as a one-off incident. For all the above reasons the word 'expected' is crucial: by introducing a forward-looking perspective, several pitfalls of the backward-looking conceptualization of CoD mentioned previously can be avoided.

Expected persistence and actors' behavior

Opting for a forward-looking systematized concept of CoD does, however, have implications. Most importantly, it makes the concept different from the majority of those used in the social sciences, because it does not refer to anything "out there before or beyond mental and linguistic apprehensions" (Sartori 1984: 24). CoD defined in terms of expected persistence is nothing "we can see and touch, here and now. … Regime consolidation, thus, is not a thing, but an argument, not an object, but an inference." (Schedler 2001b: 67). This is why any judgment of how far a democracy is consolidated must rest on two, rather than one, bases: first, the factual evidence, and second, a descriptive relation (Adcock and Collier 2001), inferring the presence of the unobservable background concept from the observable evidence.

I argue that actors' behavior provides the most plausible evidence for whether democracy is likely to persist. Again, I follow Schedler (2001b) who clarifies the point incisively, stating that there is a causal chain running from the *institutional* context as the most distant factor of CoD to actors' *attitudes*, and from there to actors' *behavior*, which ultimately impacts on expected persistence, that is, the level of CoD.

Institutions ⟶ Attitudes ⟶ Behavior ⟶ Expected Persistence = CoD

Figure 2.1 Causal chain of social dimensions leading to CoD

Notes: Adopted from Schedler (2001b), see also Dahl (1971: 124).

In other words, the degree of persistence of democracy (and also its ultimate breakdown) depends on the behavior of human beings: "Democracy is neither a divine gift nor a side effect of societal factors; it is the work of political actors. … democracy comes to town, and settles down as 'the only game in town,' only if (and as long as) actors decide to play by its basic rules." (Schedler 2001b: 69f.).[13] Or, as Lipset puts it: "Whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend significantly on the choices, behavior, and decisions of political leaders and groups." (1993: 18). This does not imply that structures, institutions, and attitudes are irrelevant. These may well have an important impact on actors' behavior, but it is the latter that ultimately *indicates* the degree of CoD.

The notion of consensus

Through their behavior, actors express their consensus or lack thereof on the existing democratic rules. Dankwart Rustow, often seen as the founding father of modern theories of democratization, in his seminal article (1970) attributes high importance to consensus for understanding CoD, claiming that while democracy arises through conflict and compromise, it survives by virtue of growing consensus. Consensus can be seen as either a normatively or an instrumentally based commitment to democracy (Schedler 2001b: 76f.). In the first case, actors agree on democracy because they believe it holds some intrinsic value. In the latter case, consensus over democracy results from the perception of each collective actor that on their own they lack sufficient power to change the rules to their favor (Schedler 2001a: 5f.). In my concept of CoD, I perceive consensus in its instrumental version, which can also be labeled as a 'negative' consensus. Thus, I assume that if actors follow the democratic rules of the game, they do so not necessarily because they like these rules, which would correspond to a 'positive' consensus, but rather because they do not see any chance to, or advantage in, changing them. This assumption is widespread in the literature.[14] Linz and Stepan, for instance, state that "democracy is less a normative utopia than an agreement about arrangements for regulating conflict." (Linz and Stepan 1996: 174). Bernard Crich also states that "the moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself" (Crich, quoted in Rustow 1970: 363). A crucial implication of this instrumental perception of negative consensus is that the relevant actors must display this in empirically observable behavior and/or official statements, not simply assert it in in-depth interviews or mass surveys as

would be required for the normative version of consensus. Instrumental consensus can be empirically observed through actors' behavior. From consensus, in turn, the degree of CoD can be inferred.

Despite its focus on empirically observable behavior of politically relevant actors, my concept is embedded in institutional theory because actors are required to perpetuate through their behavior those formal and informal institutions that are at the core of any democratic regime. Hence, democracy is consolidated "whenever the enforcers of democratic institutions themselves can be counted on with very high probability to behave in ways compatible with, and oriented toward, the perpetuation of formal institutional rules." (Hanson 2001: 141). From a rational choice perspective, as regards institutions, political actors are considered self-interested in their goal of accumulating political power. Furthermore, in situations of uncertainty over the degree of power of other players, actors tend to follow risk-averse strategies and opt for institutional configurations that disperse power (Colomer 2001: 210). A period of transition away from autocracy typically represents one such situation. Thus, once a configuration of democratic institutions is found in which none of the relevant actors expects to always be on the losing side, actors should agree on this set of rules. Such a situation of converging interests can be called a democratic 'equilibrium' (Schedler 2001b: 77). Apart from democratic equilibrium, other 'logics' can potentially help to foster consensus among actors and, thus, to consolidate democracy. For instance, over time (democratic) rules become self-enforcing and a regime consolidates because the act of following these rules becomes 'appropriate' behavior (March and Olsen 1989). Another element in the consolidation of regimes is the enforcement of compliance from the top levels of a hierarchy of power through means such as persuasion or coercion. In principle, these three different logics (equilibrium, appropriateness, and power hierarchy) as to why actors comply with specific democratic rules of the game do not contradict one another.

Drawing together the debate on the systematized concept of CoD, the argument is that for the purpose of my research, actors' behavior holds the most proximate descriptive relation to expected persistence (CoD) and, thus, forms the core of the systematized concept of CoD. Any subsequent attempt to identifying indicators of CoD should therefore make reference to the behavioral dimension of social reality. My concept of CoD in behavioral terms[15] is not limited to any one single group of actors. Instead, in different areas of the political system, the behavior, or, rather, the interaction between different 'politically relevant' groups of actors is important for CoD.[16]

Causes of CoD – a first sketch

In my causal framework for successful CoD, the concept of democratic equilibrium already mentioned plays an important role. Why? The aim of this book is to analyze the conditions under which democracies consolidate. Rephrasing the question in terms of CoD understood in behavioral terms, I ask under which circumstances actors follow the basic democratic rules. The notion of a democratic

equilibrium holds that actors agree on a democratic set of rules, follow them in their behavior, and thus consolidate them if the specific set of democratic rules distributes power in a way that is acceptable to all relevant actors. It follows that the configuration of rules, that is, the type of democracy that is acceptable to the relevant actors, depends on the characteristics of the society, its historical experiences, social cleavages, and level of economic development. This is because societal features define who the relevant actors are (different ethnic groups, social classes, etc.), how intensive the differences between diverging interests are, and what kind of cognitive and practical resources for reaching a consensus are available to actors. Put more succinctly, certain characteristics of the societal environment in which a democratic political regime is embedded render certain configurations of democratic rules more likely to become consolidated than others. In this sense, March and Olsen are right when they state that "politics mirrors the context" (March and Olsen 1989: 3). However, configurations of political institutions hardly ever perfectly mirror the context, especially not in the case of young democracies. Transitions from autocracy are highly contingent processes with actors being forced to make long-term institutional choices on the basis of highly incomplete information and under enormous time pressure. Nevertheless, the degree to which institutions fit to context – as I claim – is decisive for whether democracies consolidate. If an inadequate configuration of rules is chosen during a transition, democracy will not consolidate and autocracy or another re-designed type of democracy emerges.[17]

There is a vast literature on societal, historical, and structural features, on the one hand, and political-institutional characteristics, on the other, and how they foster democracy (see Chapter 4). From the previous discussion it is clear that the key to understanding the effects of these variables lies in their combination. Contextual, remote factors like socioeconomic development or ethnic composition alone do not have an impact on CoD – they must be mediated through features within the political system such as political institutions. At the same time, institutional configurations – as proximate factors – such as presidentialism combined with a multi-party system or parliamentarism combined with a two-party system, foster or hinder CoD depending on the non-institutional setting in which they are embedded. In some societal contexts they work, in others they do not. I argue that one of the shortcomings in the comparative literature on CoD is the lack of studies that analyze the effect of institutional configurations on CoD within non-institutional contexts. Often, too much emphasis is put on single political institutions, as if these institutions alone, regardless of the context in which they are embedded, can produce CoD. Many hypotheses and empirical tests on the effect of remote factors such as levels of development, colonial legacy, historical experiences with democracy etc., and of proximate factors like form of government, type of party system etc., exist. But they are too often kept separate, both theoretically and empirically. This book tries to fill this gap by offering a theoretical framework that combines societal and institutional characteristics and puts them to an empirical test to discover which produce the presence and which the absence of CoD.

Indicators of CoD – the Democratization Data Set

The Democratization Data Set (Schneider and Schmitter 2004a and 2004b) measures CoD over three decades and in different world regions.[18] Table 2.1 displays the twelve indicators of CoD. All items make reference to the behavior of politically relevant actors.[19] The majority of indicators have already been used in the CoD literature, such as the turn-over tests, the holding of free and fair elections, or the acceptance of the existing constitution. What is new to this data set is that all of these items are consistently measured over time and many countries from different world regions. In addition, some indicators are new, especially items C9–C12 which make reference to the existence of different partial regimes (Schmitter 1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999).[20] Inevitably, the list of items has an 'electoral' bias. This means that it is presumed that if elections of uncertain outcome are held fairly and regularly between competing parties, then social and other conflicts will be channeled through that particular form of representation. Elected officials will be able to act legitimately in resolving those conflicts and citizens can hold these persons and parties accountable by voting for their opponents. However, items C6, C9, C10, C11 and C12 all refer to other mechanisms of representation that citizens can potentially use to hold their rulers accountable. Hence, the CoD measure presented here may have an electoral bias but unlike most other approaches to CoD, it goes well beyond a purely electoral focus. The set of items as a whole represents a CoD measurement that is neither too demanding nor too easy to achieve and thus circumvents the problem held by many operationalizations which tend towards the 'all or nothing', that is, they either identify almost all

Table 2.1 Indicators of CoD

C1	No significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution
C2	Regular elections are held and their outcomes are respected by those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties
C3	The elections have been free and fair
C4	No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral conditions
C5	Electoral volatility has diminished significantly
C6	Elected officials and representatives are not constrained in their behavior by non-elected veto groups within the country
C7	A first rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has occurred within the scope of the rules already established
C8	A second rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has occurred within the scope of the rules already established
	Agreement, formal and informal, has been reached on the rules governing the:
C9	formation of associations and their behavior
C10	executive format
C11	territorial division of competence
C12	rules of ownership and access to mass media

democracies as consolidated or the reverse. CoD, thus, can be operationalized such that is not just another way of expressing that some neo-democracies fall short of Western standards, or as a term for all good things that should go together and that are supposedly present in mature Western democracies.

In sum, throughout this study, democracy is perceived as a type of political regime that is defined in processual terms as a liberal democracy. For CoD I employ a forward-looking concept and define it as a democracy that is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. I argue that, in order to assess the degree of CoD, one must look at the observable behavior of relevant actors and whether they agree on the existing democratic rules of the game. The indicators for CoD are drawn from the Democratization Data Set. This data is grounded in the 'classical' theory of democratization as most prominently expressed in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead's book (1986). In the following chapter, I use the data to generate descriptive empirical findings that cast doubt on some of the assumptions made in the classical democratization literature.

3   The consolidation of democracy across time and space

The notion of waves of democracy (Huntington 1991) presupposes that each wave of democratization is followed by a withdrawal from democracy. What can vary between one cycle of democratization and another is the relative size of the democratization and de-democratization waves. In fact, Huntington speaks of a pattern of two steps forward, one step back, implying a 'rising tide' (Rowen 1995) of democracy. The concept of CoD addresses the issue of how many of the young democracies can be expected to persist. Before investigating the core question of this book, *why* some democracies are more consolidated than others, it is important to deal with this *how* question, i.e. to describe processes of CoD in countries from different world regions over time. The Democratization Data Set provides a rich source of information on the complex political transition processes that have been taking place in numerous countries in different world regions since 1974.

One of the most common shared conceptualizations of these developments sees them split into three periods within the larger process of regime change: the liberalization of autocracy (LoA); democratization, or modes of transition (MoT) away from autocracy; and the consolidation of democracy (CoD). This is the classical analytical distinction first suggested by O'Donnell, *et al.* (1986). Given that most of the scholars working in the field of democratization either explicitly or implicitly follow this analytical scheme (Suny 2002), it is surprising that, so far, no cross-regional data set exists that measures all three concepts in a rigorous, comparative, and encompassing way. As a consequence of this, many of the disagreements about the interplay between LoA, MoT, and CoD stem from a lack of adequate data to test the various theoretical claims. With the Democratization Data Set, this problem can be overcome.

Large parts of the current democratization literature rest on two important beliefs that relate to the interplay between the processes of LoA and CoD. One is that liberalization occurs prior to democratization and consolidation. The other is that autocratic elites often miscalculate the risk of losing power when making initial moves to liberalize, overestimating their capability of keeping control over the political events following controlled liberalization. This chapter provides empirical evidence from different world regions that some important cases do not follow these scripts and thus partly challenge core assumptions of the classical democratization literature.

In order to investigate the link between LoA and CoD, aggregated scores for countries are produced. In general, aggregating scores of different indicators of the same concept into a 'bounded whole' risks committing the 'reification error' (Collier and Adcock 1999: 544), that is, "to assume blindly that all the components are unidimensional and barrel on, adding or averaging these apples and oranges." (Coppedge 2002a: 37). It is therefore important to test the dimensionality of the data. Doing so, I find strong evidence that the data on LoA and CoD, respectively, have one-dimensional structures (see Appendix C). This, in itself, is a remarkable finding. Despite the fact that the indicators cover very different aspects of political reality, they still all measure the same dimensions called LoA and CoD, respectively.[1] The finding of a one-dimensional structure allows aggregating the scores obtained by any single country not only for a single year but also over time. Both ways of aggregating the data open the possibility for various comparisons of countries and regions in terms of their degree of LoA and CoD.

Challenging facts: revisiting the transition paradigm

The main focus of this book is the phenomenon of CoD. It makes sense, though, to also include some descriptive analyses of the data on LoA. LoA and CoD may well be conceptually separable, but empirically they often overlap in time and content. Hence, knowing more about the process of LoA in a country provides useful information for analyzing its process of CoD. In addition to this, a more detailed description of the LoA data is justified by the fact that the Democratization Data is the only data set that I am aware of that explicitly measures these two concepts over time and from a cross-regional perspective. Presenting this data thus contributes evidence to a field in which cross-regional empirical information is usually scarce.

LoA captures "the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 7). The indicators used in the Democratization Data Set project to measure LoA are shown in Table 3.1.[2] In the context of the transition literature, the concept of LoA most commonly refers to bold political liberalization. Thus, progressive rights that are high on the agenda in more advanced democracies, such as, for instance, freedom of access to public documents, of sexual expression, or the right to vote for legally resident foreign nationals, are not included in the list of LoA indicators.[3] Furthermore, LoA does not include the right of citizens to hold their representatives accountable. These are the issues that are at stake during the democratization period, narrowly defined, and CoD. This means nothing else but that, in principle, political regimes can liberalize without democratizing.

Not all processes of LoA inevitably lead to democracy. Autocracies that start to liberalize can retract the rights conceded and convert back into another type of autocracy, an issue I address below. Or political regimes can get stuck in the conceptual limbo between democracy and autocracy, for which social scientists are not getting tired of inventing ever more new labels (Collier and

Table 3.1 The seven LoA items

L1	Significant public concessions at the level of human rights
L2	No or almost no political prisoners
L3	Increased tolerance for dissidence/public opposition
L4	More than one legally recognized independent political party
L5	At least one recognized opposition party in parliament or constituent assembly
L6	Trade unions or professional associations not controlled by state agencies or government parties
L7	Independent press and access to alternative means of information tolerated by government

Levitzky 1997). In fact, the rise of mixed regime types like 'liberal autocracies' (Zakaria 1997, Brumberg 2002) 'competitive authoritarianism' (Levitzky and Way 2002), or 'electoral authoritarianism' (Schedler 2006) has led to a major debate over the usefulness of the predominant transition paradigm (Carothers 2002a, 2002b, Hyman 2002, Nodia 2002, O'Donnell 2002, and Wollack 2002). Most of the evidence provided in the general debate is based either on in-depth, but somewhat eclectic case knowledge, or inconsistent use of large-N measures.[4] In order to get a wider picture of certain aspects of the relation between liberalization and democratization, several cases from the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) are included in the analysis of LoA processes. This serves the purpose of illustrating the pattern of LoA in countries which have not (yet) established a democratic political regime.

Disaggregating the LoA process

One of the assumptions in classical democratization literature is that LoA precedes CoD in time. Hence, by the time democracy comes in place, the LoA process should have been completed and subsequently be locked in at a high level throughout the democratic period. With the data at hand we can trace all seven individual aspects of LoA over time and not only identify which of them are particularly difficult to achieve and/or maintain in different world regions,[5] but also display region-specific tempos and sequences of the LoA process.

   Figure 3.1 and the following figures display for each item the average across countries within the same world region. As Figure 3.1 shows, in Southern Europe (SE), some progress on all LoA items had already been achieved in 1974. This indicates that each of the seven LoA indicators was accomplished by at least one of the three SE cases (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) in the first year of what has become labeled as the third wave of democratization.[6] Most of the LoA traits are fully achieved during the 1970s. Only item L6 (independent trade unions) comes in the early 1980s, along with, somewhat surprisingly, L1 (public concessions on human rights) in the mid-1980s, with L7 (independent press) fully achieved a little later. In Greece, for instance, government interference in trade union affairs continued until the enactment of the union reform bill in 1982 (item L6), which

Figure 3.1 LoA items in Southern Europe

also put an end to the unions' financial dependence on the government. From 1990 onwards, however, all three SE cases consistently achieve all seven of the LoA traits. Hence, in *grosso modo*, the SE countries follow the pattern 'first LoA, then democratization' as assumed by the classical democratization literature.

In South America (SA), the tempo and sequences of the achievement of LoA items differs from that of SE. L1 (concessions on the issue of human rights) is the last item achieved by at least one of the cases and, subsequently, develops slowly. If we look at the autocratic regime type that preceded the current democratic experience in SA – military dictatorships well known for their blatant violations of human rights – this finding is plausible.

In addition, the fact that item L1 has not yet been fulfilled by all of the current SA neo-democracies is a reflection of the legacies of the (pacted) transitions, the concessions made to the outgoing military rulers (e.g. Chile), and the increasing amount of human rights violations committed (most obviously in Peru under Fujimori) or tolerated (e.g. the death squads in Brazil) by democratic governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In short, the fact that not all LoA items are fully achieved, and that there has even been retrocession on some of the items, can be interpreted as (weak) evidence of the rise of illiberal trends in some neo-democracies (Zakaria 1997 and Plattner 1998; see also Karatnycky 1999 for counter-evidence). Such a finding concerning illiberal tendencies within democratic systems may be normatively repugnant, and analytically troublesome. It does not necessarily contradict, however, the assumptions made in the classical democratization literature about the destabilizing effects of liberalization for autocratic regimes.

As seen in Figure 3.3, the three cases from Central America (Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua) show a pattern of LoA item development similar to the SA region. Again, item L1 (human rights concessions) takes longest to be achieved by at least one country, coming about long after the general LoA process in other areas has begun. It then develops only slowly, and there is even a backslide in the mid-

Figure 3.2 LoA items in South America

Figure 3.3 LoA items in Central America

1990s. This is also the case for item L7 (independent press) which develops only slowly and incompletely. Inspection of the disaggregated country scores[7] reveals that Guatemala falls short of fulfilling this LoA feature for the entire period of measurement. By and large, however, there is a steady movement upwards towards more political liberalization and by the time democracy is in place all three CA countries have made substantial improvements on the LoA items.

In terms of the LoA process, the cases in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are the most different from the other regions studied here. The CEE countries liberalize fully and consistently within a time-span of a few years whilst most of the countries from other regions took a decade or even longer to do so. Most of the LoA items displayed in Figure 3.4 show an upward trend from the second half of the 1980s onwards and reach the maximum score in the early 1990s. Only item L6

(independent trade unions) displays some weak movement as far back as the 1970s.[8] One could then argue that the CEE cases conform to the expectations derived from the transition paradigm because a full-blown process of LoA occurred shortly prior to the democratization of their political regimes, thus providing evidence for the democratization triggering effect of liberalization measures. On the other hand, it is an open question whether this rapid process of LoA should be seen in all cases as the trigger for subsequent political openings or whether, in contrast, the advent of democracy was seen as inevitable and, thus, the previous liberalization was more an anticipated consequence than a cause for democratization. Furthermore, the patterns found in CEE do not contradict the transition paradigm considering that the latter also allows for simultaneous processes of liberalization and democratization. These are 'transitions by collapse' and some of the CEE cases are likely candidates for being classified as such.

If we consider the period from 1986 to 1991, the former Soviet Republics (FSR) resemble the cases from CEE in terms of LoA. In contrast to the latter, however, the liberalization process in the FSR does not subsequently lock in at a high level. In contrast, from the early 1990s onwards, most of the LoA items deteriorate. Items L3 (increased tolerance for public opposition), L7 (independent press), and even L2 (no political prisoners) are issues that find their way back on to the political agenda in countries such as Belarus, Georgia, Russia, or Ukraine. The Democratization Data Set stops in the year 2000 and, thus, is unable to register possible improvements in some LoA items in some FSR. Nevertheless, despite the recent revolutions of different colors and flowers, the overall picture of LoA in FSR is problematic and the data at hand gives a clear indication of that.

As mentioned above, downward trends in regions such as the FSR and Central America are most likely an indication of the rise of illiberal democracies. The fact that such trends can be detected even with the rather crude measurement device of the LoA items, which are designed to measure the degree of liberalization of *autocracies,* seems to speak for the severity of these trends in some of the neo-democracies: they are not even able to accomplish some of the more perfunctory LoA criteria, let alone more advanced liberal rights.

The remaining region to be discussed is the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA). Apart from the items L5 (recognized opposition party) and L6 (independent trade unions), none of the other LoA traits display a consistent upward trend in this region. A peak is achieved on several LoA items (apart from the aforementioned items L5 and L6) around the late 1980s. This coincides with the beginning of the LoA processes in the former Communist world. It is an open question whether the autocratic rulers in the MENA region responded to this wind of change by cautiously liberalizing their political systems or whether the LoA developments in CEE, FSR, and MENA, respectively, were completely unrelated. The latter argument could find support in the observation that, apparently, some countries in the MENA region had already started a careful liberalization on all seven LoA traits in the early 1980s – i.e. long before most countries of the former Communist block. Again, area specialists could help to find out more about whether these early liberalization movements in countries bordering the Mediterranean

Figure 3.4 LoA items in Central and Eastern Europe

Figure 3.5 LoA items in former Soviet Republics

Figure 3.6 LoA items in Middle East and Northern Africa

Sea could be interpreted as responses to the political regime changes in Portugal, Spain, and Greece, or whether these are regime-specific developments unaffected by cross-regional diffusion.

In sum, different regions display somewhat different sequences, rhythms, timings, and tempos in their LoA processes. Those regions that *ex post* have been declared successful in transiting from autocracy to democracy – first and foremost the countries in SE and CEE – indeed eventually get locked in at a high level of all LoA components, whereas the more problematic regions – especially the FSR – show declining trends in LoA. In this respect, the Democratization Data provides the comparable evidence of what has become a widespread impression among transitologists. There are some region-specific patterns as to which components of LoA are achieved more quickly than others. Much of these differences seem to be determined by the prior autocratic regime type.

'Illiberal democratizers'

In order to get a better understanding of the role of liberalization within the broader process of regime change and in order to assess some further assumptions in the democratization literature, it is necessary to shift perspective from LoA *items* to *countries*. Based on the democratization literature, we would expect those regimes that moved consistently upwards on the LoA index to enter into a regime transition and to hold founding elections within about a year – presumably driven to do so by an ensuing mobilization of civil society (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In other words, the expectation is that that by the time the transition ends by holding founding elections, a country will have achieved all LoA items. This proposition can be subjected to an empirical test by displaying each country's degree of LoA in the year of its founding elections. This provides rough evidence on whether or not liberalization always comes prior to democratization and if not, in which cases the pattern was different.

Figure 3.7 displays the level of political liberalization at the birth of democracy as indicated in brackets.[9] Only a minority of political regimes (6 out of 27 cases is fully liberalized by the time they enter the democratic period. Even when interpreting a LoA score higher than five as an indication for a reasonably well liberalized democratic system, only 17 of the 27 cases pass this threshold, leaving behind some successful democratic consolidators such as Uruguay or Chile. The case of Turkey presents the most obvious violation of the widely shared assumption among transitologists that liberalization precedes and perhaps even triggers democratization. Turkey entered its (semi-)democratic period in 1983 with virtually no prior movements towards liberalization. At the same time, more problematic cases in terms of democratization and CoD, such as Nicaragua, Russia, and Belarus, started their democratic periods with relatively high LoA scores. As especially the latter two cases demonstrate, this supposedly ideal start into a democratic period does not prevent subsequent backsliding. Within less than a decade, democratically elected leaders in these countries re-established anti-liberal practices not much different from those of their autocratic predecessors.

Figure 3.7 LoA score in year of founding elections

Contrary to widely held beliefs, it seems difficult to find any systematic relationship between prior achievements in LoA and the chances for CoD. Even if a more refined perspective on the link between LoA and CoD may reveal more complex connections between these two core democratization concepts, some serious doubts are cast on the claim that democratization is triggered by substantial prior liberalization because there are numerous – and important – cases of *illiberal democratizers*. These are countries that start democracy while still not having accomplished a minimum set of political liberalization. What is more, whether or not democracy consolidates seems to be only loosely related to the level of LoA at its birth.

'Liberalizing autocrats'

Another way of looking at the role of liberalization within the process of regime change and its assumed trigger effect on democracy is to display each country's process of LoA over time. Based on the insights from the classical democratization literature, we expect regimes to consistently progress along the LoA index, reaching the maximum roughly around the year in which the founding elections are held. We should not anticipate that autocratic regimes would be able to sustain political liberalization over extensive time periods, simply because such liberalization is supposed to constitute a slippery slope for autocrats towards more democratic regime forms. In order to investigate this expectation, the processes of liberalization in non-democracies are displayed. Do moves towards greater political liberties invariably spell the end for autocrats and the eventual breakdown of autocracy? Does the liberalization of autocracy unavoidably lead to autocratic breakdown?

Figure 3.8 displays the development of SE countries on the LoA index from 1974 to 2000. Spain and especially Portugal quickly reach the top of the LoA scale. Greece also shows steady progress and achieves the full LoA score of 7 in 1989.[10] The fact that Spain, Greece, and Portugal display the LoA pattern expected by the transition paradigm is not too surprising since these countries served as the

main empirical references for those who developed this democratization theory (O'Donnell, *et al.* 1986).

The countries in SA display a more heterogeneous picture than both SE and CEE (see Figure 3.11) with regard to LoA development. Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile do resemble the cases from CEE and SE in that they quickly achieve and retain high LoA scores.[11] However, unlike in CEE and SE, the successful liberalizers in SA progress along the LoA index in different time periods. By the time Argentina and Uruguay accomplished all LoA items, Chile had not even started the process, still being under the firm control of the Pinochet regime. There is, thus, less regional homogeneity in SA as far as the timing and tempo of LoA is concerned. A second type of LoA development in SA is represented by Brazil. This case is characterized by a steady but slow progress towards the higher end of the LoA scale – which was eventually reached in 1988 – despite the fact that in 1974 Brazil started from the

Figure 3.8 Development of LoA in Southern Europe, 1974–2000

Figure 3.9 Development of LoA in South America, 1974–2000

Figure 3.10 Development of LoA in Central America, 1974–2000

highest LoA level of all SA cases. Hence, Brazil is a puzzling case to the extent that its history of LoA would suggest a transition towards democracy much earlier than actually occurred. Put differently, the question is how the Brazilian autocratic rulers managed to keep control over the process of political opening for almost two decades and to persist as a 'dictablanda' (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). A third pattern of LoA processes is represented by Bolivia, which liberalized quickly in the early 1980s, but, unlike Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, never achieved an LoA score higher than 5.5. Most importantly, Bolivia falls short of fulfilling items L1 (human rights), L2 (political prisoners), and L3 (increased tolerance for public opposition) – mainly due to the continuing struggles between the central government and the guerrilla *Ejército Guerrillero Túpaj Katari* and *Comisión Néstor Paz Zamora* throughout the 1990s.

The most deviant case in SA, however, is Peru. This country already showed a steady but slow progression of LoA in the 1970s, but was then unable to move beyond a medium LoA score, even after a democratic system was put in place in 1980. What is more, unlike Bolivia, Peru did not remain stable at this medium LoA level but displayed a serious backslide when President Fujimori came into power. During the campaign against the *Sendero Luminoso* and other armed guerrilla groups, Peru failed to accomplish the majority of LoA items. Since then, Peru has only slowly been able to recover from this experience and by the end of the 1990s still ranked well below all other SA cases. Hence, throughout the 1990s, Peru can be considered as one of the most blatant examples of illiberal tendencies within democratic regimes. Notice, however, that this does not stand in direct contradiction to the assumptions of the classical democratization literature which addresses the effect of LoA *within autocracies*. In a nutshell, while the aforementioned case of Turkey as an *illiberal democratizer* contradicts the transition paradigm, Peru's illiberalizing democracy does not because, strictly speaking, such processes do not fall within the scope of this theory. In fact, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) already took notice of the possible emergence of what they coined 'democraduras',

Figure 3.11 Development of LoA in Central and Eastern Europe, 1974–2000

Figure 3.12 Development of LoA in former Soviet Republics, 1974–2000

Figure 3.13 Development of LoA in Middle East and Northern Africa, 1974–2000

i.e. political regimes in which the basic forms of democracy exist (especially elections) but in which citizens' liberal rights are constrained.

The LoA processes of countries in CA are characterized by their gradual improvement over many years. By the year 2000, both Nicaragua and Mexico were fully liberalized, although it took Mexico 25 years to reach this point. In the mid-1990s there was a short period of LoA backslide in Mexico. This appears to reflect the Chiapas conflict with the *Ejército Zapatista*, which lead to a loss of full achievement on items L1 (human rights) and L2 (political prisoners). As in the case of Brazil, the puzzle is how the Mexican autocratic rulers managed to keep control over such a slow process of liberalization when this proved impossible in the majority of other cases. Guatemala, in turn, had not achieved full liberalization by the year 2000, displaying a dismal performance on the protection of human rights (L1).

As regards the CEE countries, few surprises emerge. Hungary and Slovenia had already begun the process of political liberalization before 1980 and advanced in an orderly fashion until the beginning of the 1990s when both received a full score of 7, which they have subsequently sustained. Poland also started to liberalize well before Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. Yet it is the only case in CEE showing some regression in terms of LoA when in 1981 a military coup reversed two of its previous liberal accomplishments: some degree of tolerance for dissidents (L3) and independent trade unions (L6). The Czech Republic and Slovakia (then, Czechoslovakia) started its liberalization in 1987, shortly before the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. Bulgaria and Romania come in last with little or no evidence of liberalization prior to this dramatic moment. In both cases, however, once the process started, there were no signs of slipping back and they quickly attained and maintained a full LoA score. By the end of the period, all of the CEE countries had converged at the highest possible score.[12] By and large, all CEE countries seem to conform to the expectations derived from classical democratization theory.

As already seen in the development of single LoA items over time (see Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5), in the few years before and after the fall of the Berlin wall, CEE and the FSR looked very similar as far as LoA development is concerned. As time passed, however, the differences between these two country groups become obvious. The first case to deviate from the general upward trend was Belarus (from 1996 onwards). Russia showed a decline in 2000, and the Ukraine proved unable to retain its perfect LoA score which it attained between 1992 and 1994. In general, by 2000, none of the FSR had achieved full LoA. The exception to this is Mongolia, which, strictly speaking, is not a former Soviet Republic and is added to this country group for reasons of simplifying the presentation of the data. As with Peru, the decline of political liberties in the FSR is normatively repugnant but not directly relevant to the question of whether LoA triggers democracy because the loss in LoA occurs within a democracy, not an autocracy. Why and how such illiberal democracies emerge and what their future will be is a relevant and highly interesting question, but is different from the question to be answered here, that is, what role LoA plays in the democratization rather than the de-democratization process.

The true challenge to the standard transition paradigm comes when looking at the MENA countries in Figure 3.13. Compared with the other MENA countries, Morocco performs relatively well, beginning its LoA period with three points, having had more than one legally recognized party (L4), at least one opposition party in parliament (L5), a few trade unions not controlled by the state (L6) and a semi-independent press (L7). In 1986, it improved its score to a modest, but non-negligible, level of 4.5 which it sustained until 1999. Egypt also acquired some LoA traits as early as the 1980s. However, this score was reached from a background of great fluctuation throughout the period under consideration. Egypt ends scoring with a total of only 3 (it began with 2.5) which places it toward the bottom of the pack. Predictably, Algeria is at the bottom of the aggregate ranking, although it did experience a brief spurt of liberalization in 1989–90, when its score of 5 was the highest attained by any of the MENA countries. Following the unification of its Northern and Southern parts, Yemen started with a relatively high LoA score. Subsequently, however, this score dropped consistently and in 1999 the country reached only 2 points on the LoA index. By the end of the 1990s, none of the MENA cases were even close to a perfect score of 7, and evidence of steady progress towards this was observable in only one country: Morocco.

The patterns of LoA development in most of the MENA countries stand in sharp contrast not only to the majority of cases from other world regions, but also to expectations based on the transition paradigm, which interprets initial moves towards greater liberty as a kiss of death for autocratic rulers. In the majority of third wave cases, autocratic incumbents may well have started the LoA process with the intention of keeping demands for more freedom under control, and possibly with the intention of retracting rights conceded at a later point. However, these tactics then proved a dismal failure with autocratic rulers losing control over events much more radically and rapidly than expected both by observers and by themselves. But this is not so in MENA, a region full of examples of periodically *liberalizing autocracies*. Here, autocratic rulers seem to have the capacity to retain control over political processes even after making some initial moves in terms of liberalization. This seems to be true even for the only MENA case in which democracy has been installed: Turkey.[13]

In sum, the evidence provided here both supports and questions the role of liberalization within the broader process of democratization as hypothesized by the transition paradigm. While the majority of cases liberalize prior to the advent of democracy, there are two different types of deviation from this pattern. There are *illiberal democratizers*, most prominently Turkey, and *liberalizing autocracies*, mainly in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Both types of cases should not exist if the classical transition paradigm provided a perfect representation of regime changes in the last decades of the twentieth century.

The tempo of CoD in different world regions

Turning from LoA to CoD processes, Figures 3.14–3.18 represent each country's development patterns in terms of degree of CoD displayed over time. Each line

displays the annual sum total for the twelve CoD items for each country and year since 1974.[14] By grouping countries into world regions, some interesting geographic variations in the timing and tempo of CoD are revealed (see also Schneider and Schmitter 2004: 81–4).

In SE, Greece accomplished some initial CoD as early as 1974. However, it took Greece more than 20 years to reach the maximum CoD score of twelve (in 1996) and it then only sustained this score for one year.[15] Spain has never reached the maximum score, although, since the mid-1980s, has consistently come close to it, always achieving a score higher than 10. The main reason why Spain does not fulfill all the CoD criteria is the fact that it fails to accomplish a full score on items C1, C5, and C11. That is to say, there are significant political parties that advocate major constitutional changes, electoral volatility has risen since the national elections of 1996, and consensus on the territorial division of competencies has been difficult to sustain. Portugal, in contrast, achieved the maximum CoD score of twelve by the mid-1990s, i.e. it took the country two decades to arrive at the endpoint of the CoD scale. In general, all three SE countries show similar patterns in their aggregated CoD scores. After almost two decades they have all reached a high level on the CoD index.

In SA, the picture is much more heterogeneous. The clearest case of success in terms of CoD is Uruguay, displaying constant improvement, and eventually becoming locked in at a very high CoD level from the early 1990s onwards. Brazil also achieves high CoD scores from this point onwards, but has developed much slower than Uruguay and other cases in the region. Argentina is a third successful case of CoD, which developed quickly in the 1980s, but then stagnated throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Only in the wake of the Menem presidency did Argentina show some backslide but then slowly continued its progress towards greater CoD, and in 2000 almost achieved the same level as Uruguay and Brazil.[16] Bolivia and Peru, in contrast, are more problematic cases – especially Peru as it shows some fluctuation on a generally modest level of CoD. Bolivia seems to be

Figure 3.14 Development of CoD in Southern Europe, 1974–2000

pegged at a somewhat higher level, but without showing any clear trend towards further improvement.

A case which deserves special attention is Chile. After the referendum lost by Pinochet in 1988, Chile quickly travelled up the CoD scale, reaching the same score as Bolivia after only five years. In the subsequent years, however, its progress stagnated and by 2000 still remained below the regional mean. This seems counterintuitive as Chile is generally seen as one of the more successful consolidating democracies – together with Uruguay, and more so than Brazil or Argentina. However, let us not forget that Chile is still struggling to resolve several core issues in the consolidation of its democratic institutions. First and foremost, there is a lack of consensus among key political actors on the existing constitution (item C1), interspersed with various prerogatives for non-democratic actors. In addition, Chile is still waiting to experience its first and second turn-over in power (items C7 and C8). Since the advent of democracy, the same ruling coalition (known as *Concertación*) has been in government. Added to this are the constraints imposed on elected representatives by non-elected veto groups, mainly the military (item C6), which had not been abolished by the year 2000. All of these features form part of the CoD measurement device and are commonly referred to as key issues in the literature as well. Hence, there are good reasons for the lower ranking of Chile – even if some poor scores can be explained by the fact that it began its democratic project later than its regional neighbors.

At first glance, the countries within CA look more homogeneous and successful than their southern neighbors. All CA cases move upwards on the CoD scale and no regressions are observable. However, leaving Peru aside, the highest score achieved by any CA country is about the same as the lowest score of any country in SA in the same year. That is, the level of CoD in CA develops consistently but at a lower level than in SA. The data stops in 2000 and therefore only captures a glimpse of the decisive progress made by Mexico towards CoD over the last few years, most importantly the election defeat of the *Partido Revolucionario*

Figure 3.15 Development of CoD in South America, 1974–2000

Institucional (PRI) and the party's agreement to hand over power after more than seven decades of one party rule.

As in the case of the LoA process, the countries in CEE display a rapid and astonishingly consistent progress in terms of CoD. By the end of the 1990s, all cases achieve high scores, though none of them has reached the maximum score of 12. Bulgaria stands out in that it showed some oscillation in the first and second half of the last decade. Among the already quickly consolidating countries, Slovenia is the fastest – despite its supposedly disadvantageous starting position as a former member of Yugoslavia and with war on its Southern borders until the mid-1990s.

Among FSR cases, Belarus is by far the worst performer in terms of CoD. Ukraine performs relatively well whilst Russia and Georgia emerge in the middle of the group of cases from the FSR. The clearest success story is Mongolia, an understudied and surprising case of relative democratic success (Fish 1998; Fritz 2002 and 2008). Mongolia showed steady progress towards CoD and reached astonishingly high scores by the year 2000. In Chapter 6, when analyzing the causes of CoD, I get back to Mongolia in further detail.

The case-by-case comparison of CoD processes reveals some surprising facts. Important strands of the democratization literature would make us expect that CoD in former communist countries – if at all possible – would be a long process with many setbacks along the way. It was argued that the double transition (of both the political and economic regime) would be too much of a burden for the young Eastern European democracies to bear (e.g. Offe 1994; Elster, *et al*. 1998). Furthermore, it was held that the legacy of 40–70 years of communist rule (Jowitt 1992) had left these countries virtually bereft of any of the supposed preconditions of democracy, which further diminished the likelihood for CoD in this world region.[17]

In order to better display that for some former communist countries these speculations turned out to be highly inaccurate, let us take some uncontested model cases of successful CoD and compare them to cases in CEE. It took Spain ten years, Greece fourteen, and Portugal fifteen years to achieve a CoD score of ten. All CEE countries across the board took much less time. The worst among them needed nine years to achieve this benchmark, while Slovenia took just three years, about a quarter of the time Portugal needed.

This difference in speed at which regions succeed in CoD is nicely demonstrated in Figure 3.19, in which each line represents the regional CoD average.[18] SE is the first region to embark on the process of CoD and ranks top at any given year since 1974. SA and CA, by and large, display similar patterns of CoD, both in timing and tempo. The most striking empirical fact is the steep rise of the CEE countries after 1990. If we take SE – the region that is commonly seen as the most successful in terms of CoD – and compare it with CEE – the region for which many analysts predicted great difficulties, if not impossibility, in consolidating democracy – the data reveals that not only have the CEE countries achieved high CoD scores, but most of them did so in much less time than their SE counterparts.[19] It has to be pointed out, though, that the pessimists are right with respect to the FSR.[20] Their

Figure 3.16 Development of CoD in Central America, 1974–2000

Figure 3.17 Development of CoD in Central and Eastern Europe, 1974–2000

Figure 3.18 Development of CoD in Former Soviet Republics, 1974–2000

*Figure 3.19* Development of CoD in five world regions, 1974–2000

annual average CoD scores remain modest, and this is the only region with a seemingly consistent downward trend. Whether or not these differences between CEE and FSR can be sufficiently explained by the impact exerted by the European Union and its integration-via-conditionality strategy, as some argue, is subject to some heated debates but cannot be addressed in further detail here. It must be mentioned though that the close to perfect correlation between successful CoD cases and EU member states among the former communist countries itself does not suffice to establish the causal claim that the EU caused CoD in those countries otherwise doomed to failure. It is equally plausible that the EU engaged in 'cherry-picking', that is, assistance and EU membership was only offered to those countries where the chances for CoD were high anyway – despite their communist past.[21]

    In sum, the pessimistic views on the futures of the Eastern European democracies were erroneous with respect to the great majority of Central and Eastern European countries. Not only did these democracies reach high levels of CoD, but they also did so in a much shorter time period than countries from other world regions in the data set. As far as most FSR are concerned, the pessimists seem to have provided a more adequate evaluation of the prospects for democracy.[22]

A static comparison of CoD levels

Rather than focusing on the development of countries over time, the primary goal of this book is to explain the differences in terms of CoD among young democracies at the end of the second millennium. Comparing cases based on such 'snapshots' (Pennings, *et al*. 1999: 50) requires the construction of a single aggregate CoD index for the year 2000. Such an aggregation of the time-series data on CoD into a single index can be justified on several conceptual grounds. First, CoD is neither a point event, nor a volatile situation but an institutional characteristic of a democratic political regime. Second, aggregation over time is based on the uncontroversial assumption that a country's level of CoD at time t-1

influences its level of CoD at time t. And, third, the endpoint of the aggregate CoD index the way it is constructed can only be approached asymptotically, reflecting the widely shared assumption that no democracy can ever be fully expected to persist in the future.[23]

In order to aggregate the information on CoD for each country over the time period 1974–2000 contained in the Democratization Data Set, the sum of the annual scores is divided by the total number of years since the country achieved its first CoD trait.[24] The formula is as follows:

$$CoD = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} x_i}{t}$$

where x_i is the annual sum of CoD scores and t is the number of years that have passed since the first CoD item was attained until the year 2000, the last year of measurement in the data set. This formula yields the degree of CoD in the year 2000 but takes into account the information on CoD in previous years.

Figure 3.20 displays the CoD index that results from this aggregation formula. The range of possible values runs from zero to 100 percent. The maximum, however, is purely theoretical since it could only be achieved in the course of an 'instant consolidation', i.e. a country that met all twelve CoD items within the first year of its regime change. This is practically impossible because some of these items require the passing of a certain amount of time, such as holding more than one election in the case of items C7 and C8 (first and second turn-over) or item C5 (electoral volatility).

The countries are spread across almost the full range of scores, ranging from around 15 to 85 percent. While cases distribute in a fairly even fashion, some clusters can be detected. Of the seven clusters, the two highest included the cases

Figure 3.20 Index of CoD (1974–2000)

from SE (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) – as was anticipated – plus Uruguay and Slovenia. The high ranking of Slovenia may be surprising to those who are less familiar with the CEE region. In fact, one of the main reasons that people know so little about this small country is that it does not do much to call itself to the public's attention. Its politics have so quickly become predictable and quiet – whilst the other former republics of Yugoslavia have been anything but.[25] The next category on the CoD index is led by the Czech Republic. It is followed by Poland and Argentina. A similar mixture of cases from CEE and SA can be found in the fourth highest cluster, which is led by Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Mongolia– another often neglected and surprising success story – and followed by Hungary, Romania, and Chile. There is a clear break in the index between Chile and Nicaragua. The lower categories of CoD[26] are catch-alls for varied experiences with regime change. Here we find those countries that perform either worse (Bolivia and Peru, in the case of SA), or better (Turkey, in the case of MENA; Ukraine for the FSR) than their regional neighbors. At the bottom of the CoD index we only find countries from the FSR and, surprisingly, Mexico.

Mexico's counter-intuitively low ranking, the same as Brazil's, is the result of a methodological artifact. Briefly explaining why Brazil and Mexico end up with lower scores than expected helps to better interpret the CoD scale. In general, a low ranking reflects a combination of two factors: the country does not fulfill many of the items and/or it has taken a relatively long time to reach its current position. The first reason for a low ranking is entirely appropriate since the purpose of the CoD index is to reflect the degree to which a case fulfils the CoD criteria. The second feature, however, is more ambiguous, Mexico and Brazil being a good illustration of this. Mexico achieves CoD traits as early as 1974 on its partial regimes while still remaining a non-democracy for more than a decade. According to the Democratization Data Set, Brazil started its process of consolidation almost a decade before founding elections took place in 1989, by reaching an agreement on association formation and behavior (C9) in 1980. Thus, Brazil and Mexico could not accumulate many CoD scores during their non-democratic periods even though the process of CoD had already begun.[27] The low rankings of both Brazil and Mexico are undesirable but unavoidable results of the aggregation procedure which distorts information, something that will be corrected for when using this CoD index as the dependent variable in the empirical analyses in Chapter 6.

Summing up, the Democratization Data Set contains data for some 30 countries, which represents roughly half of the population of the third wave cases, and comparatively measures their progress and regress on LoA and CoD over the time period from 1974 to 2000. For the first time since this democratization wave started, it is thus possible to comparatively map the core components of transition processes in different world regions. The data is designed to capture comparable evidence on specific and allegedly cumulative processes – those that lead from autocracy to democracy. It reflects the degree of danger faced by young democracies, and thus helps to discern differences in how strongly we can expect different young democracies to persist in the foreseeable future. I find that with few exceptions, the

cases in Central and Eastern Europe are very successful and quick democratizers, both in terms of liberalization and consolidation. Not only do most of them achieve scores similar to the success stories of SE, they also do so in a much shorter time period. This result provides enough evidence to revise the highly pessimistic predictions that dominated in large parts of the literature on democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. The analysis of the Democratization Data also reveals that in contrast to the standard expectations derived from the prevailing transition paradigm, *illiberal democratizers* exist, i.e. cases that enter the democratic period having made no or hardly any previous concessions on political liberties. The *locus classicus* here is Turkey. What is even more damaging to the general statement that liberalization triggers democratization is the finding that there are several *liberalizing autocracies*, that is, non-democracies that display cycles of political opening and closure. In fact, in the Middle East and Northern Africa, this regime type seems to be the norm rather than the exception. The remainder of this book focuses on the main question: which factors account for CoD? Or, more specifically, under which configurations of societal-structural and political-institutional conditions do young democracies consolidate?

4 Theories of CoD – the fit of political institutions to societal contexts

There is growing dissatisfaction over the fact that the huge but also heterogeneous amount of evidence generated by the traditional camps of comparative research – comparative case studies and large N statistical techniques – so far has not been integrated into a more coherent set of propositions that link the various causal accounts of CoD (Munck 2000: 19ff.; Munck 2001). Many of the existing theories and the evidence on which they are based are either very general and simplifying, or too spatially bound and complex and, thus, difficult to generalize.

In order to develop my hypothesis, it is important to recall that CoD is conceptualized in terms of the democratic rule-abiding behavior of the relevant political actors. The core question then is: under which conditions do actors follow the democratic norms implemented in their country and thus consolidate their democracy? I hypothesize that CoD occurs if the degree of political power dispersion established by their type of democracy meets the needs for a certain degree of power dispersion created by the societal context. Put differently, democracies consolidate if the type of institutional configuration chosen fits the socio-structural contexts in which it is embedded, because under such conditions actors can be expected to follow the democratic rules. My claim makes use of two concepts that need further clarification: the notion of remote societal and proximate institutional factors, on the one hand, and the notion of power dispersion, on the other. After that, six prominent societal characteristics are classified as to whether they create the need for concentration or for dispersion of political power. The same categorization is done for the eight democracy types that can be formed based on three core institutional features: the governmental format, the party system, and the territorial division of competencies.

The hypothesis: fit between democracy types and societal contexts

In order to theorize about CoD, I believe it to be fruitful to introduce an analytic distinction between two different types of conditions which can be labelled as remote and proximate factors. Underlying this idea is the notion that causal conditions can be organized along a dimension reflecting their 'distance' from the outcome to be explained. This distance can be conceptualized in a continuous way, as in path dependence, or as multinomial or dichotomous categories of different causal depth (e.g. Kitschelt 2003).[1] Factors close to the extreme ends differ in various ways.[2]

Remote factors are perceived as decoupled from the unit of analysis whereas proximate factors are characteristics of the unit of analysis. Being relatively stable over time, remote factors are also often referred to as structural factors, or simply the context. The origin of remote factors is often also remote on the time and/or space dimension in relation to the outcome to be explained. As a consequence, remote factors are usually completely outside the reach of the conscious influence of present actors, and, thus, contexts and historical legacies are treated as exogenously given to the actors. The idea of 'remoteness' is therefore not only related to space and time, but, first and foremost, to their causal impact. In the study of CoD, remote societal factors usually comprise the level of economic development, the ethnic composition, or geo-strategic locations, just to mention a few. By contrast, proximate factors vary over time, and are subject to changes introduced by actors. Proximate factors do not originate far back in the past, but are the product of sometimes more and sometimes less conscious and purposeful human actions. Proximate factors are also temporarily and spatially closer to the outcome to be explained and, as a consequence of this, also causally more closely linked to it.[3] In the study of CoD, the list of institutional features often comprises the executive format, the party system, and the territorial division of competencies.

Nowadays, among scholars studying CoD, there is much consciousness of the need to combine remote and proximate factors.[4] In previous decades, either remote or proximate conditions prevailed in the literature on democracy and democratization. The early and by now classical studies on the rise and survival of democracy (e.g. Lipset 1959 and, to a lesser extent, Moore 1966) emphasized mainly structural, i.e. remote conditions. In the 1980s, however, in the midst of democracies emerging in countries sometime lacking every single one of the proclaimed 'preconditions' of democracy, attention shifted to proximate factors – either the possibility of 'crafting democracy' (Di Palma 1990b) through strategic behavior, and/or to the crucial role of institutional variation within democracies, like the executive format (presidentialism vs parliamentarism) and the party system for the consolidation of democracy. The focus on actors and their strategic behavior was typical of the attempts to explain the demise of autocracy and the (re)birth of democracy, i.e. the transition from autocracy towards democracy. Analytically, this is different from trying to explain the consolidation of democracy once in place.[5] Nevertheless, proximate factors also play a role in explaining CoD, as demonstrated by the ongoing intellectual interest in actors' behavior, institutional configurations, and contingent events. From a dialectical viewpoint, it seems logical that after the emphasis on remote factors in the 1960s and 1970s and on proximate factors in the 1980s and 1990s, optimal theoretical insights can be gained by trying to integrate these explanatory strands in order to understand CoD.

One way of analytically framing the fit of democracy types to societal contexts is to look at the degree to which both – institutions and contexts – disperse political power. Both societal contexts and institutional configurations, respectively, can be ranked on dimensions of power dispersion. On the one hand, different social contexts determine differences between and within countries in the relative size,

shape, needs, and interests of politically relevant social groups, such as groups of different ethnicity, income, and habits. Thus, different societal contexts create the need for different degrees of political power dispersion. On the other hand, different political-institutional setups have the capacity to disperse political power to different degrees. The political power I am referring to here derives from access to state power in order to make collectively binding decisions through different means such as laws, regulations, taxations, redistribution, coercion, and conflict resolution. In power dispersing types of democracy the access to this state power is granted to a wider array of social groups than in power concentrating democracy types. I focus on those institutions that influence the composition and interplay of the executive and legislative branch at the national level and the degree to which their political power is limited through a territorial division of power.

One can thus further distinguish two dimensions in which both contexts and institutions either concentrate or disperse power. On the one hand, there is the horizontal dimension which refers to the degree of power dispersion in the process of making collectively binding decisions at the national level. On the other hand, there is the vertical dimension which refers to the degree of power dispersion in the process of making collectively binding decisions between the national and sub-national territorial units. Certain societal contexts predominantly require dispersion on both dimensions, others concentration in both, and yet other contexts require concentration in one dimension and dispersion in another. The same holds true for types of democracy. Some of them predominantly concentrate power in making collectively binding decisions in the horizontal dimension but disperse power in the vertical dimension or vice versa. Yet other democracy types concentrate power in both dimensions while others disperse it in both. Of course, the extent of power concentration must remain within the spectrum permissible in a liberal democratic framework. I am thus not arguing for a degree of political power concentration as it can be implemented in non-democratic regimes.

The notions of power dispersion and that institutions should be chosen according to some societal circumstances in which they are supposed to operate has been used in related fields but its potential for the study of CoD has not yet been fully explored. Most influentially, an argument of a fit of institutions to societal contexts is made in the extensive body of literature on Proporzdemokratie (Lehmbruch 1967), consociational, and consensus (Lijphart 1984, 1989, and 1999) democracy.[6] Notice, however, that there is an asymmetry in most of this literature. The main focus is on those contextual conditions that require power *dispersion*, such as ethnic diversity and for which, thus, a power dispersing consensus democracy is suggested as the more viable option. Vanhanen (1994, 1997, 2003) also focuses on power dispersion rather than concentration by claiming that the more societal contexts disperse power, the more any (power dispersing or concentrating) type of democracy survives. These approaches are less focused on the issue of power concentration and the question: under which conditions, and in which form, a concentration of power can be beneficial for CoD (for a similar critique, see e.g. Horowitz 2002). Power concentration is dealt with more by those authors who focus on different stages of economic development or on specific historical

experiences and who argue that effective government and political stability can best be achieved through the concentration of power (Huntington 1968; Evans 1992; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; for a skeptical view see Przeworski 1993). An approach that is more symmetric in that it encompasses both power dispersion and power concentration is Eckstein's congruence theory (Eckstein 1966 and 1998). The core claim here is that "[g]overnments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other units of society." (Eckstein 1998: 4).

In short, what matters for CoD is that the institutions in place reflect the needs of groups constituted by the societal context to have a 'voice' (Hirschman 1970) in the process of making collectively binding decisions. Allowing all relevant actors to have their needs and interests accommodated helps establishing a 'democratic equilibrium' (Schedler 2001b: 77, see also Chapter 2). In turn, having all relevant actors agree on the democratic rules that are in place in their country is equivalent to the conceptual definition of CoD employed in this book.

Figure 4.1 Fit of power dispersion between contexts and democracy type: theoretical expectations

Notes:

HD: horizontal dispersion; HC: horizontal concentration; VD: vertical dispersion; VC; vertical concentration

Cells highlighted in light grey: match between contexts and institutions in terms of power dispersion – countries displaying such a conjunction are expected to be cases of CoD

Cells highlighted in dark grey: mis-fit between contexts and institutions in terms of power dispersion – countries displaying such a conjunction are expected to be cases of not-CoD

Cells not highlighted: no clear expectations on the value of CoD

The theoretical expectations about which combinations of contexts and institutional configurations form sufficient paths[7] towards CoD can be graphically expressed as shown in Figure 4.1. With societal contexts and political institutions that can both either concentrate or disperse power in the vertical and horizontal dimensions, there are 16 logically possible combinations. The light shaded cells in Figure 4.1 indicate a perfect fit between institutions and context in both dimensions. Under these different combinations of conditions CoD is expected to occur. In contrast, the dark shaded cells indicate a mis-match between institutions and contexts in both dimensions and the expectation is that cases of non-CoD exhibit this type of remote-proximate configuration. Finally, the non-shaded cells denote combinations between societal contexts and political institutions for which no clear expectation with regard to their CoD effect can be derived.[8]

My analytic separation into societal and institutional factors and the claim that CoD occurs if both sets of factors fit in terms of power dispersion has the potential for providing a unifying framework under which many of the core factors for CoD can be subsumed and a thicker theory (Coppedge 1999) formulated. Obviously, I do not intend to combine *all* the well-known approaches into an integrated theory of CoD. I do claim, however, that there is a way of making theoretical progress towards a more coherent set of (middle-range) theories.

Societal and institutional conditions for CoD

As befits a growing area of interest to social scientists, there are innumerable innovative approaches to understanding the conditions for CoD. Among them, a long list of potential explanatory factors makes reference to characteristics of *countries*, such as the level of socioeconomic development, the degree of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, or the geo-strategic location. At the same time, characteristics of the *democratic system* are also cited as potential factors for CoD, such as the governmental format, the territorial division of competencies, or the party system. In the framework of the present study, it is not possible (nor indeed desirable) to present all these theoretical arguments in their different shades and grades, and much less to include all of them in the subsequent analysis. The selection of factors is guided both by the prominence these variables have within the literature on CoD and, most importantly, theoretical arguments specific to my study. For the theoretical reasons for studying the following list of conditions and not others, the main line of argument is the introduction of the idea of remote societal and proximate institutional factors for CoD and their capacity to disperse or concentrate political power. For each of the societal factors and its negation, I briefly summarize the arguments of their CoD fostering or hindering effect and then specify for each condition and its negation whether it creates the need for concentrating or dispersing political power. After this, I classify the eight logically possible types of democracy that can be formed based on the three proximate institutional features that are analyzed here: the governmental format, the party system, and the territorial distribution of competencies.

Societal factors for CoD and their power dispersing effects

Socioeconomic development

Probably the most prominent CoD hypothesis is the one grounded in modernization theory, stating that a high level of socioeconomic development fosters the emergence and consolidation of democracy. This relationship is expressed in what is perhaps the most frequently cited phrase in comparative social sciences: "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset 1981: 31). Briefly, that causal chain can be summarized as follows. Technological progress leads to changes in the mode of production, the division of labor, urbanization, more education, new class formation and ultimately, or so it is believed, to the transition to and consolidation of democracy. High levels of economic welfare lead to better education for more people, a broader middle class, and the dispersion of economic and political power.[9] While numerically the number of actors demanding a share of political power increases with modernization, their capacity and willingness to deal with each other in a peaceful way increases simultaneously. In this sense, economic welfare contributes to the mitigation of conflicts in society.

The resolution of conflicts becomes easier as actors perceive democratic norms and procedures as feasible and adequate ways of dealing with each other in the political sphere. I follow the line of argument that an increase in economic development leads both to increased social differentiation and to increased capacities of individuals and groups to mitigate diverging interests and conflicts. Since I conceptualize CoD as the acceptance of the democratic rules of the game in the form in which they are implemented in one's own country, this moderation effect of modernization is expected to contribute to CoD.[10]

From this, two expectations can be derived with regard to the power dispersing effect of socioeconomic development. On the one hand, in socioeconomically developed societies, the number of politically relevant actors increases during the process of societal diversification that forms part of the larger modernization process. Hence, economically developed societies create the need for implementing a type of democracy that disperses power in the horizontal dimension. In contrast, social diversification is lower in societies with low levels of socioeconomic development. Thus, power dispersion is not required. Quite the contrary! If one takes the inverse of the post-materialist argumentation (Inglehart 1977), less socioeconomically developed societies can be expected to have less demand for political participation and if such demand exists, it is usually geared more towards issues of improving economic conditions and social welfare. Thus, in socioeconomically less developed societies, there is both more leverage and more need for concentrating political power. Some political economists have argued that political power needs to be concentrated in order to provide for socioeconomic development in these societies (Huntington 1968; Haggard and Kaufman 1992, 1995).[11] That concentration of political power, so I argue, should occur in the horizontal dimension of the political system because it is at the national level where the most decisive economic parameters are set.

Education

Within the bundle of interacting modernization theory factors there is one strand that is particularly important for my approach and will be treated as a separate factor. Rather than assuming that all economically rich societies are also always well educated societies and, what is more, that all economically less developed societies are badly educated, I investigate education as a condition of CoD in its own right. The effect of higher levels of education on the functioning and consolidation of democracy operates through various direct and indirect channels.[12] Here, only those aspects that are particularly relevant within the power dispersing framework are dealt with.

It is argued, for instance, that education fosters economic development and, thus, in the long run, also democracy (Rowen 1995). Apart from these more indirect channels, better educated people are more inclined to listen to other people's opinions and try harder to understand their position. This mitigates conflicts and raises the likelihood for finding peaceful compromises in public matters. Because CoD is conceptualized in terms of actors' behavior and whether they display consensus on the existing democratic rules, achieving such a consensus in an educated society should be easier than in a non-educated society. Within the framework of power dispersion, however, neither educated societies nor non-educated societies provide a societal context for democracy that requires any specific degree of power dispersion. In other words, both educated and non-educated societies are power neutral.

Ethno-linguistic composition

Another prominent topic in the democratization and consolidation literature is the issue of ethno-linguistic cleavages (Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1999; Welzel and Inglehart 1999: 13f.; Evans 2000; Gurr 2000; Reilly 2001; Grofman and Stockwell 2003). Early on, Dahl formulated the impact of the ethno-linguistic composition on democracy: "Ethnic cleavages give rise to hostility toward political opponents, which is detrimental to democratic conflict management" (Dahl 1971: 105–23). Thus, "ethnic differences divide societies and make compromise and consensus difficult" (Fish 2002: 8). From this it becomes clear that ethnic heterogeneity can create difficulties for young democracies, especially if these differences are frequently pushed onto the political agenda. There is widespread consensus that the more ethno-linguistically heterogeneous a society is, the more conflicting interests are present, both in number and intensity, and the more actors claim the need to actively participate in the political decision-making process. This, in turn, makes the achievement of mutual agreements on partial regimes, the electoral process and its results etc. more difficult. At the same time, none of these different collective actors can be excluded from the democratic political game without running the risk that those who are left out try to challenge the democratic rules of the game by undemocratic means. It is therefore reasonable to claim that CoD faces particular obstacles in ethno-linguistically diverse societies because of the delicate task of appeasing many divergent societal groups by giving them opportunities to

meaningfully participate in the making of publicly binding decisions. The danger that cleavages become politicized to the extent that democracy is threatened is particularly high if groups distinguish themselves both in ethnicity *and* language. This is why in this book an index of *ethno-linguistic* fractionalization and not just *ethnic* fractionalization is used. This implies that in order to score high on the scale of ethno-linguistic homogeneity, large parts of a society must consist of different groups that are both ethnically and linguistically distinguishable from one another.

Expressed in terms of the framework of power dispersion, it is clear that in ethno-linguistically divided societies the need for power dispersing institutions is high. More precisely, political power dispersion is primarily needed in the vertical dimension of a political system.[13] Hence, in the context of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, I expect to find consolidated democracies only when it is a type of democracy that disperses political power in the vertical dimension. The expectations about which institutional configurations foster CoD in ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies are not much problematized in the CoD literature. There seems to be widespread consensus that if no relevant ethno-linguistic groups exist, there is a wide choice of viable democratic institutions (see also Adsera and Boix 2004: 4, 18). Hence, unless other societal conditions create the need for dispersing or concentrating political power in either the horizontal or the vertical dimension, all types of democracy, whether concentrating or dispersing, can be expected to be viable in ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies.

This interplay between ethno-linguistic composition, on the one hand, and configurations of political institutions, on the other, renders their joint impact on CoD a complex issue. In fact, not all scholars agree that more ethno-linguistic heterogeneity should always be matched with more power sharing (e.g. Horowitz 2002; Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999; Saideman, *et al*. 2002). Context-specific features such as the geographic distribution of ethnic groups, the historical past of ethnic diversity and its political institutionalization, and the age and origin of the state might all matter in some cases. Particular attention has been paid to ethno-federalism (Roeder 1991), systems defined as multinational states in which the subunit boundaries coincide with the spatial distribution of ethnic groups (Skalnik Leff 1999: 208f.).

Communist past

With the expansion of the most recent wave of democratization from South to East, discussion began as to what extent the communist past had an impact on the chances for CoD in this world region. Especially in the first half of the 1990s, many scholars argued that the 'Leninist legacy' (Jowitt 1992) left Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and, even more so, the former Soviet Republics (FSR), in a situation that seriously hampered the attempts to establish the recently born democracies in these societies. The classification of countries in terms of their communist past is, at best, a proxy for a bundle of conditions that can be expected to have an impact on CoD. It is often argued that one of the most devastating

effects of communism in terms of hindering CoD is that it left societies bereft of a system of intermediary organizations independent from the state. Interests are thus not sufficiently aggregated and/or only erratically and sporadically expressed.[14] Interest organizations and civil society organizations are not (yet) well entrenched in society. Hence, in former communist societies, diverse interests may be present, but they are not expected to be coherently inserted into the political process, which, in turn, lowers their political relevance. Elster, Offe, and Preuss (1998) even speak of a 'tabula rasa'. Political power floats freely with few institutional incentives or cognitive capacities to make decisions over which all actors involved can compromise.[15]

Framed in terms of power dispersion, this means that the context of a former communist society creates the need for concentrating political power if democracy is to be consolidated. The longer the communist past lasted and the more it changed societal structures, the more it can be expected that power-concentrating democracy types become consolidated. Hence, my power concentration claim applies more to former Soviet republics, where the lack of both organizational social networks and social development are most pronounced, than to Soviet satellite states.[16] Like in the case of a socioeconomically not well developed society, political power should be concentrated in the horizontal dimension. Power concentration via institutional configurations not only finds less resistance, but it can also be seen as functionally superior for achieving both governability and economic and social development in such cases, an argument that can be traced back to Huntington (1968).[17] In power concentrating types of democracy, citizens have more possibilities to hold rulers accountable and rulers have more room and maneuverability to solve the pending social, economic, and political-institutional problems that are so typical for these countries. In turn, the characteristic of not being a former communist country in itself does not generate any particular need for power dispersion or concentration. Hence, as with ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies, all types of democracy should be viable in cases with no communist past – provided, of course, a country does not display any other societal traits that require either a power concentrating or power dispersing institutional formula.

Democratic past

It is often argued that past experiences with democratic forms of government help to consolidate democracy in the present. In democratically experienced societies,[18] so the claim, those political actors who attempt to make democracy work can rely not only on institutions like the party system, but also on democratic attitudes and symbols (Dawisha 1997).[19] Thus, democratic heritage in terms of institutional-practical, attitudinal, symbolic, and cognitive legacies is expected to contribute to the likelihood that the different actors adhere to the democratic rules of the game (Barro 1994, Muller 1995, Gasiorowski and Power 1998). This means that in countries with a long democratic tradition, all things being equal, it should simply be easier to consolidate the re-established democratic regime.[20]

Framed in terms of a fit between the context and the political institutions with

regard to power dispersion, a democratic past does not create the need for any specific form of democracy. Both power concentrating and dispersing types should work.[21] Also the absence of previous democratic experiences does not create strong constraints with regard to the degree of power dispersion. As a societal context for CoD democratic past is thus power neutral.

Closeness to the West

Given its global dimension, it comes as no surprise that international factors have played an important role in understanding the causes for the most recent democratization wave. Within the set of international factors, several channels of causation have been hypothesized and investigated.[22] Although most of them were developed for explaining transitions away from autocracy, by and large, their causal effect can be extended to CoD. One type of causation is labeled 'snowballing'. Earlier transitions are "stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization" (Huntington 1991: 2). Slightly different from this are 'demonstration effects', which "remain strongest among countries that [are] geographically proximate and culturally similar" (Huntington 1991:102).[23] Yet another model is that of 'contagion', or 'position in (geo-strategic) the world system': the more a country is economically integrated into the Western dominated world economic system, the more likely it is to adapt democratic norms and behavior, thus consolidating democracy.

   As with the factor of a democratic past, proximity to the West exerts its impact on CoD by widening the scope of types of democracy that can be chosen without hampering the chances for CoD. Even if the type of democracy chosen does not perfectly match the degree of power dispersion constituted by the societal context, the external support for the democratic rule can be expected to get young democracies through the first years until actors become habituated to the political institutions; and/or political institutions have shaped the societal context so that a better fit is achieved; and/or political institutions are adapted to the context through a careful reform process during which the consensus of all relevant actors is sought and which respects the democratic procedural rules for changing the rules of the game. In short, being close to the West is power neutral and also not being close to the West does not create any need for a specific degree of political power dispersion.

Democracy types and their power dispersing effects

By and large, the core set of institutions that are used in the literature in order to define different types of liberal democracy are the executive format, the party system, and the system of territorial distribution of competencies (Sartori 1994; Gasiorowski and Power 1998). The following argument is structured by the idea that institutions, or better, configurations of institutions, have power distributing effects. Of course, there are more than the three institutional features of a democracy that might have an impact on how many and how easily actors can participate in

the process of making collectively binding decisions and, thus, how much political power is dispersed in a democracy.[24] However, the three institutions discussed in the following are the most salient ones in the literature. Furthermore, they all have in common that the composition of actors acting within these institutions is subject to the outcome of the electoral process, unlike, for instance, provisions regulating the constitutional court, the role of the judicial branch, or reserved seats in parliament for minorities. Electoral systems are also not included in my analysis. This institutional feature of democracy is receiving much attention partly because it is one of the most important factors shaping parties and the party system.[25] For the classification of a political system as power dispersing or concentrating, features of the party system are important. Since there is not, however, a perfect one-to-one relation between types of electoral systems and the fragmentation of party systems, either theoretically or empirically, in the framework of my approach to explaining CoD it is therefore better to directly look at party fragmentation than to infer this information from the type of electoral system implemented in a country.

Territorial distribution of competencies – the vertical dimension of power dispersion

The most uncontested classification with regard to its effects on political power dispersion is that of the territorial distribution of competencies. By definition, decentralized democracies disperse power in the vertical dimension whereas non-decentralized systems concentrate power in the vertical dimension.

Long before the study of regime transition and consolidation became established as a sub-discipline in comparative politics, scholars have engaged in the analysis of the meaning, causes, and consequences of federalism and, more recently, decentralization. The writings on federalism go back to classics such as Tocqville, Montesquieu, or the US founding fathers. William Riker (1964) provided the most authoritative definition of what a federal system is by stating that, first, it must have a minimum of two levels of government and that, second, each level must have "at least one area of action in which it is autonomous" (Riker 1964: 11).[26] For the purpose of this book, using the concept of federalism has some flaws, though. If a strict *de jure* approach to identifying federal political systems is applied, it turns out that their number is small within the set of countries studied in this book – and even at a global level.[27] The simple distinction in federal versus unitary systems based on what is written in the constitution is a much too crude measure for the concept of territorial division of competencies. Empirical findings generated by cross-case analyses employing such an indicator should be read with skepticism (Treisman 2002: 30). Most of the theories and hypotheses on the causes and consequences of vertical dispersion of political competencies – e.g. political stability,[28] corruption, faster economic growth, higher accountability, more effective government (Schneider 2003)[29], and, in the context of the present book, the degree to which power is dispersed – require a more fine-grained measurement than a simple dichotomy indicating whether a country has formal federal rules enshrined in its constitution (Rodden 2004).

Fortunately, much of what is theorized to be at the core of federalism can

be reframed and, in fact, more adequately captured, by using the concept of decentralization. Decentralization, broadly understood, is a characteristic[30] of a political system, indicating the degree to which the making of publicly binding decisions and the allocation of resources is dispersed among vertical layers of the political system – most of the time territorially defined in a nested structure. Decentralization and federalism do not always go together (Treisman 2002). There can be formally federal states that are more centralized than formally unitary states; for decentralization, unlike federalism, does not require that the lower tier units have formal autonomy from the higher tier units.

Decentralization can manifest itself in different forms. Some authors distinguish between fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization (Schneider 2003), others between vertical, decision-making, appointment, electoral, fiscal, and personnel decentralization (Treisman 2002), and yet others between fiscal, policy, and political decentralization. These dimensions are not only conceptually but also empirically different, giving rise to different types of decentralization pattern. However, in the context of investigating the degree to which certain types of political systems disperse power – the main focus of my argument – it is not necessary to single out and focus on one specific dimension of decentralization. What matters, instead, is the overall degree to which political actors have the possibility to participate in the multiple tasks of exercising public authority and allocating resources – a fairly general concept that does not need to be operationalized in a too fine-grained manner. Hence, only one indicator reflecting the degree to which political systems are decentralized will be employed. This indicator is composed from information on each country's fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization. The more aspects of a political system are decentralized, the higher the degree of power dispersion (see Appendix A).

Executive format and party system – the horizontal dimension of power dispersion

The two other institutional features investigated here – the executive format and the number of effective parties – refer to the national level of the political system.[31] Any combination between them therefore determines the degree of power dispersion in the horizontal dimension.

In the early 1990s, at the height of the third democratization wave, Juan Linz (1990a, 1990b) triggered a lively debate with his claims about the virtues of parliamentary systems and the vices of presidential systems for CoD. He argued that "parliamentarism provides a more flexible and adaptable institutional context for the establishment and consolidation of democracy" (Linz 1990a: 68). It has, then, been argued that new democracies – especially in ethnically, culturally and/or linguistically divided societies – need the flexibility of parliamentary systems.[32] As evidence of the unsuitability of presidential democracies, it was often pointed out that among the long-lasting democracies, the majority have a parliamentary system, while among the democratic breakdowns throughout the twentieth century, the number with presidential systems has been disproportionally high (Mainwaring 1993b; Przeworski, *et al*. 2000). Not everybody, however,

subscribed to the hypothesis that presidential systems are detrimental to democratic survival. Horowitz (1985), for instance, pointed to the potentially conflict-mitigating role of presidents as mediators between different (ethnic) groups. Also, in presidential systems, the winner of the presidency is not automatically also in control of the legislature, for the parliament is endowed with a separate direct legitimacy through popular vote.[33] And, in fact, Shugart and Carey (1992) and Gasiorowski and Power (1998) report empirical evidence that democratic breakdown is not significantly linked to the executive format. In subsequent years, the claim that parliamentary systems are better for CoD – regardless of the presence of other conditions – has been criticized both on the empirical and theoretical level. It has been argued that, empirically, the higher breakdown rate of presidential democracies is largely driven by cases from Latin America, whose failure of democracy cannot necessarily be attributed to presidential systems. On the theoretical level, scholars such as Mainwaring (1993a), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Sartori (1994), Shugart and Carey (1992), Nohlen and Fernández (1991), Thibaut (1993), and Nohlen and Thibaut (1996) have argued that a differentiation between two different types of governmental systems is too crude, for there are different types of presidential and parliamentary systems (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 463).

Within the framework of my claim that institutions and contexts should fit in terms of power dispersion if CoD is to occur, two refinements of the hypothesis that the executive format matters for CoD are particularly important. First, what alters the effect of different executive formats is the surrounding *institutional* setting in which the executive-legislature relation is embedded. One of the most salient approaches to further refining the debate on presidentialism versus parliamentarism and making it fit better with power dispersion is the argument that the type of party system matters (e.g. Mainwaring 1993a and Mainwaring 1993b).[34] Second, it has been emphasized that the impact of either presidential or parliamentary systems on the prospects for CoD depends not only on the specific institutional configuration within the system of government, but also on other, non-institutional, *societal* features, such as the cleavage structure (Rokkan and Lipset 1967) or the level of economic development (e.g. Beliaev 2006). It is this literature that I base my argument on in order to advance the debate on which types of democracy are more likely to persist.

The discussion concerning the vices and virtues of presidentialism versus parliamentarism suffers from the fact that these two concepts do not represent the two poles of the dimension of power dispersion (Cheibub and Limongi 2002). Depending on the institutional configuration in which presidential or parliamentary systems are embedded, both systems can disperse or concentrate power (Gerring, *et al*. 2005). Put differently, there are types of parliamentary democracies that concentrate power while others disperse it, and the same holds for presidential democracies. Whether or not these types of executive formats concentrate or disperse power largely depends on the party system.[35] Scholars such as Sartori (1994), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), or Colomer (2001) argue along similar lines.

Different combinations between the executive format (presidential versus

parliamentary) and the party system (fragmented versus not fragmented) result in different degrees of power dispersion in the horizontal dimension of the political system. Among these combinations, the most power dispersing system on the horizontal dimension is a parliamentary system with many parties. Also, a presidential system with many parties can be classified as power dispersing. In contrast, power is most concentrated in a parliamentary system with few (and supposedly disciplined) effective political parties and less so, but still concentrated, in a presidential system with few parties.

This categorization may not be clear at first glance. Imagine, however, a political system with a directly elected president, vested with substantive institutional rights for actively making collectively binding decisions and, at the same time, an equally democratically legitimate legislature with a high number of parties, most of which do not belong to the president's political camp. Clearly, this forms a situation in which power is highly dispersed not only between the president (executive) and the parliament (legislature), but also within parliament among different social groups represented by many different parties. At the same time, however, in parliamentary systems there is only one directly legitimated institution – the parliament – and the government is chosen from and depends on the parliamentary majority. Consequently, those groups that are in control of the majority in the legislature also form the executive. Furthermore, with a low number of parties in parliament, the likelihood is high that a one-party government or a coalition with only a few parties rules. Hence, in the most extreme form of power concentration, a single person is in control of the majority party, the majority faction in parliament, and the government. An almost ideal-typical case, often quoted for the argument that under certain circumstances, prime ministers in parliamentary systems concentrate more power than a president in a presidential system, is the UK, but there are also several cases in my data that conform to this democracy type.[36] Hence, the combination of (semi)presidential systems with many parties, on the one hand, and parliamentary systems with few parties, on the other, form the two extremes on the continuum of power dispersion in the horizontal dimension.[37]

Table 4.1 displays the power dispersion classification of the eight logically possible democracy types that follow from the classification of their constituting institutional features. Two of them disperse (rows 1 and 2) and two concentrate (rows 7 and 8) power both vertically and horizontally. The remaining four types display a mix between power concentration and dispersion in the horizontal and the vertical dimension. For instance, a parliamentary system with few parties clearly concentrates power on the national horizontal level. Independent from that, it can either be a centralized system, thus also concentrate power vertically (row 7) or it can be a decentralized political system, thus dispersing political power on the vertical dimension (row 5).

Summing up, the factors for CoD can be classified into remote societal conditions, on the one hand, and proximate political-institutional conditions, on the other. Collective actors, their rights, resources, size, and thus their specific needs for power dispersion are constituted by societal features like the ethnic composition or the historical experiences of the political community. Hence, certain

Table 4.1 Power dispersion typology of democratic systems

Democracy types	Institutions			Dimensions	
	parliamentary system	high party fragmentation	decentralization	vertical	horizontal
1	1	1	1	D	D
2	0	1	1	D	D
3	0	1	0	C	D
4	1	1	0	C	D
5	1	0	1	D	C
6	0	0	1	D	C
7	1	0	0	C	C
8	0	0	0	C	C

Notes: 1 = condition is present; 0 = condition is absent; C = democracy type concentrates power; D = democracy type disperses power.

contextual conditions create the need for power dispersion, while others create the need (and the possibility) for power concentration. At the same time, certain institutional configurations concentrate political power, while other disperses it. The expectation is that CoD occurs if political institutions and social contexts match in their respective levels of power dispersion. This approach is helpful for integrating several of the most prominent theories of CoD that are presented in this chapter. The integrative capacity of my approach stems from its high level of generality. Empirically, however, the abstract hypothesis manifests itself in an equifinal, conjunctural, and asymmetric form. This means that different paths lead to CoD, these paths consist of combinations of factors, and the paths towards CoD are different from those towards not-CoD. In the following chapter I spell out the general features of the concept of causal complexity and argue that causal complexity can best be captured in set theoretic terms. From this follows that Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a data analysis technique based on set theory, is best suited for testing my claim about the causes for CoD.

5   Causal complexity and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis

Over the last few years, the issue of causal complexity and its research-practical implications for empirical-comparative research has received growing attention.[1] Causal complexity can be understood in different, not necessarily mutually exclusive ways (Braumoeller 2003). One form of causal complexity unfolds through the interplay of relevant factors *over time*. Aspects such as time, timing, sequencing, or feedback loops (Abbott 2001, Pierson 2004) are commonly dealt with in research based on the intensive analysis of few cases, often under the label of process tracing (George and Bennett 2005). The kind of causal complexity I am focusing on here, however, is of a different, *static*, nature. It goes under the labels of conjunctural,[2] equifinality, and asymmetry causation (Lieberson 1985; Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008b; Mahoney 2008).

Conjunctural causation can be defined as the situation in which one single condition unfolds its impact on the outcome to be explained only when combined with one or more other condition(s). *Equifinality*, in turn, adds to this complexity by allowing for the possibility that different conjunctions can produce the same outcome.[3] *Causal asymmetry* is present when a given conjunction contributes to explaining the presence of an outcome but, at the same time, is irrelevant for explaining the absence of that outcome. My approach to explaining CoD allows for conjunctural, equifinal, and asymmetric causation. I expect what matters for CoD is the mix between political institutions and societal contexts rather than single factors in isolation (conjunctural causation); that there are different ways of achieving CoD as long as the specific societal-institutional configurations denote a fit in terms of power dispersion (equifinality); and that the specific conjunctions producing not-CoD are not necessarily just the absence of the factors producing CoD (asymmetry).

Framing causal complexity in terms of necessity, sufficiency, and set relations

A powerful way of framing conjunctural causation, equifinality, and causal asymmetry consists in the use of the concepts of *necessity* and *sufficiency*. These terms are widely used in common language and in social scientific texts – if sometimes only implicitly and/or incorrectly (Goertz and Starr 2003). Succinct definitions

can help mitigate the confusion that surrounds necessity and sufficiency: "A cause is defined as necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to occur. A cause is defined as sufficient if by itself it can produce a certain outcome." (Ragin 1987: 99). Hence, necessity is present if whenever across a set of cases we see the outcome, we also see the cause. The opposite is not required, though. There might be cases with the necessary condition but without the outcome. Such evidence does not contradict the statement that a certain condition is necessary for the outcome. In contrast, sufficiency is present if, whenever across a set of cases we see the cause, we also see the outcome. Similarly to necessity, the logic of sufficiency implies that cases without the condition but with the outcome are not counter-evidence for the statement that this particular condition is sufficient for producing the outcome. In case a condition (or a combination of conditions) is found to be sufficient but not necessary for an outcome, we implicitly acknowledge that there must be *other* sufficient conditions for that outcome, i.e. we acknowledge that there is equifinality. We also acknowledge that the same (combination of) conditions have a different, if any, causal relation to explaining the *absence* of the outcome, that is, we are incorporating causal asymmetry.

Necessity and sufficiency, in turn, have a close relationship to set theory. If we say that a condition X is sufficient for Y, we can reformulate this claim and say that all elements (i.e. cases) with the characteristic X are a subset of all elements (cases) with the characteristic Y (Ragin 2000 and 2008b). For instance, the claim (hypothesis) that richness (X) causes democracy (Y) is set theoretic in nature. This statement formulates the expectation that the set of rich countries (X) is a subset of the set of democratic countries (Y). From such a set-theoretically framed relation we can claim – provided we also have theoretical arguments – that X is sufficient, but not necessary for Y. This has some important implications as to what kind of patterns we expect to find in the data. Most importantly, there are other subsets of democracy than just richness, such as, for instance, ethnically homogeneous countries. Not all democratic countries are rich – just think of India or Mongolia. Such cases of not-rich democracies do *not*, however, contradict the statement that richness is sufficient for democracy, because that statement only generates expectations about the value of the outcome Y (democracy) for those cases that are also rich. As a consequence, when testing whether richness is a sufficient condition for democracy, non-rich cases are logically irrelevant (see Appendix B for further details).[4]

Most social science theories (i.e. almost all but purely formal 'theories') are verbally formulated. Verbal formulations, in turn, are almost exclusively of a set theoretic nature (Ragin 2008b). Hypotheses based on set-theoretic notions thus abound in the social sciences. Braumoeller and Goertz (2000) and Goertz (2003), for example, show that literally hundreds of examples can be listed of hypotheses in the social scientific literature that make use of the notion of necessity.[5]

Another way of specifying the meaning of causal complexity is to pin down what it is not: the assumption that causes exert their effect (i.e. that the independent variables cause the dependent variables) in a linear, additive, and unifinal manner. These are the assumptions on which those standard statistical techniques operate

that are most frequently employed in the current comparative social scientific literature.[6] Data analyses techniques based on this epistemology are very powerful tools for summarizing complex data in a parsimonious way. By making these assumptions, large N statistical techniques have led to a remarkable improvement in terms of rigor and breadth of comparative analyses. But there is no doubt that this has come at the expense of theoretical subtlety (Braumoeller 1999: 3; Shalev 2007). "Additive linear models are an inherently inadequate way of modeling multiple causal path processes." (Braumoeller 1999: 7) and using non-additive specifications (i.e. interaction terms) simply offers no practical solution to the problem, especially when the N is medium to low as is often the case in macro-comparative social research (Braumoeller 1999: 9f.).[7] The undeniable strength and usefulness of regression analysis, which most likely explains its widespread use, lies in the capacity to tease out 'net effects' (Ragin 2006a and 2008b: ch. 10) of single independent variables vis-à-vis other independent variables. This strength turns into a weakness if there are good substantive and theoretical reasons to believe that the assumption of causal simplicity (additivity, linearity, symmetry) are inadequate and should be replaced by the assumption of causal complexity (conjunctural causation, equifinality, asymmetry) and when the aim consists in unraveling the different mixes of conditions, or 'recipes' (Ragin 2008b) for the outcome.

As such, neither the assumption of causal simplicity nor that of complexity can claim general superiority.[8] Both have their strengths and weaknesses. Assuming simplicity allows for deriving parsimonious models from rather complex data while the assumption of complexity usually enables the researcher to pay more tribute to different classes of cases within their population – both valuable aims of social inquiry (Brady and Collier 2004). On the downside, the methodologically induced assumption of simplicity runs the risk of generating over-simplified representations that are not only very much detached from the cases and data patterns that underlie the analysis, but which often also just present caricatures of the theories they claim to test (Munck 2001).[9] In turn, the starting assumption of complexity runs the risk of individualizing each and every single case without much progress towards generalization and with significant difficulties in theorizing (even *ex post*) that empirical complexity.[10] Hall (2003) has brought it to a point: we need an alignment of ontology and methodology. If the theoretically informed expectation was that CoD, indeed, can be meaningfully understood by teasing out the net effect of one (or more) variable in isolation, then one should employ methods that assume unifinality, additivity, and maybe also linearity. A wide range of (sophisticated) statistical data analysis techniques is available for that. If, instead, one has good theoretical reasons that CoD is better understood in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and, by virtue of that, by equifinality, conjunctural causation, and asymmetry (that is, by causal complexity), then the choice of method should be different.

If it is true that my approach to explaining CoD incorporates equifinality, conjunctural and asymmetric causation, that these concepts can best be framed in terms of necessity and sufficiency, and that these concepts, in turn, can be adequately captured with the tools of set theory and formal logic, then it follows

that any method based on these principles is best equipped for testing these causally complex claims. The family of configurational comparative methods (Rihoux and Ragin 2008), better known under the acronym QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis), is such a method.[11] QCA describes a family of techniques, comprised of crisp-set QCA (csQCA), fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), and multi-value QCA (mvQCA, Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2008). I use the generic term QCA when referring to properties common to all subtypes and the specific acronym when referring to a specific subtype, most importantly fsQCA.

Some principles of QCA

QCA is rooted in (fuzzy) set theory[12] and formal logic and thus makes use of the notation rules of Boolean algebra and so-called truth tables (Ragin 1987, 2000 and 2008b). All this makes QCA a data analysis technique well suited for dealing with causal complexity. Rather than looking for covariations of variables, with QCA the aim consists in finding subset relations between sets of conditions and the outcome set. Hence, QCA results are to be interpreted in terms of sets relations and, thus, necessity and sufficiency and thus causal complexity. A hypothetical example shall clarify these points. After that, some short introductory notes follow on those core concepts of QCA that are important for understanding and adequately interpreting the empirical analysis of conditions for CoD in Chapter 6. These concepts are solution formulae, fuzzy set membership scores and their calibration, set operations, truth tables and their logical minimization, limited diversity, the two-step QCA approach, the parameters of fit consistency and coverage, and the fuzzy set truth table algorithm.

Solution formulas

All QCA variants generate findings that are characterized by precisely the features of causal complexity introduced above. For illustration, take the following example. In a study the conditions for democracy (Y) are analyzed. Based on the consultation of theoretical and empirical literature on this issue, three potentially relevant conditions are identified: a highly developed economy (A), an ethnically homogeneous society (B), and a fragmented party system (C).

A typical QCA analysis would reveal that there is more than one alternative sufficient condition, or path, towards CoD. For instance, one is a joint presence of a highly developed economy and an ethnically homogeneous society. The other consists of the absence of a fragmented party system. Different cases of democracy follow different paths. Hence, cases might have a fragmented party system and yet achieve CoD – if only they fulfill the criteria for path 1, that is, if only they are highly economically developed and ethnically homogeneous. But it is also possible that a country follows both paths. Those democracies are consolidated for more than one reason: they are a homogeneous society with a highly developed economy (path 1) and they also have no fragmented party system (path 2).

So-called solution formulae, or solution terms, are a powerful way of succinctly

expressing such causally complex results typical for QCA. The result from above would be written as:

AB + c → Y.

'AB' stands for the combination of the conditions A *and* B. An alternative notation is A*B, where the * sign represents the logical AND or the intersection of the sets A and B, respectively. Both notations will be used in this book. The plus sign indicates a logical OR[13] and combines the two alternative paths towards the outcome Y.[14] The small letter for the condition C indicates that the negation of condition C, that is, the absence of a fragmented party system, is a sufficient condition for the outcome. Alternative notations for the negation of a set is to simply write not-C or ~C. All notations will be used in subsequent chapters. The arrow pointing to Y means that the expression to its left-hand side logically implies the expression to its right-hand side (Ragin and Rihoux 2004). Thus, if theoretical arguments are also at hand, the expression to the left can be seen as a sufficient (but not necessary[15]) condition for the outcome.

Typical solution formulae such as AB + c → Y contain all the elements of causal complexity as defined above. First, it is equifinal, as is indicated by the logical operator OR (+). The outcome Y is produced through the condition A*B and/or the condition c. Second, it is conjunctural, as is indicated by the logical operator AND (*) between conditions A and B. It is not A alone that produces Y but only when it is combined with condition B. In QCA, it frequently happens that one single factor alone, such as A in the above example, is neither sufficient nor necessary for Y, but still plays a causal role. These conditions are so-called 'INUS conditions'. INUS stands for "insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result" (Mackie 1974: 62; Goertz 2003b: 68; Mahoney 2008). The condition A is not sufficient, but it is a necessary component of the (combined) condition AB which itself is not necessary, but only sufficient for Y.[16]

Finally, let us suppose the solution term for the non-occurrence of a consolidated democracy (y) was

a + Bc → not-Y

This would mean that the QCA solution found is asymmetric because the solution formula for explaining the outcome Y is not simply the logical opposite, or negation, of the solution formula for explaining the non-occurrence of Y. In other words, the pure absence of the factors producing Y does not explain not-Y.

Crisp and fuzzy sets

The early version of QCA operates on crisp sets, or dichotomous data. Each case is assigned one of two possible membership values in the sets of conditions and the outcome: it is either a member (value 1) or not a member (value 0). Regardless of whether one subscribed to the view of those who deemed QCA inapplicable due to

the use of dichotomous data only (Lieberson 1991;Goldthorpe 1997; Braumoeller 1999; Coppedge forthcoming) or whether one followed the arguments in defense of csQCA (Ragin 1987: 86f.; Berg-Schlosser 2002, De Meur, *et al*. 2008), the crisp nature of csQCA certainly presented major obstacles to the wider use of QCA in the scientific community.

With the extension of csQCA to fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), these criticisms and limitations have become obsolete. In fuzzy sets, cases can have any set membership score in the range from 0 to 1 (Klir, *et al*. 1997; Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). As in crisp sets, the fuzzy set membership score of 0 indicates that the respective case is fully out of the set, while the value 1 indicates that the case is fully in the fuzzy set. The membership score of 0.5 is the third so called qualitative anchor of a fuzzy set, indicating the cross-over point, or maximum ambiguity, at which a case is neither 'more in than out' of the concept (fuzzy value >0.5) nor 'more out than in' the concept (fuzzy value <0.5). In between these three qualitative anchors of full membership, full non-membership, and maximum ambiguity, all membership scores are possible. Fuzzy set membership scores express the degree of membership of cases in fuzzy sets and not probabilities of a case's membership in crisp sets (Ragin 2008b: ch. 5).[17]

Fuzzy sets can vary as to how many intermediary fuzzy scores are allowed for. The most reduced form of a fuzzy set is a three value set (0, 0.5, and 1). The more intermediary fuzzy values are specified, the more fine-grained the fuzzy set becomes (see Appendix B). Cases with a fuzzy score of 1 are so-called 'ideal prototypes' or the 'core' of a fuzzy set (Klir, *et al*. 1997: 87, 100). Often in empirical research, however, no case adheres completely to the ideal type and, hence, no case qualifies as being considered 'fully in' the concept's set.

Calibration of set membership scores

The procedure for assigning fuzzy set membership scores to cases is crucial for the successful application of fsQCA because one of the appeals of fuzzy sets is the "close correspondence between the content of theoretical concepts, on the one hand, and the assessment of fuzzy set membership scores, on the other" (Ragin 2000: 166f., see also Appendix B on linguistic qualifiers). Obviously, this potential advantage of fuzzy set theory-based comparative analysis stands or falls depending on whether the fuzzy membership scores closely reflect the theoretical concept they are intended to measure. In other words, unlike standard variables in quantitative research, fuzzy sets need to be *calibrated* before a fsQCA analysis can begin.

Calibration relies on knowledge and standards external to the data itself. The assignment of fuzzy set scores should therefore start with some theory-guided decision of what kind of empirical evidence corresponds to the three qualitative anchors of full membership, full non-membership, and the cross-over point. The question must be addressed, which levels of, say GDP, correspond to the three qualitative anchors in the set of rich countries. It is bad practice to simply transform some raw data (e.g. GNP) into fuzzy membership scores in the set of rich countries

via a (simple) mathematical function relying on distributional properties of the empirical data void of any substantive meaning and theoretical justification.[18]

An example clarifies further the difference between values on variables, on the one hand and fuzzy set membership scores, on the other, and shows how in the process of calibration the former is used in order to produce the latter. For the 32 countries studied in Chapter 6, Figure 5.1 shows the translation of GDP values (x-axis) into membership scores in the set of socioeconomically developed societies (y-axis). I use the direct method of calibration[19] (Ragin 2008b: ch. 5). The following GDP values correspond to the different qualitative anchors of the fuzzy set of socioeconomically developed societies: a GDP higher than 20,001 USD indicates full membership (fuzzy score >0.95), for there are no convincing theoretical or substantive reasons for establishing any substantively meaningful difference between countries with 20,000 USD GDP and, say, 35,000 USD when classifying them as rich. The same holds true for differences in GDP lower than 3,000 USD when classifying them as not-rich. All cases with less than 3,000 USD GDP receive full non-membership scores (fuzzy score <0.05). A GDP of 8,500 USD indicates the point of maximum ambiguity (fuzzy score of 0.5) with regard to membership in the set of socioeconomically developed societies. From Figure 5.1 we see that not all empirical variation in GDP translates into equal variation in fuzzy set membership scores. This is because not all differences in countries' GDP carry the same substantive meaning for expressing the degree of membership in the set of socioeconomically developed societies.

In sum, fuzzy set membership scores reflect for each case the degree of set membership in a concept. These scores come from a careful calibration in which the researcher uses knowledge of theory, the understanding of the fuzzy concept derived from this knowledge, and the empirical evidence at hand. Clearly, most of the criticisms at crisp-set QCA motivated by its exclusive use of binary data have

Figure 5.1 Calibration function for membership scores in fuzzy set 'socioeconomically developed societies' based on GDP

been invalidated by the introduction of fuzzy-set QCA. For this and other reasons, fsQCA is used in my analysis of the causal conditions for CoD.

Operations on crisp and fuzzy sets

Once each case has been assigned a distinct fuzzy membership score for each of the concepts involved in the analysis (i.e. both the outcome and the conditions), different operations can be performed on these set values. As crisp sets can be seen as special cases of fuzzy sets, all the operations and rules presented now apply to both crisp and fuzzy sets. I limit myself to the most basic operations, which are, at the same time, sufficient for performing fsQCA.[20] The operations I discuss are: (a) negation/complement; (b) logical OR/fuzzy intersection; and (c) logical AND/fuzzy union.

The formal definition of *negation*, or the complement of a set, states: "The complement of a given set A is the set of all elements in the universal set X which are not in A" (Klir, *et al*. 1997: 53). It is easy to calculate a case's membership in the negation of a set. One simply has to subtract the membership score in the non-negated set from 1.[21] The negation of a crisp set changes the original values into their direct opposite: e.g. a membership score of 1 in the set of democracies becomes a membership score of 0 in the set of non-democracies. The calculation of the negation is identical for fuzzy sets. If, for instance, a country has a fuzzy membership score in the set of democratic countries of 0.8, then its membership score in not-democratic countries is $1 - 0.8 = 0.2$.

One commonly used operation to form a new set that brings together two or more single sets into a conjunction of sets is the logical AND, or, fuzzy *intersection*. The intersection of sets A and B is defined as the set that contains all elements that belong to sets A and B simultaneously (Klir, *et al*. 1997: 55). If, for instance, set A contains all countries with a parliamentary system and set B contains all countries with a federal structure, then the intersection between these two sets (A*B) denotes all countries with a parliamentary system *and* federalism. The arithmetic calculation of a case's membership score in the conjunction of (fuzzy) sets is straightforward. The membership of each case in the intersection is determined by the lowest (fuzzy) membership score the case holds across all the sets that are intersected.[22] Let a country's membership in the set of parliamentary systems be 0.9 and in the set of federal systems be 0.4. Then its membership in the set of parliamentarian *and* federal countries is 0.4, the minimum value across the two set membership values.

The *union* of set A and set B is the set containing all the elements belonging *either* to A *or* to B, *or* to both. The union of sets operates with a logical OR. The set of countries that have a parliamentary system *or* a federal structure (A+B) obviously contains all cases that have either a parliamentary system, *or* a federal system, *or* both. In order to calculate a case's fuzzy membership score in the union of sets, one has to take the maximum score across all the joint sets.[23] A case's membership in the set of parliamentary systems of 0.9 and in federal systems of 0.4 yields a membership in the set of parliamentary *or* federal countries of 0.9, the maximum value across the two set membership values.

Truth tables and their logical minimization

Both in csQCA and fsQCA, the information on cases is represented in the form of truth tables. In a truth table, each row represents one of the 2^k logically possible combinations of conditions (with k being the number of conditions) and the outcome value that is observed in those cases that show one of the 2^k conjunctions. In csQCA, each case falls into one, and only one, truth table row, whereas in fsQCA cases have partial membership in more than one row (see below, section 'Fuzzy set truth table algorithm'). Cases in the same row are analytically identical and the differences between cases in different rows are interpreted as qualitative differences of kind and not quantitative differences of degree. A truth table indicates under which combination of conditions a given outcome occurs and under which conditions it does not occur. Each row with the outcome value 1 can thus be interpreted as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the outcome and any row linked to the outcome value 0 as a sufficient condition for the non-occurrence of the outcome. This empirical information contained in a truth table can be minimized through a process of logical reduction during which the initial truth value – the initial information under which combination of conditions the outcome occurs – is not violated, but simply expressed in a more parsimonious but logically equivalent way.[24]

Table 5.1 displays a truth table for the three conditions A, B, C and the outcome Y from the example above. Out of the eight logically possible combinations between the three conditions, five are connected with the occurrence of the outcome (Y = 1). This is the most complex answer to the question, which conditions are sufficient for the outcome Y, and can be expressed in a solution formula as follows:

ABC + ABc + Abc + aBc + abc → Y.

The rules for logical minimization dictate that if two truth table rows coincide in their outcome value, and differ only in the value of one condition, that condition is logically redundant. It can be eliminated and the two truth table rows can be merged into one. For example, row 1 in Table 5.1 states ABC → Y and row two states ABc → Y. Hence, in the presence of AB, condition C is irrelevant for producing Y. We can thus logically minimize rows one and two to the expression AB → Y. Applying this principle to all rows with Y = 1 yields the most parsimonious solution term for Y:

AB + c → Y

This is the most parsimonious expression of the empirical evidence contained in the truth table. Any logical expression that is a subset of the most parsimonious solution term and a superset of the most complex solution term is also logically equivalent and thus an acceptable representation of the information contained in the truth table (Ragin and Sonnett 2004). Ultimately, it depends on the taste and goals of the researcher which level of parsimony and precision to choose and which of these different solution formulas to put into the center of substantive interpretation.

Table 5.1 Hypothetical truth table

row	Conditions			Outcome	
	A	*B*	*C*	*Y*	*Hypothetical cases*
1	1	1	1	1	Delta, Epsilon
2	1	1	0	1	Gamma
3	1	0	1	0	Alpha, Beta
4	1	0	0	1	Kappa
5	0	1	1	0	Iota
6	0	1	0	1	Zeta, Eta, Theta
7	0	0	1	0	Lambda, Mu
8	0	0	0	1	Omega

In the empirical analysis below in Chapter 6, I opt for the most complex solution term in order to maintain as much detailed information on cases as possible.

Solution formulae put the relationship between conditions and the outcome into the center of attention. In order to render them more focused on cases, too, one can indicate the case labels under each sufficient path towards the outcome. From the truth table above in Table 5.1, we know each case's configuration of conditions and thus know which case follows which sufficient path towards the outcome. We can therefore write:

$$A \cdot B + c \rightarrow Y$$

Cases covered: Delta, Epsilon, Gamma + Gamma, Kappa, Zeta, Eta, Theta, Omega

We see, for instance, that sufficient condition 'c' covers more cases (six) than path 'AB' (three) and that case 'Gamma' follows both sufficient paths. Focusing on cases and on conditions rather than just one of them is paramount for making the most of QCA, a method that aims at transcending the divide between case-oriented and variable-oriented research (Schneider and Grofman 2006).

Limited diversity in comparative social research

Truth tables are also powerful tools for detecting and specifying limited diversity. Limited diversity is defined as all those logically possible combinations of conditions for which no empirical evidence is at hand. Thus, in QCA limited diversity manifests itself through truth table rows for which no cases exist in the data set. These are so-called logical remainder rows. Comparative social research based on observational data, as opposed to experimental data, almost inevitably suffers from limited diversity, and this has a crucial impact on drawing causal inference – regardless of the data analysis technique used.

Take again the hypothetical truth table in Table 5.1. This time, however, case XL is not observed and row 8 is thus a logical remainder. Hence, it is impossible to empirically observe the outcome value (Y or not-Y) for the conjunction 'abc'. Applying the logical minimization rules described previously to the empirical evidence at hand yields as the solution term:

$$AB + Ac + Bc \rightarrow Y$$

As can be seen, the presence of limited diversity changes the analytic results. Before, when case XL was observed, it was $AB + c \rightarrow Y$.

One of the strengths of QCA is that it makes limited diversity directly visible via a truth table and thus forces the researcher to make conscious and explicit decisions on these 'empty cells' rather than assuming them away by default. In QCA, different possible treatments of logical remainder rows exist.[25] One way of mitigating the problem of limited diversity is the so-called two-step QCA approach, which is described now and which I apply in the empirical analysis of CoD in Chapter 6.

Two-step QCA approach

For the empirical analysis of CoD factors, I use the two-step QCA approach developed by Schneider and Wagemann (2006, see also 2007: 81ff.). This module is explicitly modeled on the distinction between remote and proximate factors and it directly tackles the omnipresent problem of limited diversity.

The basic logic of the two-step QCA module is the following. In a first step, only the remote structural factors are analyzed using QCA. The result of this first step is different (combinations of) contextual factors that enable the outcome but do not provide a satisfying account of its occurrence. In other words, the analysis of remote factors alone leads to the formulation of different contexts in which the occurrence of the outcome is possible[26] but they do not produce, or explain, the outcome.[27] In order to discern broad patterns of outcome-enabling contexts, lower consistency thresholds (see following) are chosen and simplifying assumptions about the logical remainders are allowed in order to produce the most parsimonious solution term.[28] Therefore, in the second QCA analytical step, proximate factors are inserted into the outcome-enhancing, structurally defined contexts.[29] All outcome-enhancing conditions identified in step one are analyzed together with all proximate conditions. As the aim of the second QCA step is to find consistent sufficient conditions for the outcome, the consistency threshold for sufficiency is higher than in step one and no simplifying assumptions about the logical remainders are allowed.[30]

The number of logically possible combinations between conditions grows exponentially with the number of conditions. The formula is 2^k with k indicating the number of conditions. Splitting up the exponent k into two groups, as the two-step module does, drastically reduces the property space by ruling out as causally irrelevant after the first step many logically possible combinations between remote

and proximate conditions that empirically, however, do not contribute to the outcome (see Appendix B and Schneider and Wagemann 2006 for details). This reduction of truth table rows is based on theory – the distinction between remote and proximate factors – and empirical evidence – the result after the first QCA step.

Measures of fit – consistency and coverage

It is often argued that QCA can have little practical value as an empirical research method because the concepts of sufficiency and necessity by default require deterministic relations. For even if we do not assume that causal processes in the real world are stochastic, the concept of determinism in empirical research raises the problem that we can never be sure to have specified the correct model or to have correctly operationalized and measured the variables. In the presence of either omitted variables and/or incorrectly measured variables, cases will deviate from fully consistent patterns of necessary or sufficient relations, invalidating any attempt to detect fully consistent relations of necessity or sufficiency because no deviating cases are allowed for.

Fortunately, advanced QCA allows for deviations from perfect set relations and is far from deterministic. Two parameters of fit – consistency and coverage – provide numerical expressions for how well the QCA solution term represents the underlying data from which it has been generated (Ragin 2006b, Goertz 2006a, Schneider and Wagemann 2007: 86ff.). The *consistency* value for sufficient[31] conditions expresses the degree to which a given condition deviates from a perfect subset relation with the outcome and thus from being a 100 percent consistent sufficient condition. The *coverage* measures support the researcher in determining how much of the outcome is covered by a solution term. As a rule, one first needs to assess consistency. The calculation of coverage only makes sense for those conditions that pass the threshold for consistency. One can differentiate between 'solution coverage', which indicates how much is covered by the entire solution term; 'raw coverage', which indicates the share of the outcome explained by one of the different sufficient paths; and 'unique coverage', which indicates the share of the outcome *uniquely* explained by one of the alternative sufficient paths. Hence, while consistency expresses the degree to which a given condition (or a conjunction of conditions) is sufficient for the outcome, the coverage measures assign an empirical weight to that condition.

Both for calculating consistency and coverage, the information contained in the membership scores of cases in the condition and the outcome is used. The formula for calculating the consistency of a condition X as a sufficient condition for the outcome Y is as follows:

$$\text{Consistency}_{\text{sufficient condition}}(X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} X_i}$$

where X_i and Y_i denote the fuzzy set membership scores of the ith case in the condition and the outcome. If all cases have lower membership scores in condition X than in outcome Y, the formula for consistency of a sufficient condition takes on the value of 1, indicating that condition X is fully consistent with the statement of being a sufficient condition for outcome Y.[32] The more cases display membership scores in X that are higher than their membership scores in Y and the more the X-values exceed the Y-values, the lower the consistency value for this condition becomes as a sufficient condition for Y. As a rule of thumb, consistency values for sufficient conditions should not be lower than 0.7, preferably even much higher.

The formula for calculating the coverage of a sufficient condition is:

$$\text{Coverage}_{\text{sufficient condition}}(X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} Y_i}$$

If X stands for each case's membership score in the overall solution term (that is, all sufficient conditions combined by a logical OR), then this formula yields the 'solution coverage'; if X stands for each case's membership in one sufficient path, then it yields the 'raw coverage'. In macro-social reality, outcomes such as CoD are often explained by overlapping causes and in QCA this is expressed by the empirical overlap between different sufficient paths. The 'unique coverage' of a sufficient condition, i.e. that coverage of a single causal conjunction net of the coverage of all other causal conjunctions, is defined as the overall coverage of all sufficient conditions minus the coverage of all sufficient conditions except the share covered by the causal conjunction of interest. All measures of fit can be calculated with the fsQCA software.

The consistency value might be conceptually (though not mathematically) similar to the significance value of inferential statistics, and some of the coverage values might share some characteristics with measures which we know from regression analysis, such as the R^2 and partial correlation coefficients. The way consistency is calculated, it is a purely descriptive measure. Nothing in principle and practice, however, prevents the use of well-known statistical tools, ranging from simple binomial tests to more advanced statistical approaches to investigating set relations.[33] With regard to coverage, while we would like a (partial or solution) coverage of hundred percent in the same way that, in multivariate statistics, we might want an R^2 of 1 or high values for explained variance for a particular variable in an ANOVA table, one key aspect of QCA, linked to its equifinal epistemology, is its strength in detecting theoretically interesting conjunctions that might or might not apply to many empirical cases (Schneider and Grofman 2006). In QCA, one does not necessarily hunt for high coverage values. The *empirical* importance of a path, measured by the degree of coverage of the outcome to be explained, is not always equivalent to its *theoretical* importance. Some paths with a high coverage can be theoretically uninteresting or even trivial and, vice versa, empirically weak

paths might carry very interesting theoretical implications, e.g. they cover cases that usually remain unexplained or cases that in themselves are important.

Fuzzy set truth table algorithm

Like csQCA, the analysis of fuzzy set data in fsQCA is based on the principles of truth tables. In order to understand how fuzzy set data can be represented in a crisp truth table, it is necessary to explain the fuzzy set truth table algorithm (Ragin 2006a and 2008a).[34]

In order to present fuzzy data in a crisp truth table the following steps are taken. First, cases are assigned to one of the truth table rows. This is possible because the fuzzy conditions (k) used in a fsQCA analysis form a multidimensional property space (Lazarsfeld 1937, Ragin 2000) with 2^k corners. Each of these 2^k corners corresponds to one of the 2^k rows of a truth table. There is thus a direct correspondence between the 2^k logically possible combinations, the corners of a vector space, and truth table rows (Ragin 2008b: ch. 7). Each case has partial membership in most corners/truth table rows. It is a property of fuzzy sets, however, that each case has a fuzzy membership of higher than 0.5 in only *one* of the 2^k combinations.[35] In other words, for each case one can identify one truth table row to which this case belongs most, i.e. a combination that is the best description of a case's characteristics.

After assigning each case to one of the 2^k truth table rows, one can distinguish between those truth table rows that contain enough empirical evidence (i.e. those with at least one case with a fuzzy set membership of higher than 0.5) and those truth table rows without enough empirical evidence. The latter are assigned the status of logical remainders. For those truth table rows that contain enough empirical evidence, a distinction can be made between those that are subsets of the outcome and thus sufficient conditions and those that are not. The assessment of a subset relation is performed based on the formula for consistency of a sufficient condition introduced above. Any truth table row that passes a pre-established threshold for consistency can be interpreted as a sufficient condition for the outcome and, consequently, is assigned the outcome value of 1. In contrast, any truth table row that does not pass the threshold for consistency cannot be interpreted as a sufficient condition for the outcome and, thus, receives the outcome value of 0.

Once cases have been distributed to one of the 2^k truth table rows and once each of these rows has an outcome value assigned expressing its status as a sufficient condition for the outcome, a truth table is obtained that can be analysed just as any normal truth table based on crisp set data using the minimization rules described previously.[36] Despite its dichotomous appearance, the fuzzy data has not been dichotomized. The more fine-grained information contained in fuzzy set membership scores is never lost but merely summarized for a short analytic moment in the form of a crisp truth table and is used in the subsequent analytic steps, especially when calculating the values of consistency and coverage.[37]

Figure 5.2 Example of x-y plot

x-y plots

A powerful way of displaying analytic results generated with fsQCA is the so-called x-y plot. On the y-axis, the fuzzy membership values of the cases in the outcome are displayed. On the x-axis, the cases' fuzzy membership score in the condition are shown, where the condition, of course, can consist of combinations of different factors.

Despite its apparent similarity, the x-y plot should not be interpreted as a scatter plot because the axes carry different meanings. In an x-y plot the axes make references to fuzzy sets and fuzzy sets, in turn, are calibrated measures with endpoints that carry a qualitative meaning (i.e. full membership and full non-membership in a set), therefore, all four corner regions and the main diagonal of the plot have a substantive meaning, too. Drawing the main diagonal (connecting the 0,0 corner with the 1,1 corner), subdivides the plot into two equal halves. The area above the main diagonal is where the x-values are smaller than the y-values. Hence, if all cases fall in the upper triangle, condition X is a subset of Y and can be interpreted as a sufficient condition (Ragin 2000).[38]

The more cases fall below the main diagonal, the less *consistent* is a sufficient condition. Case A in Figure 5.2, for example, contributes to the less than perfectly consistent sufficiency relation. Knowing which cases deviate from a perfect subset relation can help to re-specify the analysis and/or to gain substantive insights by giving these cases a closer look. In contrast, cases to which the solution term does not apply well are on the left hand side of the x-y plot. Case B, for instance, has a high membership in the outcome but low membership in the sufficient condition and is thus not well covered by this sufficient path towards the outcome. The more cases are on the upper left hand side of the plot, the less *coverage* is achieved.

In this chapter one notion of causal complexity was presented. This was done because the hypothesis on CoD developed in the previous chapter generates expectations that *different combinations* of political institutions and societal

context fit to each other in terms of power dispersion and, thus, should be sufficient for CoD; and that different conjunctions should lead to not-CoD. In other words, in my approach to CoD I expect conjunctural causation, equifinality, and asymmetry. These phenomena can be adequately captured with the notions of necessity and sufficiency, which, in turn, describe subset relations between conditions and the outcome CoD. As shown, QCA is the appropriate technique for dealing with causal complexity because it models subset relations and is, thus, designed for detecting necessary and sufficient conditions. Furthermore, QCA works better than other data analysis techniques frequently used in comparative social science when the number of cases is too large for using classical comparative case study approaches based on Mill's methods and, at the same time, too small to perform advanced multivariate statistical techniques sophisticated enough to match the level of causal complexity postulated in the hypotheses. Using fuzzy set QCA, I avoid the need to use dichotomized data. Furthermore, the two-step fsQCA approach, a module explicitly designed for the study of remote and proximate conditions, contributes to mitigating the omnipresent methodological and substantive problem of limited diversity. Finally, as shown, with the parameters of fit – consistency and coverage – researchers using QCA are not doomed to produce purely deterministic logical statements but have a tool at hand to express how well their solution term describes the underlying empirical data. The following chapter applies fsQCA to the analysis of the conditions for CoD in 32 countries from different world regions.

6   CoD and the fit of institutions to contexts

Which combination of conditions account for CoD and which ones for not-CoD? The expectation is that all the conjunctions of factors that lead to CoD represent a fit in terms of power dispersion between a country's societal and political-institutional characteristics. Following the sequence of analytic steps prescribed by the standards of good practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2007 and forthcoming), the analysis starts with a test for necessary conditions for the occurrence of CoD and not-CoD, respectively. The analysis of sufficient conditions is performed based on the two-step fsQCA approach (see Chapter 5 and Schneider and Wagemann 2006).

Table 6.1 displays the fuzzy set membership scores for the 32 countries in the six societal and three institutional conditions, and the outcome CoD. All subsequent fsQCA analyses are based on this data.[1] Out of the 32 cases analyzed, 19 (59 percent) are more in than out of the *set of consolidated democracies*, that is, they have a fuzzy set membership score in this set that is higher than 0.5. Cases such as Spain, Portugal, Uruguay, or Slovenia scored around 80 percent or more on my CoD index (see Chapter 3), and thus they come close to being fully in the set of consolidated democracies. Only 13 cases are more in than out of the *set of socioeconomically developed countries*. To qualify for a set membership of higher than 0.5, a country must have a GDP of 8,500 USD or higher. Cases like Spain (GDP of almost 20,000 USD) or Slovenia (17,400 USD), but also Argentina (12,000 USD) easily exceed this benchmark and obtain high fuzzy set membership scores, while Nicaragua (2,100 USD) or Georgia (2,470 USD) are almost fully out of the set of socioeconomically developed countries and thus receive membership scores close to 0.

Despite the demanding criteria imposed for being a member of the set of educated societies – it not only requires high literacy rate but also elevated levels of higher education enrollment (see Appendix A) – still 24 cases are more in than out of this set. With the exception of Mexico, the Central American cases of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua perform far worse than countries in other regions. Only Turkey displays similarly low figures of literacy and higher education enrollment and, consequently, has an equally low membership of 0.19 in the fuzzy set of educated societies. Three countries (Bolivia, Guatemala, and Latvia) are fully out, and two further countries (Peru and Georgia) almost fully out of the set of ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies. More than half of

Table 6.1 Fuzzy set membership scores in remote and proximate conditions and the outcome

| Country | Label | Outcome | Conditions | | | | | | | | |
		CoD	ECONDEV	EDUCHI	ETHLIHOM	CLOSE	DEMEX	NOCOM	PARLSYS	PARFRAHI	DECENT
Albania	AL	0.35	0.06	0.45	0.94	0.88	0.05	0.00	0.80	0.21	0.03
Argentina	AR	0.84	0.72	0.88	0.42	0.03	0.15	1.00	0.00	0.54	0.97
Belarus	BE	0.06	0.37	0.90	0.14	0.88	0.05	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.25
Bolivia	BO	0.41	0.03	0.48	0.00	0.10	0.05	1.00	0.00	0.77	0.42
Brazil	BR	0.65	0.34	0.58	0.94	0.07	0.57	1.00	0.00	0.97	0.86
Bulgaria	BU	0.82	0.17	0.62	0.65	0.86	0.05	0.20	0.80	0.43	0.74
Chile	CH	0.69	0.54	0.77	0.81	0.03	0.68	1.00	0.00	0.87	0.44
Czech Rep.	CR	0.85	0.79	0.74	0.90	0.97	0.72	0.20	1.00	0.80	0.39
Ecuador	EC	0.35	0.05	0.80	0.02	0.27	0.05	1.00	0.00	0.94	0.35
Estonia	EST	0.65	0.54	0.96	0.01	0.88	0.07	0.00	0.80	0.90	0.35
Georgia	GE	0.13	0.04	0.72	0.02	0.43	0.05	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.23
Greece	GR	0.93	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.77	0.90	1.00	1.00	0.25	0.35
Guatemala	GUA	0.19	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.47	0.15	1.00	0.00	0.62	0.00
Honduras	HO	0.35	0.03	0.13	0.89	0.48	0.60	1.00	0.00	0.21	0.41
Hungary	HU	0.76	0.72	0.67	0.97	0.94	0.05	0.20	1.00	0.66	0.30
Latvia	LAT	0.65	0.30	0.93	0.00	0.90	0.47	0.00	0.80	0.96	0.46
Lithuania	LIT	0.65	0.30	0.90	0.19	0.90	0.05	0.00	0.40	0.47	0.62
Mexico	MX	0.65	0.52	0.53	0.67	0.46	0.05	1.00	0.00	0.56	0.84
Mongolia	MO	0.78	0.02	0.58	0.80	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.60	0.02	0.47

Table 6.1 Fuzzy set membership scores in remote and proximate conditions and the outcome (*continued*)

Country	Label	Outcome	Conditions								
		CoD	ECONDEV	EDUCHI	ETHLIHOM	CLOSE	DEMEX	NOCOM	PARLSYS	PARFRAHI	DECENT
Nicaragua	NI	0.49	0.03	0.12	0.66	0.45	0.05	1.00	0.00	0.36	0.63
Paraguay	PA	0.15	0.10	0.46	0.77	0.05	0.05	1.00	0.00	0.26	0.29
Peru	PE	0.32	0.11	0.83	0.01	0.14	0.51	1.00	0.00	0.75	0.10
Poland	PL	0.84	0.53	0.90	0.96	0.94	0.21	0.20	0.40	0.86	0.35
Portugal	PO	0.93	0.90	0.83	0.97	0.86	0.51	1.00	0.60	0.55	0.19
Romania	RO	0.75	0.24	0.48	0.70	0.85	0.05	0.20	0.60	0.70	0.47
Russia	RU	0.13	0.44	0.88	0.25	0.71	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.99	0.97
Slovakia	SK	0.81	0.66	0.79	0.61	0.95	0.72	0.20	1.00	0.79	0.77
Slovenia	SL	0.94	0.91	0.83	0.78	0.96	0.05	0.20	1.00	0.95	0.34
Spain	SP	0.95	0.94	0.97	0.03	0.92	0.92	1.00	1.00	0.51	0.63
Turkey	TU	0.26	0.31	0.19	0.55	0.74	0.40	1.00	1.00	0.42	0.35
Ukraine	UK	0.40	0.07	0.85	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.00	0.40	1.00	0.35
Uruguay	UR	0.96	0.52	0.84	0.56	0.03	0.65	1.00	0.00	0.62	0.65
'more in than out'		19	13	24	18	18	10	16	14	23	10

Notes:

ECONDEV = set of socioeconomically developed countries; EDUCHI = set of educated societies; ETHLIHOM = set of ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies; CLOSE = set of cases geographically located close to the West; DECENT = set of cases with decentralized political systems; DEMEX = set of cases with prior experiences with democracy; NOCOM = set of cases with no previous communist experience; PARLSYS = set of cases with parliamentary systems; PARFRAHI = set of cases with a high number of political parties.

the cases studied are more in than out of this set. Six out of these 18 cases have particularly ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies, as indicated by their very high (>0.9) membership in this fuzzy set. Out of the 32 cases, 18 belong to the set of cases geographically located close to the West. The majority of cases (22 out of 32) have had little or no substantive *prior experiences with democracy* and are thus more out than in this set. Exactly half of the cases have not had any previous communist experience. Among the cases with previous communist experience, the former Soviet Republics (FSR, nine cases) all receive a fuzzy set membership score of zero, whereas the countries in CEE are assigned a score of 0.2.[2]

With regard to the proximate conditions, it is interesting that despite the global tendency towards implementing parliamentary regimes, the countries studied here are almost evenly split between parliamentary systems (mostly the European cases) and non-parliamentary systems (mostly the Latin American cases): 14 out of 32 cases have a membership in the set of parliamentary systems of higher than 0.5. The picture is less equilibrated when looking at the set of systems with a high number of parties. A majority of cases (23 out of 32) have fragmented party systems and thus receive membership scores of 0.5 or higher in this set. Finally, only a minority of cases (10 out of 32) show substantive territorial distribution of public authority simultaneously in fiscal, administrative and political matters. Argentina and Russia turn out to be the most, and Guatemala and Albania the least decentralized political systems in my data.

The aim of the following fsQCA analyses is to find subset relations of necessity and sufficiency between the outcome CoD and not-CoD, on the one hand, and the different combinations of societal and institutional conditions, on the other.

Searching for necessary conditions

The first analytical task consists in searching for necessary conditions. Often times the asymmetric nature of necessity claims is not taken into account (Goertz and Starr 2003) and it is incorrectly assumed that if the presence of a condition is necessary for the presence of the outcome, then the absence of the same condition must also be a necessary condition for the absence of the outcome. This is wrong. From formal logical we know that if condition X is necessary for an outcome Y, then not-X is *sufficient* for not-Y (see also Chapter 5). QCA does not share the simplifying assumption of symmetry and therefore requires separate analyses of necessity and sufficiency for the occurrence of CoD and its non-occurrence, respectively.

Within the study of democracy and democratization, an argument that is often read as one of necessity is put forth by the precondition school, whose most prominent representatives come from the different realms of modernization theory (Lipset 1959). Based on these theories, one would expect the level of economic development and/or the level of education to be a necessary condition for CoD, for socioeconomic development is frequently hypothesized to come temporarily prior to the establishment of democracy. In addition, parts of the institutional literature have highlighted the virtues of parliamentarism (Linz 1990) for CoD to

Table 6.2 Necessity test for CoD and not-CoD, remote and proximate conditions and their negations

Condition	CoD		not-CoD	
	consistency	*coverage*	*consistency*	*coverage*
Socioeconomically developed society	0.621	n.r	0.397	n.r.
Not socioeconomically developed society	0.626	n.r	0.950	0.641
Educated society	0.882	n.r	0.768	n.r.
Not educated society	0.392	n.r	0.616	n.r.
Ethno-linguistically homogeneous society	0.689	n.r	0.489	n.r.
Not ethno-linguistically homogeneous society	0.494	n.r	0.769	n.r.
Close to the West	0.741	n.r	0.678	n.r.
Not close to the West	0.476	n.r	0.626	n.r
Previous democratic experience	0.452	n.r	0.332	n.r
No previous democratic experience	0.753	n.r	0.956	0.554
No communist past	0.563	n.r	0.603	n.r
Communist past	0.498	n.r	0.483	n.r
Parliamentary system	0.593	n.r	0.352	n.r
No parliamentary system	0.533	n.r	0.826	n.r
High party fragmentation	0.776	n.r	0.825	n.r
No high party fragmentation	0.467	n.r	0.516	n.r
Decentralization	0.667	n.r	0.606	n.r
No decentralization	0.652	n.r	0.842	n.r
Not socioeconomically developed society without prior democratic experience	–	–	0.910	0.681

Notes: n.r. = coverage value not relevant due to low consistency value.

such an extent that one might expect this feature to come close to being a necessary condition for CoD.

For each of the two outcomes – CoD and not-CoD – Table 6.2 displays two pieces of information for each of the nine conditions and their negations.[3] The two 'Consistency' columns display the degree to which the given condition is consistent with the statement of being a necessary condition for the outcome CoD and the outcome not-CoD, respectively. As explained, a value of 1 indicates a perfect consistency while values lower than 1 indicate a deviation from this perfect set relationship (see Chapter 5 and Appendix B). In general, fairly high consistency values should be applied for the test of necessity (see Schneider and Wagemann 2007 for arguments on that). The two 'Coverage' columns display a numerical expression of the empirical importance of a necessary condition.

The higher the coverage value the more empirically important is the necessary condition. Low coverage values, in turn, indicate that the condition under question is a trivial necessary condition (Ragin 2006b, Goertz 2006a). The interpretation of the coverage scores is only relevant for those conditions that pass the threshold of consistency, for it makes no sense to assess the empirical importance of a condition that does not pass the test of being a necessary condition.

The analysis of necessary conditions for the *occurrence* of CoD reveals that none of the nine remote and proximate conditions and their complements is necessary for producing CoD across my 32 cases from the East and South. The most likely candidates for necessity – the level of economic development and a parliamentary system – clearly fail to meet the standards with consistency values of 0.621[4] and 0.593 respectively. Another plausible candidate for necessity frequently mentioned in the literature is education (e.g. Lipset 1959; Rowen 1995). And, in fact, the set 'educated society' achieves a consistency value of 0.882 as a necessary condition for CoD – the highest value among all conditions but still below the recommended threshold of 0.9. Thus, an interpretation of 'educated society' as a necessary condition for CoD is not warranted. The finding that there is no condition that passes the test as a necessary condition for CoD is in line with that part of the democratization literature that expresses doubt over the claims of the precondition school, and it coincides with the simple observation that the last wave of democratization, in particular, has brought democracy to quite unlikely places (see Chapter 3).

The investigation of necessary conditions for the *non-occurrence* of CoD yields a slightly different picture. Both the absence of a socioeconomically developed society (consistency value 0.950)[5] and the lack of previous democratic experience (consistency value 0.956) pass the consistency test as necessary conditions for the non-occurrence of CoD. Both are also non-trivial necessary conditions as is indicated by their high coverage values. What is more, even their intersection – that is, the societal characteristic of simultaneously being not economically developed and without prior democratic experience – is a consistent (0.910) and non-trivial (0.681) necessary condition for non-CoD.

The finding that lack of economic development is necessary for the lack of CoD seems to foster that part of the literature that argues for the existence of preconditions for democracy – but it does so only partially. Only if it was *assumed* that necessity denotes a symmetric relationship, or if it was *empirically* demonstrated that the presence of economic development was necessary for the presence of CoD, would one have full support for the claim that there are certain societal preconditions for CoD. As shown above, though, necessity relations are not symmetric and empirically the presence of socioeconomic development is not necessary for the presence of CoD. Furthermore, the finding that the lack of prior democratic experience is necessary for the absence of CoD lends some indirect support to the observation that for many cases, successful democratization and consolidation does not work out the first time. Most countries have to try more than once before they succeed in consolidating democracy, just think of virtually all Latin American cases of successful CoD, but also Spain.

Analyzing sufficient conditions

I now turn to the analysis of sufficient conditions for CoD and not-CoD. In the framework of the two-step QCA approach, the first analytic step consists in finding those contexts in which the occurrence of the outcome CoD is enhanced. This means that only remote conditions are specified in this first analysis. In the second step, all proximate factors are added to the picture with the aim to find out which combinations of these proximate conditions need to be combined with which of the CoD-enhancing context conditions in order to be jointly sufficient for the occurrence of CoD (see Chapter 4).

First step: Analysis of CoD enhancing remote context conditions

Based on the discussion of the most prominent hypotheses on societal factors for CoD step 1 starts with the following model.

COD = f(ECONDEV, EDUC, ETHLIHOM, CLOSE, DEMEX, NOCOM),

where ECONDEV represents the set of socioeconomically developed societies; EDUC the set of educated societies; ETHLIHOM the set of ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies; CLOSE the set of countries close to the west; DEMEX the set of democratically experienced countries; and NOCOM the set of non-former communist countries. The analytic task now is to find which (combinations) of them empirically constitute CoD-enhancing contexts.

Table 6.3 shows the outcome of the fuzzy set truth table algorithm (see Chapter 5) with CoD as the outcome and the six remote conditions. The 'Consistency' column gives a numeric expression of how consistent each combination is with the statement that this combination is a subset of the outcome. The 'Case' column indicates which cases have a membership higher than 0.5 in the respective combination of conditions. Since six different societal features are used, it comes as no surprise that most countries are analytically different and thus fall into different truth table rows. Most configurations describe best just one country (e.g. rows 2, 5, 6, and 7), some others two or more (e.g. rows 1, 3, or 20). Those rows that cover more than one case make intuitive sense. Row 1, for instance, shows that, not surprisingly, the Czech Republic and Slovakia display the same configuration of societal features and row 15 shows that Nicaragua and Paraguay look similar with regard to the six remote conditions. Despite the empirical diversity among cases, the amount of limited diversity (see Chapter 5) in the data is still high. Of the 64 logically possible combinations of conditions, 44 do not contain cases. For these logical remainders it is not possible to empirically determine the value of CoD, for these 'cases' simply do not exist in the data. With this information at hand, it can be determined whether a given combination of conditions can be interpreted as a CoD-enhancing context (1) or not (0) or whether not enough empirical information is available to make a clear decision (logical remainder). I use the following thresholds: in order to be interpreted as a CoD-enhancing combination of conditions, its consistency value

Table 6.3 Sufficiency test of remote conditions for CoD

Configuration	Conditions						Outcome: CoD-enhancing[a]	Consistency[b]	Cases[c]
	ECONDEV	EDUC	ETHLIHOM	CLOSE	DEMEX	NOCOM			
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1.000	CR,SK
2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000	SP
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.000	GR,PO
4	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000	CH,UR
5	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000	BR
6	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1.000	AR
7	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1.000	MX
8	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.946	HU,PL,SL
9	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.930	HO
10	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.921	PE
11	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.917	BU
12	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.915	RO,AL

Table 6.3 Sufficiency test of remote conditions for CoD (*continued*)

Configuration	Conditions						Outcome: CoD-enhancing[a]	Consistency[b]	Cases[c]
	ECONDEV	EDUC	ETHLIHOM	CLOSE	DEMEX	NOCOM			
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.899	MO
14	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.873	NI,PA
15	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.862	BO,GUA
16	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.836	EC
17	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.827	TU
18	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.813	EST
19	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.701	GE
20	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0.680	BE,RU,UA,LAT,LIT
21–64							?	-	-

Notes:
a A combination of conditions that does not contain at least one case with fuzzy membership higher than 0.5 is treated as a logical remainder; if it contains at least one case and passes the consistency threshold of 0.8, it is interpreted as a sufficient conjunction for the outcome CoD and thus receives a score of 1; if it fails to pass the consistency threshold, it receives a score of 0.

b Consistency with the statement that this configuration is a subset of the outcome and, thus, interpretable as sufficient for the outcome.

c Cases with fuzzy membership score higher than 0.5 in this configuration.

must be higher than 0.8 and it must contain at least one case with a set membership higher than 0.5. Configurations that fulfill these two criteria are interpreted as CoD-enhancing societal contexts and coded 1 in the column 'CoD-enhancing'. Configurations not containing any case are coded as logical remainders and these rows are omitted from Table 6.3. Finally, configurations with cases but consistency values lower than 0.8 are not CoD-enhancing contexts and thus coded 0 in the column 'CoD-enhancing' (see Chapter 5).

As we are interested in the context conditions enhancing the occurrence of CoD, truth table rows scoring 1 in column 'CoD-enhancing' are included into the logical minimization process (see Chapter 5) while all 0-rows are excluded. In addition, following the script of the two-step fsQCA approach, all logical remainder rows are made available for potential use in the logical minimization process, allowing simplifying assumptions to be made about their outcome value.

The analysis of the remote conditions yields the results displayed in Table 6.4. The complex empirical information at hand can be logically reduced to three CoD-enhancing contexts. The occurrence of CoD is enhanced in socioeconomically developed societies (ECONDEV) and/or in ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies (ETHLIHOM) and/or in non-former communist societies (NOCOM) and/or in societies that combine two or all three features. The other three remote factors tested here – educated society, prior democratic experiences, and closeness to the West – are logically redundant and not needed to represent the relation between societal conditions and CoD.

The design of the two-step QCA approach explicitly relies on the fact that the first step yields inconclusive results. The three remote context terms, thus, represent the underlying data in a logically minimized way, but allow for a certain level of deviation from the statement of sufficiency. As indicated in Table 6.4, the consistency value of 'socioeconomically developed society' as a sufficient condition for CoD is 0.945. In essence, this means that about 95 percent of the empirical evidence is in line with the statement that this condition is sufficient for CoD. The values for the other two conditions are smaller: 81 percent for 'ethno-linguistically

Table 6.4 Consistency and coverage solution of CoD-enhancing remote conditions

	Consistency	*Raw coverage*	*Unique coverage*
ECONDEV +	0.945	0.621	0.062
ETHLIHOM +	0.807	0.689	0.124
NOCOM	0.621	0.562	0.082
solution consistency	0.668		
solution coverage	0.910		

Notes:
Quine Algorithm
Outcome: CoD-enhancing.
Simplifying assumptions on logical remainders.
Frequency cut-off for truth table rows: 1.000.
Consistency cut-off for truth table rows: 0.800.

homogeneous society' and 62 percent for 'non-former communist society'. From the very low unique coverage values we can infer that all three CoD-enhancing conditions heavily overlap, that is, many consolidated democracies have higher membership in more than one, if not all three of these CoD-enhancing contexts. As expected and intended by the two-step fsQCA analysis, this result after the first step is incomplete. First, the entire solution term (i.e. all three conditions together) is highly inconsistent with a consistency score of only 67 percent. This means that not all cases displaying one (or more) of the CoD-enhancing contexts necessarily also have a consolidated political system and, vice versa, not all consolidated democracies are located in societies characterized by one (or more) of the three remote context conditions. Thus, the 91 percent coverage of the fuzzy set scores in the outcome CoD can not be meaningfully interpreted (see Chapter 5). And, second, from theory we know that remote factors alone are not expected to produce CoD and that political-institutional factors need to be added to the analytic picture. In short, the solution formula based on only societal conditions leaves room for improvement in empirical fit and theoretical subtlety. That improvement is expected to occur when the proximate political-institutional factors are introduced into the analysis. Before that, let us look at the empirical distribution of cases among the different CoD-enhancing contexts.

Based on the classification of single societal context conditions developed in Chapter 4, the eight logically possible combinations of these three context conditions can be classified as shown in Table 6.5. Some contexts require power dispersion in both the vertical and the horizontal dimension, such as socioeconomically developed societies that are also ethno-linguistically heterogeneous, regardless of whether or not they are former communist societies (rows 3 and 4 in Table 6.5). Only a few cases – Argentina (AR), Spain (SP), and Estonia (EST) – show these types of context. All ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies do not require any

Table 6.5 Power dispersion typology of societal contexts

Context types	Context conditions			Dimensions		Cases
	ECONDEV	ETHLIHOM	NOCOM	vertical	horizontal	
1	1	1	1	N	D	CH,GR,MX,PO,UR
2	1	1	0	N	D	CR,HU,PL,SK,SL
3	1	0	1	D	D	AR,SP
4	1	0	0	D	D	EST
5	0	1	1	N	C	BR,NI,HO,PA
6	0	1	0	N	C	AL,BU,MO,RO
7	0	0	1	D	C	BO,EC,GUA,PE,TU
8	0	0	0	D	C	BE,GE,LAT,LIT, RU,UA

Notes: 1 = condition is present; 0 = condition is absent; C = context requires power concentration; D = context requires power dispersion; N = context is power neutral.

specific degree of dispersion or concentration in the vertical dimension (denoted as neutral [N] in Table 6.5). However, due to other societal features, some require dispersion (rows 1 and 2) and some power concentration (rows 5 and 6) in the horizontal dimension.

As Table 6.5 shows, all eight types of societal contexts occur in the data. Only a minority of five cases simultaneously display all three allegedly positive context conditions, i.e. they are members of the sets of socioeconomically developed, ethno-linguistically homogeneous, non-former communist countries (row 1 in Table 6.5). While Chile, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, and Uruguay are, in fact, also members of the set of consolidated democracies, there are many more consolidated democracies in the data and some of them manage to achieve CoD in much less favorable societal contexts. As a matter of fact, there are 11 cases that are both not rich and not ethno-linguistically homogeneous (rows 7 and 8) among which some cases (Latvia and Lithuania) manage to consolidate despite these unfavorable contexts while others do not. Most cases of CoD depart from contexts that are CoD-enhancing and require power dispersion, mainly in the horizontal dimension. Significantly fewer cases manage to achieve CoD through more difficult contexts that require power concentration – but some do. Bulgaria is a case of an economically not highly developed, ethno-linguistically homogeneous former communist country that is nevertheless classified as a consolidated democracy. Also, Mongolia achieves CoD from a similar context. The reason those cases manage to achieve CoD even under these societal circumstances is, so I claim, because they have chosen an adequate type of democracy.

The empirical distribution of types of democracy is displayed in Table 6.6. This table is identical to Table 4.1 in Chapter 4 but adds case labels to the respective political-institutional configurations. As in the case of societal contexts, all eight democracy types also occur in the data. The most popular configuration (seven among the 32 cases) is a parliamentary system with a fragmented party system and no decentralization (row 4 in Table 6.6), a democracy type found in some CEE countries and the Baltics, but also in Portugal. There is no discernible geographical pattern as to which democracy type is chosen. Power-dispersing democracies can be found both in Europe's East (Russia and Slovakia) and the South (Spain) and in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay). Power-concentrating democracies are also found in different word regions, from Southern Europe over Central and South America to Mongolia in Central Asia.

As with the types of context, many democracy types are also linked to both the occurrence and non-occurrence of CoD. Hence, neither power-dispersing nor power-concentrating democracies per se are unequivocally linked to either CoD or not-CoD. What matters, instead, is whether institutions and contexts fit in terms of power dispersion. This is why I now turn to the second fsQCA step and analyze which types of contexts link up with which type of democracy in order to be jointly sufficient for CoD.

Table 6.6 Power dispersion typology of democracy types

Democracy types	Institutional conditions			Dimensions		Cases
	PARLSYS	PARFRAHI	DECENT	vertical	horizontal	
1	1	1	1	D	D	SK,SP
2	0	1	1	D	D	AR,BR,MX,RU,UR
3	0	1	0	D	C	BE,BO, CH, EC,GE, GUA,PE, PL, UA
4	1	1	0	D	C	CR,HU,PO,RO,SL, EST,LAT
5	1	0	1	C	D	BU
6	0	0	1	C	D	LIT, NI
7	1	0	0	C	C	AL,GR,MO, TU,
8	0	0	0	C	C	HO,PA

Notes: 1 = condition is present; 0 = condition is absent; C = democracy type concentrates power; D = democracy type disperses power.

Second step: institutions in contexts as sufficient paths towards CoD

In the first fsQCA step, different characteristics of a country's societal context have been found that contribute to CoD but do not produce it on their own. The task in the second fsQCA step consists of finding out which different *combinations* of institutional features in neo-democracies *within* these different contexts are leading to CoD and which ones are leading to the lack of CoD. As mentioned, the expectation is that actors behave in a rule-affirming way – and, thus, consolidate democracy – if the rules of the democratic game reflect the needs of the relevant actors in a given society of having access to the collectively binding decision-making processes. As societies differ in their configuration of relevant social forces, their relative size, rights, and resources, the need for power dispersion differs across societies and, as a consequence of that, different configurations of democratic institutions should satisfy the collective actors' needs and expectations. What matters for achieving CoD, thus, is the fit between the type of democracy and the societal context. Inversely, a mismatch between societal context conditions and the type of democracy implemented is expected to lead to non-CoD.

All three CoD-enhancing remote conditions plus the three proximate institutional factors are analyzed together in the second fsQCA step. Following the two-step QCA template (see Chapter 5 and Appendix B), the consistency value for sufficient conditions must be higher than in the first QCA step and is set to a value of 0.9.[6] Furthermore, any combination that does not contain at least one case with a fuzzy set membership score higher than 0.5 is treated as a logical remainder. No simplifying assumptions on these logical remainders are allowed. Even more, in the following analysis, I do not perform any logical minimization at all. This is done in order to maintain the configurational nature of my claim that CoD occurs when

democracy types fit to societal context conditions. Any logical minimization would mean a loss of detail as to which democracy type is implemented in any given country and which combination of societal conditions is in place. Since the power-dispersing character of a democracy type changes with the change of one single institution, such information on institutional features should not be minimized away. The same holds true for the configuration of context conditions.

Table 6.7 displays the 22 combinations between remote and proximate conditions for which at least one case has a membership of higher than 0.5. To facilitate the substantive interpretation, labels of those cases are reported that are best described by a given combination of conditions. Furthermore, each path's consistency value as a sufficient condition for the outcome CoD and for the outcome not-CoD is displayed. Finally, the columns CoD and not-CoD, respectively, indicate whether the given combination fulfils the test parameter and thus can be interpreted as a sufficient condition for either CoD or for not-CoD or whether it is not sufficient for any of the two possible outcomes.

Due to the fact that I opt for a conservative approach to the empirical evidence and do not logically minimize the configurations of conditions, the pattern displayed in the truth table is already the result of the fsQCA analysis. Each row with an outcome value of 1 in either column CoD or column not-CoD is a sufficient condition for CoD or not-CoD, respectively. With the parameters and minimization strategy just described, 15 different conjunctions pass the consistency thresholds for sufficient paths leading to CoD (rows 1–15). Another four paths are consistent enough to be interpreted as sufficient conditions for not-CoD (rows 19–22). The remaining three truth table rows containing enough empirical evidence (rows 16–18) are neither sufficient for CoD nor for not-CoD. Rows 23–64 are logical remainder rows and are not displayed in the table nor included in the subsequent substantive analysis.

In order to explain how to read the information contained in Table 6.7, take path p4 in row number four as an example. It describes cases that are socioeconomically developed, ethno-linguistically homogeneous, and former communist regimes. Within this societal context, a democracy type has been installed that can be described as a parliamentary system with a higher number of parties and no substantive decentralization. Out of my 32 cases, three are best described by this ideal type of remote-proximate configuration: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.[7] The consistency value of this conjunction as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of CoD is 100 percent while it is very low (47 percent) for the occurrence of not-CoD. Hence, this conjunction is interpreted as a sufficient condition for CoD. As such, it covers about 18 percent of this outcome. As another example, consider path n3 in row number 21. It denotes socioeconomically undeveloped, ethno-linguistically heterogenous former communist societies combined with a presidential system with many parties and high levels of decentralization. Russia is the only case that has a high membership in this ideal type.[8] This combination of conditions passes the threshold as a sufficient condition for not-CoD (0.933) and it covers 20 percent of this outcome.

Some of the sufficient paths towards CoD do depart from contexts that are

Table 6.7 Sufficient paths towards CoD and not-CoD

Row	Path	ECON-DEV	ETHLI-HOM	NOCOM	PARLSYS	PAR-FRAHI	DECENT	Cases	CoD	Consistency CoD	Coverage CoD	Not-CoD	Consistency not-CoD	Coverage not-CoD
1	p1	1	0	1	1	1	1	SP	1	0.974	0.102	0	0.663	
2	p2	1	1	0	1	1	1	SK	1	0.976	0.152	0	0.591	
3	p3	1	1	1	1	1	0	PO	1	0.980	0.132	0	0.641	
4	p4	1	1	0	1	1	0	CR,HU, SL	1	1	0.179	0	0.473	
5	p5	0	1	0	1	1	0	RO	1	1	0.135	0	0.694	
6	p6	1	0	0	1	1	0	EST	1	1	0.131	0	0.820	
7	p7	0	0	0	1	1	0	LAT	1	1	0.163	0	0.809	
8	p8	0	1	0	1	0	1	BU	1	1	0.132	0	0.675	
9	p9	1	1	1	1	0	0	GR	1	0.981	0.136	0	0.608	
10	p10	1	1	1	0	1	1	MX,UR	1	1	0.171	0	0.624	
11	p11	0	1	1	0	1	1	BR	1	0.969	0.202	0	0.687	
12	p12	1	0	1	0	1	1	AR	1	1	0.125	0	0.667	
13	p13	1	1	1	0	1	0	CH	1	1	0.127	0	0.618	

Table 6.7 Sufficient paths towards CoD and not-CoD (*continued*)

Row	Path	ECON-DEV	ETHLI-HOM	NOCOM	PARLSYS	PAR-FRAHI	DECENT	Cases	CoD	Consistency CoD	Coverage CoD	Not-CoD	Consistency not-CoD
14	p14	1	1	0	0	1	0	PL	1	0.946	0.074	0	0.748
15	p15	0	0	0	0	0	1	LIT	1	1	0.078	0	0.828
16		0	1	1	1	0	0	MO,AL	0	0.852		0	0.768
17		0	1	1	0	0	1	NI	0	0.896		0	0.779
18		0	1	1	0	0	0	HO,PA	0	0.737		0	0.882
19	N1	0	0	1	1	0	0	TU	0	0.807		1	0.946
20	N2	0	0	1	0	1	0	BO,GUA, PE,EC	0	0.689		1	0.912
21	N3	0	0	0	0	1	1	RU	0	0.747		1	0.933
22	N4	0	0	0	0	1	0	BE,GE,UA	0	0.589		1	0.971
23– 64								-	-	-	-	-	-
						Overall solution term for CoD				0.975	0.680		
						Overall solution term for not-CoD						0.931	0.654

usually seen as detrimental to democracy taking root. Paths p1, p6, and p12, for instance, testify to the fact that successful attempts at establishing democracy in ethno-linguistically heterogeneous societies are not limited to old and experienced democracies, such as Switzerland or Belgium, but also occur among young demo- cracies. Also, contrary to common claims, as paths p5, p7, p8, p11, and p15 show, CoD occurs despite the context of a socioeconomically undeveloped society.

How well do the solution terms for CoD fit the underlying data? For the outcome CoD, the overall solution term achieves a high consistency value of 0.975 and it covers about 70 percent of what needs to be explained in terms of CoD. Overall, these numerical values show that the fsQCA solution for CoD fits well the underlying data. A more case-oriented graphical assessment of the quality of the solution term is achieved by producing an x-y plot (see Chapter 5) with the fuzzy membership scores in the overall solution term on the x-axis and CoD on the y-axis. If all cases fall on or close to the main diagonal it indicates both high consistency and coverage values – a sign of an empirically good QCA solution term.[9] Ideal-typically, cases with high membership in CoD should also have a high membership in (at least) one causal conjunction and thus be close to the main diagonal in the upper right area of the x-y plot. In contrast, those cases that fall into the upper left corner of the x-y plot are instances of CoD for which, however, no fully satisfactory solution has been found.

As Figure 6.1 shows, cases that are almost fully out of the set of consolidated democracies, such as Belarus or Georgia, also have very low memberships in any of the fifteen paths towards CoD. Guatemala, another bad CoD performer, even has a zero membership in all of the sufficient conditions for CoD. All these low-CoD performers fall into the lower left area of the x-y plot. All this is in line with the requirements for a good QCA solution term. In addition, highly consolidated democracies, such as Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, or Slovenia, all fall into the upper right area and above the main diagonal. This means not only that all these CoD cases are well covered by the solution term found, but also that their membership

Figure 6.1 x-y plot – solution term for CoD

scores in their sufficient path are consistent (otherwise they would be below the main diagonal). The four cases that slightly deviate from a perfect sufficiency relation and prevent the overall solution term for CoD to be fully consistent are all instances of non-CoD (Beralus, Russia, Paraguay, and Turkey). Finally, the upper left corner is void of cases, indicating that no case that well represents the set of consolidated democracies is left fully unexplained by my solution term for CoD.

Turning to the analysis of conditions for not-CoD, there are only four conjunctions that qualify as sufficient conditions for not-CoD (paths n1 to n4 in rows 19–22 in Table 6.7). Compared with the solution term for CoD, it is striking that cases of not-CoD are analytically more similar and thus fall into the same truth table rows. Path n2, for instance, applies best to four cases (Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, and Ecuador) and alone covers more than 30 percent of the fuzzy evidence for not-CoD. Also path n4, which denotes non-rich, ethno-linguistic heterogeneous, former communist societies with a presidential systems, few parties and no decentralization, applies to more than one case (Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine) and alone covers about 25 percent of the fuzzy evidence on not-CoD to be explained. Among the non-consolidated democracies, only Turkey (path n1) and Russia (path n3) do not share their causal combination with any other case.[10] Four cases of non-CoD do have their membership in conjunctions that do not pass the consistency threshold for being sufficient conditions for not-CoD: Albania, Honduras, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. They are not well covered by the solution term for not-CoD and thus remain somewhat under-explained. Below I discuss which (idiosyncratic) factors that are missing from the comparative analysis might explain Albania.

Overall, the numerical values for assessing the empirical quality of the result for not-CoD indicate that the solution found describes the data relatively well without fully determining each case's outcome score. Both the consistency value (0.931) and the coverage (0.654) are high. As Figure 6.2 shows, most of the cases with high

Figure 6.2 x-y plot – solution term for not-CoD

membership in the set of non-CoD (y-axis) also have a high membership in one of the four sufficient conditions for non-CoD (x-axis) and thus fall into the upper right corner above the main diagonal. Among the non-consolidated democracies, only Peru's membership in one sufficient path (path n2) exceeds its membership score in the outcome non-CoD. All other inconsistent fuzzy set scores come from cases that are classified as members of the set of consolidated democracies, especially Uruguay, which has a membership of 0.35 in path n2 and a membership in not-CoD of only 0.04, thus falling well above the main diagonal. It also fosters the quality of the result that no case of a consolidated democracy has a membership score of higher than 0.5 in any of the sufficient conditions for not-CoD.

Theorizing the results: the power dispersion argument

Do these fsQCA results lend support to my claim that democracies consolidate if the institutions fit the societal context in terms of power dispersion? In order to answer this question, I make use of a slightly amended version of Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4, which graphically summarizes my fit-of-institution-to-context claim. In Figure 6.3, the columns display the eight societal contexts that can be formed based on the three remote context conditions, which, for space reasons, are abbreviated with X (socioeconomic development), Y (ethno-linguistic homogeneity), and Z (not a former communist country). The rows represent the eight democracy types formed on the three institutional features, which, also for space reasons, are abbreviated with A (parliamentary system), B (high number of effective parties), and C (decentralized system). In addition, I indicate for each context and for each democracy type whether it disperses (D) or concentrates (C) power and whether it does so in the vertical (V) or horizontal (H) dimension. For example, if a given context or democracy type concentrates power in the vertical dimension, this is denoted as VC, if it disperses it would be VD, and so on.

Each cell represents one of the logically possible combinations between the societal and institutional features. In other words, each cell in Figure 6.3 directly corresponds to one truth table row displayed in Table 6.7. Light shaded cells are those that represent a match in terms of power dispersion between institutions and contexts while dark shaded cells indicate a mis-match in terms of power dispersion. The remaining not shaded cells constitute remote-proximate configurations for which no clear expectations about the value of CoD exist.[11] In order to further ease interpretation, Figure 6.3 also displays the case labels and indicates whether they are more in than out of the set of CoD (*) or the set of not-CoD (^), respectively. Finally, case labels in brackets indicate that their remote-proximate conjunction does not meet the test criteria for being a sufficient condition for either CoD or not-CoD.

My hypothesis is supported if cases of CoD fall in the light shaded cells and cases of non-CoD in the dark shaded cells. Cases in the non-shaded cells provide no direct evidence in favor or against my theoretical expectations.

Some examples should help to further clarify how to read Figure 6.3 and the multiple pieces of information it contains. Take, for instance, column two. Its label

'XyZ' indicates that all cases in that column are instances of the societal context that is defined as socioeconomically developed, ethno-linguistically not homogeneous, and with no communist past. Furthermore, the second label 'HD-VD' tells us that this specific context requires power dispersion in the horizontal (HD) and in the vertical (VD) dimension (see also Table 6.5). In turn, row one, for example, contains all cases that are parliamentary systems with many parties and decentralization – thus the label 'ABC'. In addition, from its label 'HD-VD' we see that this particular democracy type is dispersing power both in the horizontal (HD) and the vertical (VD) dimension (see also Table 6.6). From this follows that the intersection between the XyZ column and the ABC row constitutes a combination of remote and proximate conditions that represents a match between remote societal and proximate institutional features in terms of power dispersion. Hence, this conjunction is expected to be a sufficient condition for CoD and those cases that fall into this cell are expected to be consolidated democracies.

In fact, the combination just described (XyZABC) is a sufficient condition for CoD. It corresponds to row one in Table 6.7, which is almost fully consistent and covers about 10 percent of CoD. The case it describes best – Spain – is a consolidated democracy. Spain might have had several factors in favor of successfully consolidating democracy, such as being socioeconomically relatively developed or the interest of important European democracies in Spain succeeding in its democratic transition. A clear obstacle for CoD in Spain was, however, its ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Just think of the violent fight of the Basque terror organization *Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna* (ETA), but also more peaceful but nevertheless politically tense struggles for more autonomy from Madrid fought by Catalonia and other Spanish regions. Accordingly, Spain's fuzzy set membership in the set of ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies is low (indicated by 'y' in Figure 6.3, see also Table 6.7) and thus its societal context requires the vertical dispersion of political power. And, in fact, that is what Spain's political system does. Political power is (increasingly) dispersed vertically between the national center and the regions. In addition, Spain's other societal features – especially that of socioeconomic development – require horizontal dispersion of power. By having implemented a parliamentary system with a relatively high number of effective parties, Spain's democracy achieves exactly this: access to the process of making collectively binding decisions at the national level is given to a wider range of social groups, i.e. power is dispersed in the horizontal dimension.

Let us take another example from Figure 6.3: context 'xyZ'[12] in column five and the type of democracy 'aBc'[13] in row four. Based on my classification (see Table 6.5), this context creates a need to concentrate power in the horizontal dimension (HC) and to disperse power in the vertical dimension (VD). The type of democracy implemented, however, does the contrary (see Table 6.6). As a presidential system with many parties, it disperses power horizontally (HD) and by being non-centralized it concentrates power vertically (VC). Hence, the cell defined by this remote-proximate configuration is a clear mismatch between political institutions and the societal context and I therefore expect it to be a path towards not-CoD.

Democ. Type	Societal Context	Xyz	XyZ	XYZ	XYz	xyZ	xyz	xYZ	xYz
		HD-VD	HD-VD	HD-VN	HD-VN	HC-VD	HC-VD	HC-VN	HC-VN
ABC	HD-VD		SP*		SK*				
aBC	HD-VD		AR*	MX* UR*			RU^	BR*	
ABc	HD-VC	EST*		PO*	CR* HU* SL*		LAT*		RO*
aBc	HD-VC			CH*	PL*	BO^ GUA^ PE^, EC^	BE^ GE^ UA^		
abC	HC-VD					(NI^)	LIT*		
AbC	HC-VD								BU*
Abc	HC-VC			GR*		TU^			(MO* AL^)
abc	HC-VC							(HO^ PA^)	

Figure 6.3 Fit of power dispersion between contexts and democracy type: empirical findings

Notes: See notes for Figure 4.1.

For space reasons, the following abbreviations are used for the remote and proximate conditions:

X = economically developed society; Y = ethno-linguistically homogeneous society; Z = non-former communist society; A = parliamentary system; B = high number of effective parties; C = decentralized political system

* = more in than out of set of consolidated democracy (fuzzy set membership score in CoD higher 0.5)

^ = more in than out of set of unconsolidated democracy (fuzzy set membership score in not-CoD higher 0.5)

Case labels in parentheses indicate paths that are inconsistent for both CoD and non-CoD

And, indeed, combination 'xyZaBc', which corresponds to row 20 in Table 6.7, is one of the four sufficient conditions for non-CoD. As Table 6.7 shows, this path constitutes an empirically important sufficient condition for non-CoD, covering more than 30 percent of that outcome and four of the 12 cases of non-CoD in my data (Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru) are more in than out of this set of conditions.

Overall, for the majority of paths – both towards CoD and not-CoD – my expectation is confirmed that a match between context and institution is sufficient for CoD while a mis-match is sufficient for non-CoD. Out of the 19 cases that are more in than out of the set of consolidated democracies, 13 (68 percent) are covered by ten sufficient paths towards CoD that are in line with my expectation. An additional four CoD cases display high memberships scores in remote-proximate conjunctions for which no clear expectations exist. They therefore neither support nor undermine my expectations. Only one case among the consolidated democracies (Latvia) shows a mismatch between institutions and contexts on both dimensions. Finally, Mongolia is a case of CoD but it has its maximum membership in a conjunction that does not pass the test criteria for being a sufficient condition for CoD. A more detailed discussion of the case of Mongolia below reveals further aspects of the fsQCA solution and its meaning for my theoretical claim.

The paths towards non-CoD are similarly confirming for my fit claim. Out of the 13 cases with a membership higher than 0.5 in the set of unconsolidated democracies, seven (Belarus, Bolivia, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Peru and Ukraine) fall into two different conjunctions that clearly represent a mismatch between the type of democracy and the societal context in which it is supposed to operate. The societal contexts in all these cases suggest that power should be concentrated horizontally and dispersed vertically but all cases opted for democracy types that do the opposite: they disperse political power horizontally and concentrate it vertically. With Turkey and Russia there are two cases of non-CoD that follow paths towards non-CoD for which no clear expectations can be derived from the power dispersion perspective. The remaining four cases of non-CoD do have a membership of higher than 0.5 in conjunctions that represent a match between institutions and context. This would count as evidence against my theoretical expectations if these conjunctions were sufficient conditions for not-CoD – but they are not. As reported in Table 6.7 (rows 16–18), none of the conjunctions describing Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Paraguay passes the test criteria for being a sufficient condition for either not-CoD or CoD. Hence, these cases remain largely uncovered by my fsQCA solution term and therefore provide only weak evidence against the theoretical expectations.

In sum, most sufficient paths towards CoD and non-CoD are in line with my claim that CoD consolidates if context and institutions match and that democracy fails to consolidate if the political institutional configuration does not match the societal context. In order to unravel these complex configurational patterns, the application of the two-step fsQCA approach is paramount. Given the theoretical claim to be tested, it has advantages not only over multivariate regression analysis, but also over a one-step fsQCA approach (see Appendix C).

Mongolia and the virtues of power concentration

Why does Mongolia's conjunction turn out as not being sufficient for CoD? Addressing this issue provides the opportunity for spelling out and clarifying additional aspects of the fsQCA solution and for further specifying the reasons why power concentration in Soviet republics would have been conducive for CoD if such a democracy type had been implemented earlier on.

Mongolia is a surprising success story of CoD but the conjunction that describes this country best does not pass the sufficiency test for CoD. From Table 6.7 and Figure 6.3 we know that Mongolia's societal context is best described as an economically undeveloped, ethno-linguistically homogeneous former communist society. According to my classification (see Table 6.5), this context requires the concentration of political power in the horizontal dimension if CoD is to be achieved. And, indeed, Mongolia has a strongly power-concentrating type of democracy: a parliamentary system with few parties and a centralized political system. As an illustration of this, consider the fact that, for instance, the parliamentary elections in 2000 saw the then opposition party Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party win 72 out of 76 seats, turning around a similarly disproportionate defeat they had suffered when being in office in the 1996 elections. In addition, Mongolia's democracy not only concentrates power horizontally but, due to the lack of decentralization, also vertically. Hence, Mongolia is fully in line with the hunch that it is the fit between institutions and contexts that causes CoD – especially in such unlikely places like Mongolia.

Mongolia virtually lacks any of the so-called preconditions for a successful operation of democracy, being poor, without any prior experience with democracy, under Soviet influence for more than seven decades, surrounded by powerful nations with questionable democratic credentials, far away from the supposed centers of democratic gravity in the West, and a vast and largely under-exploited territory (Fish 1998, Fritz 2002 and 2008). The explanation I offer for Mongolia's surprising and largely unexplained success is the extremely power-concentrating nature of the Mongolian democratic political system, which allows democracy to survive under these unfavorable conditions. It has to be mentioned, though, that the installation of an extremely power-concentrating democracy is facilitated by Mongolia's ethno-linguistic homogeneity and its relatively small size of population, concentrated mostly in the capital Ulaanbaatar. These conditions facilitate inter-elite agreements on any set of rules, in general, and on the power-concentrating type of democracy, in particular. Such consensus and mutual trust is key, for at every election, the Mongolian democracy creates clear (and different) winners, and the losers must have reasons to expect that no winner uses the vast political power to tilt or even stop the democratic game.

Why then does Mongolia's combination of conditions not turn up as a sufficient condition for CoD? The x-y plot shown in Figure 6.4 helps to get an answer to this question. The majority of cases studied here have very low or even zero membership in the conjunction that describes Mongolia best. Only Albania also has a fuzzy set membership higher than 0.5 in this conjunction. Since Albania is more out than in the set of consolidated democracies (with a fuzzy membership of 0.35

Figure 6.4 x-y plot – Mongolia's path towards CoD

in the set of CoD, see Table 6.1), it lowers the consistency value of the 'Mongolian path' as a sufficient condition for CoD to 0.852, well below the acceptable level of 0.9 imposed in my analysis.

   The fact that it is Albania that makes Mongolia's path towards CoD insufficient for CoD suggests that Albania's non-consolidation can only be explained by one or more country-specific and perhaps idiosyncratic factors that are not covered by any of the conditions used in my analysis. The obvious candidates here are large scale violence and even civil war in and around Albania during its early years of transition to democracy. It is not implausible to claim that the strategy of concentrating political power that worked in Mongolia and some other places, such as Greece, Lithuania, and Romania, could not unfold its CoD-conducive effect in Albania because it found itself in exceptional – and to a large extent international – circumstances that shaped the political fate of all the (Western) Balkan states during the course of the 1990s.

   To some it might sound counter-intuitive to claim that power-concentrating types of democracy would have helped to produce CoD in FSR and elsewhere, for one of the most outstanding and problematic features of the political development in FSR today is precisely the rampant attempts to concentrate power in the hands of the national executive. Most regional experts correctly point out that, by now, most of the FSR display an excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president (e.g. Fish 1999; Metcalf 2000) and obscure groups ranging from the security services to neo-oligarchs. The Russian presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008 with perfect organization by the Kremlin under Putin epitomize this regional trend towards concentration of power. It thus seems plausible to claim that attempts at democratizing and CoD fail precisely because rulers engage in excessive power concentration (e.g. McFaul 2000). I agree with this diagnosis but hold that it is *not* in contradiction to my claim. Rather, it indicates that the chances for CoD in Russia and elsewhere would have been greater if democratic power-concentrating institutional features had been implemented right after the transition.

First, one of the current problems in countries such as Russia or Belarus is that power is concentrated to such a *degree* that the type of political regime that results from it can barely be classified as a liberal democracy anymore. When I argue for power concentration, I do not, of course, argue for the abolishment of the principles of liberal democracy, for it would be nonsensical to claim that democracy consolidates by eliminating it. The second problem in these cases is the *type* of power concentration. Contrary to what can be observed in Russia and elsewhere, my suggestion for a power-concentrating democracy does *not* encompass the suggestion to concede de facto power for making collectively binding decisions to unelected and unaccountable actors such as former secret service buddies of the current (and/or former) president, or actors with similarly questionable democratic credentials. Instead, any potential reform of a political system towards more power concentration should target the formal institutions (the governmental system, the party system, and the territorial distribution of competencies) rather than informal practices (e.g. killing of journalists, closing down of critical non-governmental organizations or higher education institutions, or banning opposition parties). Third, any change in the type of democracy needs to follow the procedures prescribed in the democratic rules of the game for doing so instead of being brought about through informal arrangements behind closed doors between democratically not legitimized and non-accountable actors. Any unilateral and imposed reform via presidential decree or any other emergency measure that does not respect the democratic procedures for institutional reform and, thus, does not seek for *consensus* among the politically most relevant actors[14] cannot unfold its potential democracy-enhancing effect – even if it goes in the right direction in terms of power concentration. In short, attempts at concentrating power by democratically elected leaders in FSR can be interpreted as evidence for the (perceived) inadequacy of the power dispersing types of democracy that were established after the transition to democracy. However, it is the exaggerated *degree*, the undemocratic *type*, and the faulty *process* of establishing a power-concentrating political system in most FSR that is the problem – not the tendency towards power concentration per se*,* which explains their low levels of CoD. Had the 'founding fathers' established more adequate institutional formulae right from the beginning, the chances for CoD would have been higher. Now politicians in most FSR are faced with a dilemma. In order to consolidate, the type of democracy needs to be changed, but the conditions necessary for executing such an institutional transformation respecting the existing democratic rules and achieving consent from most of the relevant political actors are virtually absent. Mongolia, a country with similar starting conditions in the early 1990s, demonstrates the difference. It opted for a highly power-concentrating type of democracy combining features of a parliamentary system with a low number of parties, the virtual lack of any decentralization, and a highly unproportional electoral law.

Overall, the results provide support for the main hypothesis. As expected, the majority of paths towards CoD represent a fit in terms of power dispersion between societal context conditions and political-institutional features. In addition, most democracies

that fail to consolidate display remote-proximate conjunctions that represent a misfit between the type of democracy implemented into the societal context.

These findings have several important broader implications. First of all, democracy consolidates in quite diverse, and even averse, places – if only the right institutions are chosen. None of the societal factors analyzed turned out to be a necessary condition for CoD. Some democracies even manage to consolidate in countries that show societal characteristics that are necessary for non-CoD, such as lack of socioeconomic development or prior democratic experience. And, second, very different types of democracy become consolidated – if only they match with the societal context. There is thus no clear best type of democracy for CoD. And there is even less a single one-size-fits-all institutional feature for achieving CoD, as, for some time, it was believed to be the case with decentralization. In short, CoD is neither the result of anonymous social processes of modernization void of any actors, nor the outcome of cleverly designed institutions that can successfully be implemented anywhere. In the concluding Chapter 8 I further elaborate on these broader implications of my findings. If the choice of institutions is important for CoD, as I claim, it is interesting to ask under which conditions actors during and shortly after transition are more likely to come up with the appropriate institutional mix for their own country. This is a question I turn to in the following chapter.

7   Choosing institutions – some notes on how to study the impact of transition modes on CoD

According to the 'natural' model used by practitioners (Carothers 2002a) and the 'theoretical' model developed by academics, liberalization and democratization are not related to each other in a linear or inevitable fashion. Between the two 'phases' of LoA and CoD, with their different actors and processes, lies the period of *transition*. Virtually all observers of regime change agree that this involves a more or less lengthy period of exceptional politics, the outcome of which is more or less uncertain. They also agree that there is no one way by which the transition from one regime to another is accomplished – if it is accomplished at all. Labeled as the mode of transition (MoT), lively debates are fought over which specific MoT – pact, reform, revolution, etc. – has which kind of impact, not only on the structure of the nascent democracy, but also on its likelihood to survive. Many of the debates around transition modes are still unresolved.[1] Whether a transition mode matters or not is anything but just another purely academic dispute. Finding out more about this question has important practical repercussions, too. External and internal actors in autocracies could adapt their strategies for promoting democracy based on this knowledge.

The distinction between remote societal and proximate political institutional factors and the idea that the choice of appropriate institutions fosters CoD opens a new perspective on the role of the mode of transition (MoT) as a crucial intervening variable for explaining CoD. MoT is a critical juncture during which choices about the design of democratic institutions are made and a country's political development is put on a different path. Thus, a more appropriate question to be asked about transition modes is: given a certain context, which mode of transition enables the actors to choose the appropriate institutional configuration, such that the type of democracy implemented is likely to consolidate? Within the broad transition literature, this chapter focuses on pacts as one specific transition mode. Since the mid-1980s, the hypothesis has been put forward that pacts represent the most appropriate mode of transition in order to arrive at a consolidated democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Karl 1990, 2006; Karl and Schmitter 1991, 2002; or Encarnación 2005). This claim has been contested ever since (e.g. Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Bunce 1995a,1995b; Bermeo 1997; or McFaul 2002).

The major aim of this chapter, however, is not to provide a conclusive empirically based answer to this crucial question but, more modestly, to outline how to design

a medium-size N comparative research such that it is appropriate for correctly testing this hypothesis. This is a crucial issue because much of the disagreement over the effect of pacts rests on the fact that the complexity of the pact hypothesis is under-estimated. This, in turn, leads to an erroneous selection of relevant cases and the choice of the wrong dependent variable. This chapter should thus be read as a reaction to the request formulated in Michael McFaul's (2002) influential article on the state of transitology, in which he argues that the "next generation of democratization theory must seek to specify more precisely the conditions under which pacts can facilitate democratization and the conditions under which pacts are inconsequential." (p. 243). Correctly specifying the causally complex hypothesis and selecting the right cases are no doubt paramount in this task.

Defining modes of transitions and pacts

Transition, in its broadest sense, can be defined as the period in between the breakdown of one political regime and the installation of a new regime. More narrowly, if the newly installed regime turns out to be a democracy, one can speak of a democratic transition which can be defined as "a process of liberalization sufficient to trigger the resurrection or formation of organizations within civil society and, in this context, the convocation of 'founding elections'" (Karl and Schmitter 2002: 11). From an early stage, it has been recognized in the literature "that there are multiple paths following the demise of authoritarian rule, that only some of these paths lead to democracy and that there are multiple paths to democracy." (Karl and Schmitter 2002: 13). Ever since scholars reflected on the two very contrasting transition experiences in Portugal and Spain – which happened to inaugurate the most recent wave of democratization in the last quarter of the twentieth century – debates have centered around the questions on how to typologize modes of transition and whether different modes have any impact on subsequent political developments. Many typologies of transition modes have emerged in the literature.[2] Sometimes different labels are attached to the same type or the same labels are used for different modes of transition.[3]

I concentrate on what can probably be seen as the most prominent classification of transition modes, i.e. the one offered by Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter in their various writings (Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991, 2002). This classification is based on two dimensions. The first dimension differentiates between elites and masses as the initiators of transitions, and the second dimension reflects the transition strategy, separating those based on compromise from those based on force. This classification yields four different modes of transitions: (1) *Pacts* are elite dominated compromises; (2) *Impositions* consist of elites using force unilaterally and effectively to bring about a regime change against the resistance of incumbents forcing the transition; (3) *Reform* is present when masses mobilize from below and impose a compromised outcome without resorting to violence; whereas (4) *Revolution* consists of masses rising up in arms and defeat of the previous authoritarian rulers militarily (Karl 1990: 8–9; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 275).

Of these four types, pacts play the most prominent role in the literature.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 37) define pacts as "an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power in the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interest' of those entering into it." It is claimed that pacts have a positive impact on the prospects for successfully establishing democracy in a country, mainly because pacts (a) include all significant political actors whose interests must be respected in order to gain their consent on the new political regime and the new distribution of power it brings with it; (b) make pacting actors mutually dependent on each other; and (c) exclude certain issues from the negotiation table that are of vital interest to some of the participants in the negotiation (such as securing property rights and non prosecution of human rights abuses).

So far, this is the common reading of the pact hypothesis. It has lead scholars to insert the 'pact' variable (usually as a dummy variable) into multivariate models and to test whether – on average and holding everything else constant – those cases of pacted transitions are more consolidated than those without pacts. In a research design like this, the pact variable in isolation usually turns out to be irrelevant. It neither correlates significantly with CoD, nor with any of the core institutional features of democracy, such as the governmental format, the party fragmentation, or the degree of decentralization (e.g. Przeworksi, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996: 48f.; Shin and Lee 2003; or Merkel, Sandschneider, and Segert 1996: 17f.). These findings should be read with a grain of salt – regardless of whether or not they display a correlation between pacts and CoD or some institutional features. In the following, it is argued that in order to adequately test the pact hypothesis, particular attention must be paid to what exactly the dependent variable is, how pacts are hypothesized to interact with other factors, and which cases are relevant at all.

Specifying the pact hypothesis

Extrication from autocracy versus installation of democracy

In order to develop my argument, it is important to highlight that transitions to democracy, as such, have two different purposes: the extrication from autocracy, on the one hand, and constitution of democracy, on the other hand. Empirically, these two critical junctures might often overlap but analytically they should be separated, a fact that is not often stressed in the literature (for exceptions, see Munck 1994; Munck and Skalnik Leff 1997; Przeworski 1991; Rustow 1970). At the core of the first critical juncture is the question: how can the old autocratic regime be ended? As a matter of fact, the appearance of this question on the agenda of day-to-day politics marks the *beginning of the transition*. The second critical juncture centers on the problem: how can democracy be successfully established, that is, how can democracy be constructed such that its chances for consolidation become enhanced? Successfully solving this puzzle marks the *end of the transition*.

The core difference between these two critical junctures consists of the type of actors involved. In the beginning of transition, the important counterparts

of democratically minded actors are the old autocratic elites. The latter are characterized, first, by their (varying degree) of veto power capacities, which often stems from their control over the use of physical force, either the military or the secret service; second, by their rather short-term, defensive strategic interests to save their own skin; and third, their lack of a profound societal basis which would enable them to hold long-term interests and to claim that those interests must get a chance to be heard in the future political system. In contrast to this, once the attention shifts from ending autocracy to making choices about the type of democracy to be established, a multitude of new actors with different basic characteristics enter the picture. These actors are socially entrenched groups with long-lasting needs and interests to participate in the process of making collectively binding decisions in the new democratic. Examples of this latter group of actors include regional, national, ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic groups, many of which were deprived of exercising political influence during the autocratic regime. It can be expected that if the democratic actors fail to pay tribute to these groups and their needs and interests, then the prospects for CoD are severely hampered.

The difference between the political forces involved in these two critical junctures matters in several respects for the analysis of the effect of the transition mode on CoD. First, not all strategic actors whose interests are relevant when trying to end autocracy do necessarily matter when trying to consolidate democracy. Just think of, for example, General Jaruzelski and the forces he represented in Poland. The satisfaction of those interests was crucial in the beginning of the transition when the prime concern was to end communist rule – a short term goal. These interests were (and are) irrelevant, however, for the further task of finding a type of democracy that could consolidate in the societal context conditions in Poland – a long-term goal. Second, not all social forces which have enduring needs and interests that need to be made heard in the process of collectively binding decision making are present at the moment(s) when the institutional rules for the new democratic game are negotiated. At the same time, however, successful consolidation depends on the consensus on the rules of all relevant groups. Relevant groups are all those that are socially entrenched, which makes them permanent (as opposed to situational) actors with enduring interests and potentials for challenging the democratic consensus in case they are excluded from the making of collectively binding decisions. It is therefore paramount that those actors who negotiate the institutional design of the new democracy also take the interests and needs of those socially constituted groups into account that are not sitting at the 'round table' – not just their own and those of their counterparts in the negotiations. Neither the military nor the communists per se (i.e. regardless of the country-specific context) count as a social group with a social basis and thus with long-lasting political interests. Hence, in those cases in which the military or the communists are nothing other than representatives of the old regime without much social support, it is less important to take into account their interests during the design of the new democratic regimes. In the framework of the present chapter, the second transition is more relevant because it is when actors negotiate the institutional design of the new democratic regime.[4]

The 'supremacy of pacts hypothesis' rests on the plausible claim that the actors negotiating the type of democracy not only are better enabled to create mutual trust and understanding among themselves, but also – and this is important – the pacting environment makes actors more capable of thinking, speaking, and acting on behalf of those who – for whatever contingent reason – are not present at the negotiation table.[5] The incentive for democratically minded actors to pay attention to the needs and interests of groups that do not belong to their 'constituency' is clear: if they do not do so, their project of consolidating democracy is at risk. They know that in the long run the fate of democracy depends on whether well-entrenched social groups can be accommodated and integrated into the democratic political process, and not whether short-term interests of the outgoing elites are satisfied, such as immunity for military generals, authoritarian enclaves, special prerogatives, or highly distorting electoral rules in favor of the old communist party. Of course, pacting actors can still get it wrong. Information and time for making decisions are usually limited. Nevertheless, the likelihood that the institutional configuration fulfils the requirement of distributing power to an adequate degree should be higher in pacted than in other types of transitions, particularly in comparison with revolutionary and violent changes.

Specifying the dependent variable of the pact hypothesis

From what has been said so far, it becomes clear that the link between pacts and CoD is only an indirect one: pacts are expected to enhance the choices of appropriate institutions which, in turn, should lead to CoD. This is in line with the argument of Karl and Schmitter, who have abandoned their initial claim that pacts lead to a more rapid and secure CoD. In their more recent writing they hold, instead, that the mode of transition has an impact on the choice of the democratic institutions.

> Thus, the proposition that modes of transition matter for the subsequent process of democratization, shared by many of us, has been cast in doubt, at least with regard to the durability of democracy. […] there is evidence to buttress the claim that it has had an important impact on the choice of particular institutions and, through this mechanism, on the type of democracy that emerges. Thus, if the dependent variable is conceived differently from simple durability, the mode of transition may matter a great deal.
>
> (Karl and Schmitter 2002: 23f.)

Above, I mentioned some of the literature that failed to detect any correlation between pacts and either CoD or any institutional feature. It is now clear why these results do not provide very convincing evidence against or in favor of the pact hypothesis. First, the pact theory claims that pacts enhance the chances for choosing the *appropriate* institutional configuration. Since the appropriateness of institutions depends on the societal context, it comes as no surprise that different consolidated democracies show different institutional setups (see Chapter 6).

Second, the theory claims that pacts help in choosing appropriate institutional *configurations* rather than just single institutions in isolation. Third, the logic of the pact theory does not exclude the possibility that some democracies consolidate regardless of the mode of transition. Even a transition characterized by large-scale violence can, under certain circumstances, result in CoD. In other words, scholars who claim that pacts matter do not claim that they are a necessary or sufficient condition for CoD. Rather, pacts are a typical INUS condition (see Chapter 5) hypothesized to enhance the chances for establishing democracy in otherwise difficult societal contexts.[6]

In sum, when assessing its impact on CoD, the mode of transition must be understood as a critical juncture that comes into play at the moment when democratic institutions are chosen. Whether or not democracy consolidates does *not* directly depend on a specific mode of transition, or on any specific institutional configuration. Instead, CoD depends on whether the given societal context and the configuration of the democratic institutions chosen, fit. From this angle, the 'superiority of pacts' hypothesis claims that pacts enhance the chances that actors will choose the institutions that are appropriate for their country. More than any other MoT, pacts create an environment that enables actors to address crucial questions under high time pressure and uncertainty, most importantly the "institutional arrangements regarding the future distribution of power." (Welsh 1994: 381).

Specifying the set of relevant cases

All this has important implications for which cases do count as evidence when testing the pact hypothesis. In order to demonstrate this point, Figure 7.1 cross-tabulates whether a country's democracy is consolidated (yes/no) with whether a country's societal context is CoD-fostering (yes/ no). No reference is made to any specific kind of institution or democracy type (institutional configuration). This is in line with the theory to be tested, which does not claim that pacts lead to any such specific institution. The resulting 2x2 table yields four different types of cases.

If, in fact, pacts have the causal effect on CoD described above, then they should be able to help to consolidate democracy in an otherwise CoD-unfriendly social context (cell 2). At the same time, pacts should not have occurred in cases that fail to consolidate democracy, despite a CoD-friendly societal context (cell 4). Simultaneously, violent and revolutionary transitions – the conceptual antipode to pacts – should be more frequent in cell 4 and less frequent in cell 2. Notice that only two of the four cells are important for the assessment of the effect of the transition type on CoD (cells 2 and 4). Drawing inference based on the distribution of cases in cells 1 and 3 is prone to produce misleading results.[7] The reason is simple: Cases in cell 3, i.e. democracies that depart from a strongly CoD-enhancing context are much more likely to consolidate regardless of the type of transition and the type of democracy they choose. At the same time, cases in cell 1, i.e. democracies that emerge in highly unfavorable contexts and subsequently fail to consolidate are also not directly relevant for the present question concerning the impact of pacts on CoD. Unconsolidated democracies born in highly unfavorable conditions may

Context is CoD enhancing

		No	Yes
Democracy is consolidated	Yes	(2) • cases of pacted transitions • no cases of violent transitions	(3) • cases not directly relevant
	No	(1) • cases not directly relevant	(4) • no cases of pacted transitions • cases of violent transitions

Figure 7.1 Expected distribution of cases under pact hypothesis – 2 x 2 table

have failed to consolidate regardless of the type of institutional configuration chosen. Thus, it is analytically questionable to attribute the failure of CoD in cases from cell 1 or the success of CoD in cases from cell 3 to the choices made during transition and thus to the transition mode. In sum, only two of the four cells are directly relevant for the test of the pact hypothesis: cases that consolidate despite the absence of a CoD-fostering context and cases that do not consolidate despite the presence of a CoD-enhancing context (cells 2 and 4).

A preliminary test of the pact hypothesis

Figure 7.2 is based on the logic of Figure 7.1. It displays all 32 cases in a simple cross-tabulation which classifies the four types of cases mentioned above: unsuccessful CoD in the absence of a CoD-fostering context (cell 1), successful CoD in the absence of a CoD-fostering context (cell 2), successful CoD in the presence of a CoD-fostering context (cell 3), and, finally, unsuccessful CoD in the presence of a CoD-fostering context (cell 4). If the hypothesis is correct that pacts play a crucial role, many instances of pacted transitions should be found in cell 2 but none in cell 4. Furthermore, cases of violent and disruptive modes of transition – the conceptual antipode of pacts – should be found in cell 4 but not in cell 2. As mentioned, cells 1 and 3 are not directly relevant because success or failure may be incorrectly attributed to the transition mode in the presence of contextual conditions highly (un)favorable to CoD.

First, if we look at the countries in cell 4, we find no single clear case of a pacted transition among the unconsolidated democracies within CoD-fostering contexts. This is in line with our expectations. Furthermore, with Paraguay and Turkey we find two cases that have experienced a transition that involved larger scale violence at certain stages – the opposite of pacts. A conservative interpretation of this pattern is that pacted transitions are not involved when inappropriate institutional design

Context is CoD enhancing

		No	*Yes*[b]
Democracy is consolidated	Yes[a]	(2) **Bulgaria** Estonia **Mongolia** Latvia *Lithuania* *Romania*	(3) *Argentina*, Brazil, **Chile**, Czech Rep., Greece, **Hungary**, Ecuador, Mexico, **Poland**, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, **Spain**, **Uruguay**,
	No	(1) Albania, Belarus, *Bolivia*, Georgia, *Guatemala*, *Nicaragua*, Peru, Russia, Ukraine	(4) Honduras *Paraguay* Turkey

Figure 7.2 Test of pact hypothesis – 2 x 2 table
Bold: cases of pacted transitions[c]
Italics: cases of 'significant violence' or 'high violence'[d]

Notes:
a   In order to classify cases whether or not they show a CoD-enhancing context, factor scores for each case are derived from a factor analysis with all six remote context conditions using the raw data rather than the fuzzy set membership scores. Cases with positive factor loadings on the single factor solution are classified as cases with CoD-enhancing contexts. An alternative procedure for classifying cases based on the predicted CoD values by regressing CoD on the six remote conditions yields results that are in line with the interpretation of the pattern offered here.
b   Fuzzy set membership score in CoD > 0.5.
c   The classification of the cases' mode of transition is based on Karl (1990) and Karl and Schmitter (2002) and the country comments from the Democratization Data Set codings (see chapter 2).
d   The classification of cases as violent transitions is based on Karatnycky and Ackerman (2006).

choices are made in otherwise CoD-enhancing contexts. Instead, inadequate institutional choices and subsequent failure to consolidate democracy despite favorable context conditions occur more often when countries have traveled through violent transition modes. So far, this is in line with our expectations generated by a closer reading of the pact hypothesis.[8]

Admittedly, finding many cases of violent transitions in cell 4 is rather weak evidence for the functional (N.B. not necessarily moral) superiority of pacts for CoD because the claim is that pacts have a positive effect on CoD and not simply that other modes of transition might have a damaging effect on the appropriate institutional choice. If pacts are superior, instances of pacted transitions should represent the majority in cell 2 of Figure 7.2. They do not. Bulgaria has been classified as having had a pacted transition. Also, in the case of Mongolia rumors have been spread that a pact took place during the country's transition to democracy in the early 1990s. At the same time however, both Lithuania and Romania are classified as having undergone a transition with significant violence (Karatnycky

and Ackerman 2006). From the perspective of the pact hypothesis, these cases are puzzling, for their democracy consolidates despite a non-favorable societal context and a supposedly detrimental transition mode.[9]

This chapter aimed at contributing to solving a long-lasting and hotly debated puzzle in the literature on transitions to democracy: do pacts matter and if so, for what? With my distinction between remote contexts and proximate institutions and the claim that it is the adequate combination of both that leads to different paths towards CoD, the question to be asked about transition modes becomes the following: given a certain societal context, which mode of transition enables the actors to choose the appropriate institutional configuration, such that the type of democracy implemented into the given societal context is likely to consolidate?

The theoretically guided expectations about the positive effect of pacts rests on the plausible assumptions that pacts help to (a) reduce the uncertainty about the opponents' preferences and incentives; and (b) create a climate of mutual understanding, if not trust, among actors, and a common agenda. All this should enhance the pacting actors' capacity to come up with an institutional formula that reflects the degree of institutionalized power dispersion needed for them to agree on the set of new rules. Furthermore, pacts can also be expected to enable actors to take into account the interests and needs of socially entrenched actors that are not sitting at the negotiation table. This is crucial for CoD since these politically relevant groups might be excluded from the pact negotiations but, in the long run, cannot be excluded from the democratic decision-making process.

In order to test this proposition, a rather simple cross-tabulation approach has been applied and checked (a) whether pacts are more frequent among those cases that *consolidate* despite *unfavorable* context conditions and, parallel to this, (b) whether violent and disruptive transitions are more frequently found among those cases that *do not consolidate* despite a *favorable* context. The preliminary empirical evidence is ambiguous. Contrary to the theoretical expectation, pacted transitions are not the majority among successfully consolidated democracies in CoD-hostile contexts. At the same time, however, violent transitions – the conceptual antipode of pacts – prevail among those cases that fail to consolidate democracies despite a CoD-fostering context [10]. This is preliminary empirical evidence though. More fine-grained classifications of a country's CoD-enhancing or hindering context and its exact type of transition should be developed, not an easy undertaking given the often clandestine nature of pacts and the turbulent character of transitions in general (see concluding Chapter 8).

8   Reframing debates – looking back and looking ahead

What explains the consolidation of democracy in some countries and the lack thereof in others? In the introduction to this book, four shortcomings in the present CoD literature were identified that present hurdles one needs to overcome in order to answer this question. These problems referred to the conceptual meaning of CoD, its measurement, causal theories, and the methodological constraints when investigating causally complex claims.

In Chapter 2, I provided a discussion of the definition and conceptualization of CoD, arguing that it should be understood in a forward-looking manner, that is, as the expected persistence of liberal democracy, and conceptualized in terms of the most relevant political actors' behavior. In Chapter 3, I presented the Democratization Data Set, a novel cross-regional assessment of processes of liberalization of autocracy and the consolidation of democracy in countries from different world regions from 1974 to 2000. Some of the descriptive findings cast doubt on some of the core assumptions on which the classical transition paradigm rests. In Chapter 4, a theoretical framework was elaborated based on which various approaches to CoD could be integrated. This was done by subdividing the list of CoD factors into remote societal characteristics, on the one hand, and proximate political-institutional features, on the other and the claim that CoD is the result of a fit in terms of power dispersion between societal contexts and institutional democracy types. In order to accomplish its integrative function, this general claim needs to be at a high level of generality. Empirically, however, it is expected that it manifests itself in a causally complex form, that is, different combinations of remote and proximate factors are expected to produce CoD and yet different conjunctions are expected for the occurrence of not-CoD. Chapter 5 was therefore dedicated to a discussion of the concept of causal complexity and its methodological challenges in comparative macro-social research. Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) was introduced as an appropriate method for testing my causally complex claim based on just a medium number of cases. The empirical results presented in Chapter 6 lent support to the expectation that, indeed, democracy consolidates if political institutional configurations match the societal context, and that democracy fails to consolidate if institutions and contexts mismatch. Among other things, this implies that it is possible – though not equally easy – to achieve the consolidation of democracy virtually everywhere if only the institutional mix appropriate for

the given context is found. Based on these findings, in Chapter 7, I turned to the question of why in some countries the appropriate institutions are chosen while in others they are not. This shifted the focus on to the transition period because this is the critical juncture when the design of the new democracy is decided upon. More specifically, it shifted attention to the different types of transition, for they differ with respect to the time, information, willingness, and capacity actors have at their disposal in order to make informed institutional choices. The preliminary evidence suggested that disruptive transitions are detrimental to CoD, but not necessarily that pacted transitions are demonstrably superior for choosing the appropriate institutions.

Middle range theories: linking the results to the literature

When researching an extensively studied topic such as CoD, the challenge is to generate new insights whilst avoiding the reinvention of the wheel. A promising way of contributing to the literature is to take ready-made hypotheses and well-researched causal mechanisms, and make them speak to each other in a way that they have not done before in order to develop new theoretical claims. In fact, the attempt to make theoretical progress by integrating existing findings into more complex and subtle theories of CoD has long been put on the agenda by several leading scholars in the field (Coppedge 1999; Munck 2000,2001). The research on the causes of CoD that I have presented in this book has been performed under the premise that rather than concentrating on one particular type of hypothesis at the expense of others (e.g. the role of economic development, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, or the executive format), the aim should be to combine some of the most prominent hypotheses into a more coherent set of propositions. As I give prevalence to causal complexity over parsimony, many of the most prominent hypotheses in the CoD literature are, while not rejected wholesale, redefined to some extent by my findings.

In order to frame the debate on how the findings of this book relate to the established literature and to outline possibilities for further research, I make use of the concept of middle-range theories (e.g. Merton 1957; Thelen 2002: 95; or Esser 2002). Middle-range theories, as opposed to wide-range theories, are more sensitive to context, allowing for more causally complex patterns. At the same time, middle-range theories, as opposed to small-range theories, do not renounce the aim of generalizability. Middle-range theories postulate a relation between cause and effect that is bounded in time and/or space. A theory about why certain factors produce some social phenomenon is contextualized, i.e. causal effects are limited in scope and, thus, not postulated to be valid in all times and/or spaces. These scope conditions have to be explicitly integrated into the hypothesis. They are thus not simply variables that are controlled for but an integral part of the theory without which that theory cannot be put to empirical tests (Walker and Cohen 1985). The concept of middle-range theories is also appealing because it is characterized by the combination of a simple idea with the capacity to integrate otherwise dispersed hypotheses and empirical regularities. Due to their clearly stated limitations in

time and space, middle-range theories lend themselves as building blocks for the development of more general theories in further research (Esser 2002: 129).

There are several reasons why my empirical results and theoretical interpretations can be understood as building blocks for a middle-range theory. First, the general nature of findings obtained using fsQCA (conjunctural, equifinal, and asymmetric) are such that the effect of variables is never interpreted in isolation but in conjunction with other variables. By default, this epistemology leads to a contextualization of the effect of each variable. The two-step fsQCA approach applied in this book further sharpens the idea of contextualization. The effect of institutional configurations on CoD is explicitly conditional upon the presence of different societal contexts and vice versa.

Second, my approach employs a simple and fairly general idea – the fit of institutions to context in terms of power dispersion – in order to integrate otherwise dispersed hypotheses and empirical regularities, such as the frequently found correlations between parliamentarism and CoD or between economic development and CoD. The theoretical claim that democracies consolidate if the institutions chosen fit the context in terms of power dispersion moves the finding of various sufficient paths leading to CoD up a rung on the ladder of generality, a research strategy suggested by leading comparative methodologists (e.g. Sartori 1991; Adcock and Collier 2001; or Goertz and Mahoney 2005). The introduction of the concept of power dispersion and the idea of a fit between institutions and contexts is nothing more than identifying a common logic behind all the different sufficient paths towards CoD. The various configurations are, thus, the functionally equivalent 'superficial' causes, or empirical manifestations, of that 'basic cause' (Lieberson 1985: 185ff.). Moving up on the ladder of generality when interpreting the empirical findings thus avoids the individualization of findings and enables the formulation of more general laws without losing nuanced differences between cases.[1]

Third, while my 'fit-of-institutions-to-context' claim is *not* bound to any geographic scope condition, it is, however, bound to a specific period in time and should therefore be seen as part of a middle-range theory rather than a universal claim. This book presents an analysis of those countries that have become democratic at one point in time after 1974. I therefore deliberately abstain from claiming that the consolidation of democracies that emerged in earlier waves can be explained by the same logic. My theoretical framework is, thus, confined to the general scope conditions that have been present in the late twentieth century. Obviously, these conditions are radically different from those present in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth century. It is, in fact, by now common knowledge that the causes for democracy and its consolidation in different historical epochs differ from each other (Moore 1966: 414; Huntington 1991; Mayer 1998). For instance, the cases of successful consolidation in second wave democracies such as Germany, Japan, and Austria cannot be understood without realizing that these countries were occupied by democratically oriented foreign powers. The latter pressed for the installation of democratic institutions. Hence, even if the type of democracy chosen by national actors was not adequate given the societal context

at that time (a misfit between context and institution) the presence of non-national tutelary actors secured the persistence of democracy for years, if not decades. Under such conditions, the institutional configuration could either be slowly changed and/or the institutions themselves could shape the environment, a possibility suggested by the neo-institutional literature (e.g. March and Olsen 1984). Hence, successful consolidation processes in previous waves of democratization may well have followed causal mechanisms other than that of a 'fit-of-institutions-to-context'.

The integration of different hypotheses into a middle-range theory is what has been identified as one of the most important remaining tasks within the CoD literature. Part of this book can be read as an attempt to respond to this undertaking. My research contributes to the reformulation of several prominent hypotheses on factors fostering CoD. First, I shall address some of the hypotheses on remote structural factors, and then those concerning proximate institutional conditions on CoD. Among the remote conditions, I discuss the precondition approach based on modernization theory and among the proximate factors, I outline a contribution to the discussion on presidential versus parliamentary systems. I will also readdress the issue of whether there is a superior mode of transition to democracy and how we could see it if it was there.

Are there preconditions or best democracy types for CoD?

Seymour Martin Lipset's argument about the effect of societal 'modernization', in general, and of economic development in particular, can be read in two different ways. Either economic development and its social corollaries raise the likelihood of transitions away from autocracy towards democracy, or, once in place, high levels of economic development help to consolidate democracy. After decades of debate and both large and small empirical research, it can be safely concluded that the first of these readings – i.e. economic development as a precondition for transition to democracy – can be rejected (e.g. Londregan and Poole 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski *et al.* 2000). Democracies have emerged at virtually all levels of economic and social development. Hence, the transition school, founded by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and drawing from ideas formulated by Rustow (1970) was correct in its statement that the birth of democracy is better understood as the result of actions and actors' strategies rather than deterministic preconditions.

But what about the second reading of Lipset, that economic and social development are preconditions for CoD?[2] The results of my analysis have shown that economic development is *not* a necessary condition for CoD – even if more relaxed test criteria are applied. In fact, there is no factor at all that empirically qualifies as a necessary condition for CoD. Instead, I find a number of sufficient paths towards CoD, some of which include socioeconomic development while others do not. In other words, some poor democracies consolidate. Socioeconomic development is thus far from being a necessary condition for CoD and it is not even a sufficient condition on its own right. It is, instead, just one among various INUS conditions. For sure, being a rich country helps in achieving many desirable goals,

among them also CoD. However, it is clear that socioeconomic development, or any other societal feature for that matter, in and of itself cannot produce a political outcome like CoD; it must be mediated through institutions. I also show that there are relatively poor countries – Lithuania, Mongolia, or Romania, just to mention a few – that manage to consolidate their democracy because they choose the appropriate set of political institutions.

It is also worth noting that also within modernization theory it is often argued that economic development alone is not enough to consolidate democracy. It must be combined with the development of an adequate political culture, class structures, state-society relations, and civil society (Diamond 1992: 487). These additional CoD fostering factors are perceived as endogenous phenomena because they exist in a close mutual causal relationship with economic development. Hence, modernization theorists who reject economic development as the single precondition for CoD still claim that the process of modernization in more general terms is necessary (i.e. a precondition) for CoD. My findings suggest a different conclusion. Apparently, there are cases of successful CoD that can be explained without making reference to *any* form of modernization, be it social, cultural, or economic. There are, thus, other ways of achieving this goal than waiting for a long-lasting and sustainable period of economic growth. Mongolia, a country lacking high levels of economic or social development is just the most glaring case demonstrating this point.

Some caveats are apt. First, saying that socioeconomic development is neither necessary nor sufficient for CoD does not exclude the possibility that societal modernization makes CoD easier and faster. As a matter of fact, in Chapter 3, I provided evidence that countries from Central and Eastern Europe consolidated their democracies in much less time than most countries from any other world region. Since most CEE societies also display higher levels of education and lower levels of social inequality, one might tentatively conclude that modernization helps to speed up the process rather than being the only way to CoD (Merkel 2008). Second, the indirect importance of socioeconomic development is further evidenced by my finding that lack thereof is a necessary condition for the lack of CoD. The conclusion from this for policy makers who aim at consolidating democracy should not be so much to argue (only) for more socioeconomic development but to carefully assess which type of democracy would be most appropriate given the country's configurations of societal features. While it is true that many instances of failed CoD are countries that are poor, the more outstanding feature is how inadequate their institutional framework is given the societal constraints they face.

It is interesting to note that among the many modernization theory-based approaches to CoD, we can find one version that explicitly uses the concept of power dispersion for theorizing the effect of development on CoD. In his theory of power assets, Tatu Vanhanen (1994, 1997, 2003) identifies three types of power resources (land, money, and education) and claims that the more dispersed they are, the more likely it is that democracy will consolidate. He argues that if power resources are concentrated, only cyclical movements between democracy and

autocracy can be achieved. In the past, such cyclical processes of change between democracy and autocracy were observed not only in Latin America but also in countries like Turkey and some African countries.

While I share his idea that the degree of power dispersion induced by societal factors matters for democracy, there is, however, a crucial difference between Vanhanen's theory of power assets and my approach of a fit between political institutions and societal context. Unlike me, Vanhanen does not distinguish between different democracy types and their fit to different contexts. His argument boils down to the plausible claim that per se and over a long period of time, more power-dispersing contexts induced by socioeconomic development lead to more democracy in a country. I argue, instead, that institutions matter, too. Human agency in the form of sometimes more, sometimes less skillful crafting and adapting of institutions is largely absent in Vanhanen's theory. In my approach, human agency, political skill, will, *fortuna* and *virtú* in choosing and reforming the appropriate institution play an equally important role alongside the structural constraints they are facing when trying to consolidate democracy.

Amongst the most prominent institutional hypotheses within the CoD literature is Juan Linz' (1990a, 1990b) claim that parliamentary types of government are more likely to foster CoD than presidential or semi-presidential systems. Throughout the 1990s, this bivariate hypothesis has been refined by making the effect of executive format on CoD conditional on the presence of other core political institutions, usually the type of party system and the electoral system (e.g. Mainwaring 1997). Such a conjunctural institutional approach is in line with the prevalence of causal complexity over parsimony as it has been adopted in my study. However, in my approach, I go even further in contextualizing the effect of core institutional mixes on CoD by also taking the non-institutional societal context into account. This holds as well for the territorial distribution of competencies, a concept very much *en vogue* not a long time ago, especially among policy advisers.

My analyses show, though, that institutions exert their impact only in *combination with* other institutions *and* the societal context in which they are inserted. There is no single best type of governmental format, no single best type of party system, and no single best formula for the territorial distribution of competencies. Virtually any logically possible democracy type that can be formed based on these three institutional features is, in fact, implemented in at least one country with a consolidated democracy. That alone should be evidence enough that the search for a one-size-fits-all institutional panacea is a futile endeavor. What matters for CoD is that the institutional mix as a whole fits in the context in which it is supposed to operate; or, as Fish (1999: 805) puts it: "the dispersion of power, rather than the specific type of constitution, serves as the key macroinstitutional guardian of democratic advancement." The empirical fact that a majority of consolidated democracies have adopted a parliamentary form of government with a higher number of parties (Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski, *et al.* 2000) and that there are increasingly more decentralized political systems is *not* proof against my claim that these are not superior types of democracy per se. It simply indicates that many of the young democracies display those kinds of societal contexts for which

this power-dispersing type of decentralized parliamentary democracy provides a fit and thus jointly produce CoD.

Is there one best mode of transition for CoD?

Yet another important strand of literature to which my analyses speak is the hotly debated issue of the role of the transition mode in the process of consolidation. In Chapter 7, I argued that a great deal of the disagreement about the effect of pacts and other transition modes on CoD stems from the fact that the transition modes only have an indirect effect on CoD and that not all cases are equally relevant for testing this impact.

With my distinction between remote contexts and proximate institutions and the claim that it is an adequate combination of both that leads to different paths towards CoD, the question to be asked about transition modes becomes the following: which mode of transition enables the actors to choose the appropriate institutional configuration, so that the type of democracy implemented fits to the surrounding societal context conditions in terms of power dispersion and thus consolidates? Framed in this way, the research question stays true to the theoretical claims about pacts made in the literature. Careful reading reveals that the pact hypothesis claims (a) that pacts help to find the most appropriate institutional configuration for achieving CoD and (b) that pacts are not a necessary condition for CoD. From this it follows (a) that different types of democracy can emerge out of pacts and (b) that CoD can also occur in the absence of a pact. This is a paradigmatic example of a complex causal statement: it is conjunctural, equifinal, and asymmetric because we do not expect that one mode of transition is significantly correlated with the implementation of any single type of democracy, and even less so with CoD, nor is it expected to be necessary or sufficient for CoD or not-CoD. Instead, depending on the context, (a) different transition types can lead to the same outcome and (b) the same transition type can lead to different outcomes. Further, (c) under certain favorable societal contexts, there are many types of democracy that are appropriate and democracy thus becomes consolidated regardless of the mode of transition and the institutional configuration implemented.

While my empirical findings on the role of transition modes in choosing the appropriate institutions are only preliminary and inconclusive, the major methodological point remains. The test of the pact hypothesis based on a static comparison of a larger number of cases requires careful research design that takes into account the causally complex and indirect impact of pacts on CoD. It should therefore come as no surprise that scholars normally do not find any significant association between any type of transition and levels of CoD because the pact hypothesis postulates set relations not covariations.

It might be argued that in the majority of successful CoD cases political institutions are not the result of deliberations guided by long-term concerns of 'founding fathers' about the democratic future but simply a mix of habits inherited from the past and short term strategic calculations of how to get to power (Colomer 1995). In a number of cases, these strategies meant that decisions on a new

constitutional order were delayed for several years, thus losing the opportunity to seize a 'constitutional moment' (Ackerman 1991, see also Stanger 2004). While the empirical evidence cannot be contested, its relevance for the present argument can. First, the pact hypothesis states that pacts can facilitate and speed up the search for appropriate institutions. Cases without pacts and with delayed institutional decisions do not constitute counterevidence against this claim. Second, the pact hypothesis is more about institutional rather than constitutional choices. Many institutions that define the democracy type, such as the number of effective parties, are commonly regulated at a level lower than the national constitution.

Critiques of the pact hypothesis argue that pacts might have a positive impact on CoD in former military regimes such as those of Southern Europe and Latin America, but not in former communist regimes, which were ruled by a single party (Bunce 1995a, 1995b, 1998, 2003; McFaul 2002). It is convincingly argued that, while in the South, pacted transitions led to more successful outcomes, in the East, those transitions were successful which (a) featured simultaneous political and fast economic transformation, (b) displayed skewed economic benefit distributions, (c) were driven by mass pressure, and (d) lacked a balance of political power (McFaul 2002: 225). In other words, in the East almost the exact opposite of pacts has led to CoD. It is argued that in the context of post-communism, pacts are not only inconsequential to CoD and difficult to set up, but also that they were detrimental to CoD. These claims thus come close to stating that in post-communism (a) pacts are a sufficient condition for non-CoD and (b) non-pacted reforms or revolutions from below are a necessary condition for CoD. However, the empirical evidence – even that provided by authors making such claims – does not support these conclusions. There are post-communist cases both of pacted transitions that lead to CoD (Hungary, Poland), and of non-pacted transitions that lead to non-CoD (e.g. Albania).

The debate on pacts is also insightful for the broader issue of conceptual traveling and stretching (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993) and the vices (Bunce 1995a, 1995b) and virtues (Schmitter and Karl 1994; Karl and Schmitter 1995, 2002, Bunce 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2003) of cross-regional comparisons. Leaving aside debates over the empirical plausibility of different MoT claims, this debate confirms the point that one needs to contextualize the effect of transition modes by taking the societal features in which pacts are made into account. Like Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter (2002), critiques of the pact hypothesis also agree that MoT has an indirect effect on CoD through institutional choices made during the transition period. If contextualization is desirable, I see it as a mistake to derive from this that different world regions should not, or cannot, be compared. Quite the contrary! Any claim that regional context matters requires more, not less inter-regional comparisons in order to specify what exactly the summary variable 'region' analytically stands for. Only through broader comparisons can we unravel the scope conditions under which the pact hypothesis holds and which are only implicitly included in their original version. The pact hypothesis, for instance, seems to implicitly assume that there are at least two coherent groups of actors willing to negotiate and able to implement the agreements. It needs to be

investigated whether or not the effect of pacts remains the same when these scope conditions are not present, such as, apparently, in some former Soviet republics. In this sense, the discussion on the role of pacts is an example *par excellence* of how concept traveling can lead to important conceptual refinements through adding context factors that surround the core causal mechanism.

Comparing cases from different world regions is strengthening the analytic leverage, but it also brings to the fore some old and mundane-looking problems in the study of MoT. First, by broadening the geographic scope, the classification of each case's type of transition becomes ever more difficult. Even for country experts this task is often painstaking. Large parts of most pacts are of a clandestine nature and the public is only informed, if at all, long after the facts. Furthermore, some countries oscillate between different transition modes throughout the transition period. What might start out as a reform or a revolution turns into pacts or vice versa, and thus time, timing, and sequencing (Schmitter and Santiso 1998) causally matters and needs to be taken into consideration.[3] Finally, even cases clearly identified as pacted transitions vary in degree and type: in some cases only one all-encompassing pact is made whereas in other cases actors strike separate political, social, and economic deals (Karl and Schmitter 1991);[4] and each of these pacts can show varying degrees of ideological inclusiveness.[5]

Concepts, measurements, and methods

Apart from the contributions to the literature that try to explain CoD by making use of different perspectives, such as modernization processes, institutional theories, or mode of transition approaches, this book also contains aspects that speak to both the literature on concept formation and measurement and to some general comparative methodological issues.

First, with the Democratization Data Set one can avoid relying on less specific and often criticized large N measures that are usually employed in CoD studies, such as the data provided by Freedom House, or the Polity data. The descriptive analysis of this novel data revealed findings of theoretical and substantive importance. It has been shown that contrary to widespread beliefs in the early 1990s, former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe not only managed to achieve CoD, but did so at world record speed. Also, contrary to expectations derived from classical transitology, there are a number of successful CoD cases which inverted the standard sequence and first democratized before they fully liberalized. Equally puzzling, while for many autocrats moves towards greater liberalization proved to be a slippery slope towards democratization, autocrats in one world region seem capable of resisting this mechanism. As my data shows, the Middle East and Northern Africa is full with periodically liberalizing autocracies that have so far resisted any serious move towards more democratization.

Explaining why MENA countries are different in their capacity of keeping control over political liberalization is an interesting question that goes beyond the scope of this book. It has already triggered an increased scholarly interest in the Islamic and Arab world more generally.[6] A tentative list of factors that helps

MENA autocrats to stay in command while periodically liberalizing, and which sets them apart from autocrats elsewhere in the past and present, could be comprised of the following factors:[7] autocratic leaders have enough financial resources for maintaining a sufficiently strong state apparatus capable of performing acts of repression when required; recent experience with two bloody civil wars in Algeria and Egypt are interpreted by many in the region as the result of too much and too uncontrolled political opening; some MENA regimes are monarchies, granting the heads of state an extra legitimacy; there is a widespread belief among elites and the population that MENA is different and not (yet) ready for democracy; autocratic rulers generate legitimacy as fighters against Israel and the US; the middle class is largely dependent on the state; the military is either controlled by the government or is the government itself; and since the military rule was never strongly justified by the aim to achieve development, it cannot loose much legitimacy when failing to achieve development.

Second, with the Democratization Data Set scholars can also classify and select cases with regard to their CoD status using comparable numeric evidence rather than relying on common sense judgments or data sets not designed for measuring CoD. A more precise and inter-subjective categorization of cases from different world regions has several benefits for studies that go beyond the topic of CoD. For instance, it is high time to include obvious success stories of CoD into studies of 'normal' democracies rather than to continue treating them as instances of young democracies still in the process of consolidation and to assume that they are qualitatively different from old democracies. On the other hand, it is also of benefit to clearly identify the cases of failed CoD. These are the places where scholars should start – and, in fact, have already started – looking for the emergence of other important political phenomena, such as the rise of new types of hybrid regimes. As the very notion of low CoD is that a respective democracy cannot be expected to persist in its present form, weakly consolidated democracies are the places where defect democracies (Merkel 2004), competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitzky and Way 2002), or electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006) are likely to emerge – or have already emerged over the last years. Unconsolidated democracies are also the place where so-called electoral revolutions (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik forthcoming; Hale 2006; Herd 2005; McFaul 2005) are most likely to occur – or have already occurred in some cases during the last few years, *vide* Georgia in 2003 or Ukraine in 2004–2005. What the CoD data does not indicate, however, is the quality of the democracies that have become consolidated. The quality of democracy is receiving increased attention, especially among scholars who have previously written on issues of democratic transition and consolidation (O'Donnell, *et al.* 2004, Diamond and Morlino 2005, Bühlmann, *et al.* 2007). Although it has not yet been defined and conceptualized, let alone measured properly, it is clear that the meaning of quality of democracy cannot be the expected persistence of democracy, for this, and only this, is already covered by the concept of CoD.

Third, a notable part of this book is dedicated to methodological issues that are frequently encountered in mid-sized N, macro-comparative research. How can one deal with causally complex theoretical claims, especially when the data is limited

in its diversity? The argument in this book is that fuzzy set QCA has comparative advantages over other available data analysis techniques because it is rooted in set theory and formal logic and thus mimics core principles of configurational thinking prevalent in small N qualitative research. More and more comparativists pay attention to the fact that the power of statistical techniques can only be fully brought to bear if the N is high, and that it is difficult to justify that cases are hidden behind coefficients, significance levels, and error terms, if there are only a handful of them relevant for the research question. In recent years, some important steps have been undertaken to make regression analysis more case sensitive (Collier 1993). For instance, procedures like 'robust' least absolute error regression or the reweighted least squares regression have been designed in order to put outliers at the center of attention and to keep the effect of different types of outliers on the estimates under control. While it is uncontroversial that these developments constitute an important methodological progress, it is, however, important to point out that an outlier in regression is different from those cases in QCA that follow specific paths to the outcome. Such 'exceptional' cases in QCA cannot be discovered by conventional residual analysis because they are not evoked by extreme or deviant scores. It is, rather, the combination of scores that is exceptional. Furthermore, whereas fuzzy set analysis reveals the presence of necessary and sufficient causal conditions, quantitative correlational analysis commonly indicates the correlation between variables, not set-theoretic relations. Hence, whenever theory generates hypotheses that are framed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and – by the virtue of this – in terms of conjunctural, equifinal, and asymmetric causation, the use of QCA should be seriously considered. Methods not based on the principles of set theory and calibrated set membership scores but on the principles of covariation and quantitative variables can perhaps be used to investigate set relations, but further research and development of adequate statistical methods is still needed for achieving this (Ragin 2008b).

Possible refinements

In my approach to explaining CoD, at the empirical level primacy is given to causal complexity over parsimony. Different combinations of societal factors and political-institutional institutions are sufficient for CoD and yet other such combinations are sufficient for not-CoD. The theoretical interpretation, however, subsumes all these different paths under the common principle of a fit in terms of power dispersion, a notion that operates at a rather high level of generality. As a consequence, the power dispersing characteristics of both the context and the democracy type can be further refined by taking additional aspects into account.

With regard to remote societal context conditions, one might argue, for example, that the kind of political power dispersion differs according to whether ethno-linguistic groups are concentrated in a few regions or scattered throughout the national territory without any regional concentration. Also, country-specific historical experiences with concentrating or dispersing institutional arrangement may shape the viability of present democracy types. With regard to types of

democracy, the list of institutional features to look at could be extended, too. These additional institutions can be formally fixed rules but also more informal social practices. Among the formal rules that affect the power-distributing character of a democracy, one could focus in more detail on the substantive variation within presidential systems with regard to presidential powers.[8] Also, the type of electoral system could be integrated, although, as argued above, unless it can be empirically shown for each country that electoral systems strongly determine the shape of the party system, they are not directly relevant for measuring the concentration or dispersion of political power as conceptualized here. Electoral systems have many other effects on various elements of a political system and the political process that are potentially relevant. Trying to integrate all of them into the power dispersion concept might make this concept intractably complex, though. A further refined power dispersion classification of democracies should also pay closer attention to the inner functioning of parties and their capacity of giving voice to different social groups, something that in this book was treated as a constant, both within and between countries. Among the social institutions, probably the most important is the system of interest representation that brings together different social groups (associations and movements) and political actors vested with formal powers. Different systems of interest representation also disperse power to different degrees. As a rough rule, pluralist systems disperse power more than corporatist systems. Clearly, this list of power-sharing mechanisms is much longer and, depending on theoretical taste and research interests, can be extended virtually *ad infinitum*, just the same as the list of different powers granted to presidents, the interest representation capacities of different parties, etc.

There is, however, a trade-off between empirical accuracy, on the one hand, and empirical tractability, on the other, that needs to be taken into account when deciding to subsume more societal or institutional features into the power dispersion classification of societal contexts and democratic regime types. The number of democracy types and contexts grows exponentially with the number of characteristics added. More empirical detail thus comes at the price of increasing complexity and a danger of idiosyncrasy. At the end of the day "the choice among theoretical models also involves an aesthetic decision of how much richness or goodness of fit the researcher is willing to sacrifice in exchange for an increase in parsimony." (Bennett 1999: 10).

A further complexification of the types of democracy not only has research practical, but potentially also policy relevant repercussions. My approach gives actors a margin of maneuverability for influencing the fate of their democracy through choosing the appropriate institutions. Consequently, if the number of theoretically relevant institutions for CoD is extended, then maneuverability is likewise extended – but so is the complexity of the task to find the appropriate institutional mix. Furthermore, the chances for CoD are subject to fluctuation over time, as not only constitutionally fixed, but also less formalized institutions are included in the theoretical framework. The integration of the system of interest representation into the framework of a fit between institutions and context would in particular help to place more emphasis on my claim that the fate of democracy is

not set in stone with the adoption of a certain type of democracy after the transition away from autocracy. Instead, democracies can and do change over time. Not only do actors reform their constitutions and core institutions, they also transform their system of interest representation and other relevant, yet less formalized features alike. If done well, whether intentionally or by accident, these (ongoing) changes contribute to a better fit of the institutional mix to the needs created by the societal structure and thus to CoD.

By now, many of the cases studied in this book are consolidated democracies. Countries such as Slovenia, Brazil, and Greece have disappeared from the daily news on democracies on the brink of breakdown. We pay little attention to them because their politics have become predictable – and this is a positive sign, taking into consideration that only a few decades ago, people in these countries were denied the most fundamental political rights, imprisoned without just cause, tortured, and killed. Yet the topic of democratization and CoD remains on the agenda of both political activists and social scientists. We still need to know more and understand better what (has not) happened and why it (has not) happened in the last 30 years of transitions to democracy and their (non-)consolidation. At some point in the future, another window of opportunity for democratic change may open for many of today's autocratic regimes. Only if we learn the lessons of past CoD, will we, as academics, practitioners, and citizens be able to make at least educated guesses and suggestions as to what should be done to secure the future of young democracies. Certainly not an unimportant task!

Appendix A   Data

Table A1 Liberalization of Autocracy (LoA) annual scores, 1974–1999/2000

	1974	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*
Algeria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Argentina	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.5	6.0	7.0	7.0
Belarus	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bolivia	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	0.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Brazil	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5	5.0	5.5	5.5	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Bulgaria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Chile	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Czech Rep.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Egypt	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Georgia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greece	4.0	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
Guatemala	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Hungary	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.0
Mexico	2.5	2.5	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.5	5.5
Mongolia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Morocco	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.5
Nicaragua	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Peru	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.5	2.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Poland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.0	2.0
Portugal	5.0	5.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Slovakia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Slovenia	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Spain	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0
Tunisia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	4.5	4.5
Ukraine	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uruguay	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.5	3.5	6.5	6.5
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table A1 Liberalization of Autocracy (LoA) annual scores, 1974–1999/2000 (*continued*)

1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
0.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	-
7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
0.5	0.5	0.5	4.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.0	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.0
5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
6.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
0.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	-
1.5	2.5	2.5	5.0	6.0	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
1.0	1.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	-
3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	2.5	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	-
0.5	0.5	1.5	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
1.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
2.5	3.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	-
5.5	6.0	6.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.0	5.5	5.5	6.0	6.5	7.0	7.0
0.0	0.0	2.5	4.5	5.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	-
3.5	3.5	5.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
4.5	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.0	1.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.0
2.5	4.0	6.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	-
7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	-
2.0	2.5	3.5	4.0	4.0	4.0	6.5	5.5	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	4.5
1.0	1.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	-
2.0	2.0	3.5	5.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
1.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5
4.5	4.5	4.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	-
1.5	2.0	3.5	5.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
-	-	-	6.5	6.0	6.0	5.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0

Table A2 Consolidation of Democracy (CoD) annual scores, 1974–1999/2000

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Argentina	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
Belarus	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bolivia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	5.5	5.5
Brazil	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5
Bulgaria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Chile	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Czech Rep.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Georgia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greece	2.0	6.0	6.5	7.0	7.5	7.5	7.5	8.0	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.5	10.0
Guatemala	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.5	1.5
Hungary	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mexico	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.5
Mongolia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nicaragua	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.5	1.5
Peru	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.5
Poland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Portugal	0.0	3.0	5.5	5.5	5.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	10.5	9.5
Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Slovakia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Slovenia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.5	7.0	9.0	9.0	8.5	8.5	9.0	9.0	9.5	10.5
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	4.0	4.0	4.0
Ukraine	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uruguay	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.5	7.5	7.5

Table A2 Consolidation of Democracy (CoD) annual scores, 1974–1999/2000 (*continued*)

1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
8.0	8.0	8.5	8.0	8.5	8.5	7.5	9.5	9.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	10.0	10.5
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	4.5	3.0	3.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.5
5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5
2.5	4.0	7.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.5	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	8.0	7.5	6.0	8.0	10.0	10.0	7.5	10.5	10.5	-
0.0	0.0	4.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.5	9.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5	7.5	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.5	9.0	9.0	10.5	10.0	-
0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	4.0	2.5	2.5
11	10.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	10.5	10.5	11.0	12.0	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5
1.5	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5	3.5	3.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	9.0	9.0	10.0	10.0	11.0	11.0	-
2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	6.5	6.5	7.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	10.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	4.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	11.0
2.5	3.0	3.0	8.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0
5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	4.0	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	4.5
0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	7.5	8.5	9.0	9.5	9.0	9.5	10.0	11.0	11.0	-
9.5	9.5	11.0	11.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	12.0	12.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	5.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	-
0.5	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	8.0	8.0	10.5	10.5	-
0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	8.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.5	10.5	10.5	11.0
10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	11.0	11.0	11.5	11.5	11.5	10.5	11.0
4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	-
0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	4.5	6.0	6.0	7.0	7.5	8.0	8.0	8.5	7.0	7.0
7.5	7.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5

Table A3 Calibration of fuzzy set membership scores in conditions and outcome

---

ECONDEV

Fuzzy set: socioeconomically developed society

Direct method of calibration based on the following thresholds for the qualitative anchors:

$$ECONDEV = \begin{cases} \text{fs>0.95 when GDP>20001} \\ \text{fs>0.50 when GDP>8500} \\ \text{fs<0.05 when GDP<3000} \end{cases}$$

Data source for variable 'GDP':

World Development Report, gross national income 2000 at purchasing power parity

Remarks: I take the usual shortcut and use the level of socioeconomic development as a measure for the economically (and otherwise) modernized societies.

EDUC

Fuzzy set: highly educated society

Direct method of calibration based on the following thresholds for the qualitative anchors:

$$EDUC = \begin{cases} \text{fs>0.95 when education>90} \\ \text{fs>0.5 when education>74} \\ \text{fs<0.05 when education<60} \end{cases}$$

Data sources for variable 'education':

For higher education enrolment: combined first-, second-, and third-level enrolment ratio (%, 1995). Data from UNDP Human Development Report 1998. For Albania, Ecuador, Estonia, Honduras, Latvia, Lithuania, and Paraguay: from UNDP report 2002 (data for 1999). For Guatemala and Mongolia: Human Development Report 2003 (data for 2000/01)

for literacy rate: CIA World Factbook

Remarks: In order to assess the degree of education, I combine the indicators for literacy rate and enrolment with the following formula: EDUC = (literacy rate + (2 * enrolment))/3. The same formula is used in the Human Development Report. More weight is given to the enrolment component of education, because what seems to be important for democracy and consolidation is that people acquire cognitive capacities that go well beyond the pure capacity of reading and writing.

Usually, in broader cross-national comparisons, the percentage of literate citizens is used (e.g. Gasiorowski and Power 1998). This seems to be an adequate operationalization only if the aim of the study is to unravel very broad, historic co-variations between democracy and education throughout the last centuries, making the alphabetization rate a valid indicator for education only when earlier waves of democratization are investigated. In the context of the more recent wave of democratization in the late 20th century, however, I suggest a somewhat more demanding criterion for education that allows for a greater differentiation between countries.

ETHLIHOM

Fuzzy set: ethno-linguistically homogeneous society

Direct method of calibration based on the following thresholds for the qualitative anchors:

$$\text{ETHLIHOM} = \begin{cases} \text{fs}>0.95 \text{ when ethnoling}<0.1 \\ \text{fs}>0.5 \text{ when ethnoling}>0.27 \\ \text{fs}<0.05 \text{ when ethnoling}>0.49 \end{cases}$$

Data source for variable 'ethnoling':

Roeder (2001), variable 'ELF85'

Remarks: The data by Roeder (2001) uses an index of fractionalization, measured along ethno-linguistic scales, as proxies for the number of competing groups in society, and hence for the degree of conflict within society. For a given number of ethnic-linguistic groups in society, the index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the country in question will not belong to the same ethnic group. A higher value in the interval between zero and one, thus, reflects a greater degree of fractionalization.

The data thus reflects ethno-linguistic cleavages and not just ethnic cleavages. The difference consists of the fact that in order to form an ethno-linguistic cleavage, a group must be different both in ethnic and linguistic terms. In the context of CoD studies, this seems to be more appropriate than simply ethnic cleavages.

Logically, since the set of ethno-linguistic groups is a subset of all ethnic groups, the fractionalization index for ethno-linguistic groups for one country is either the same or lower than the index for ethnic fractionalization. Roeder (2001) has assembled data for both ethnic and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. It turns out that for the majority of the cases I look at, both indices give the same results. There are, however, important exceptions. Apart from moderate changes in the index value for Chile, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, the distinction between ethno-linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity is significant for Brazil. Brazil is an ethnically heterogeneous society, but at the same time ethno-linguistically homogeneous. This does not exclude the existence of many languages, but most of these are spoken only by a miniscule minority (some by less than 100 people). Many language groups are not defined as separate ethnic groups as well. Hence, counter-intuitively, Brazil has a high membership in the set of ethno-linguistic homogeneous societies. It should be noted though that no relevant Brazilian party with an ethnic platform has ever existed. This can be taken as evidence for the hunch that it is the intersection between language and ethnicity that matters for these groups to become politically active, see http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=Brazil.

Correction of fuzzy set membership scores due to flawed raw data for the following cases: Czech Republic to 0.8; Mongolia to 0.8; Turkey to 0.4.

CLOSE

Fuzzy set: closeness to the West

Direct method of calibration based on the following thresholds for the qualitative anchors:

$$\text{CLOSE} = \begin{cases} \text{fs}>0.95 \text{ when dist}<1000 \\ \text{fs}>0.5 \text{ when dist}<2800 \\ \text{fs}<0.05 \text{ when dist}>7500 \end{cases}$$

Data source for variable 'dist':

http://www.indo.com/distance/, measured in kilometers

Remarks: Closeness to the West can be operationalized in various ways (for different approaches, see Slater, *et al.* 1993: 49ff.; Huntington 1991; Pridham 1997). Brinks and Coppedge 2006; and Levitzky and Way 2005, 2006; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; I measure geographic distance to the Western capitals (Brussels and Washington, respectively) and use this as a proxy for economic, cultural, and geo-strategic interest of the West to support democracy.

DEMEX

Fuzzy set: countries with previous experience with democracy

Direct method of calibration based on the following thresholds for the qualitative anchors:

$$\text{DEMEX} = \begin{cases} \text{fs}>0.95 \text{ when demyears}>41 \\ \text{fs}>0.5 \text{ when demyears}>14.5 \\ \text{fs}<0.05 \text{ when demyears}=0 \end{cases}$$

Data source for variable 'demyears':

Polity III (Jaggers/Gurr 1995), http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/Polity.html

Remarks: 'demyears' represents the number of years with scores equal to or higher than 5 on the variable 'dem_aut' prior to the ongoing democratic period of each case. The rather low threshold of 5 on the –10 to +10 scale has been chosen because the aim is to assess historical experiences with democracy and, thus, present standards (e.g. a score of 8 or higher) are too strict to capture these experiences.

Corrections of fuzzy set membership scores for individual countries due to inexact Polity III data: Greece to 0.9; Honduras to 0.6; Turkey to 0.4.

NOCOM

Fuzzy set: countries with no communist past

Fuzzy set membership function:

$$
\text{NOCOM} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ when comyears=0} \\ 0.2 \text{ when } 1<\text{comyears}<50 \\ 0 \text{ when } 51<\text{comyears} \end{cases}
$$

Data source for variable 'nocom':

Own coding.

Remarks: The membership function for the fuzzy set of 'countries with no communist past' allows differentiation between the former Soviet Republics (more than 50 years of communist rule) and the Eastern European Communist Soviet satellite States (less than 50 years of communist rule).

PARLSYS

Fuzzy set: countries with a power dispersing executive format

Fuzzy set membership function:

$$
\text{PARLIA} = \begin{cases} 0.9 \text{ when govsys = parliamentary system} \\ 0.8 \text{ when govsys = parliamentary system, struggle over} \\ \qquad \text{presidential power} \\ 0.6 \text{ when govsys = mixed system, more parliamentarian} \\ 0.4 \text{ when govsys = mixed system, more presidential} \\ 0.1 \text{ when govsys = presidential system} \end{cases}
$$

Data sources for variable 'govsys':

General information: Beck, *et al.* 2001, http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?id=25467, <

Scores are cross-checked with Przeworski, *et al.* 2000, http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~cheibub/data/Default.htm

For individual countries, scores are corrected with the following more case-sensitive sources:

For Mongolia: Fritz (2002) and Fish (1998).

For the Baltic States: Norgaard, *et al.* (1996) For Central and Eastern Europe: Beyme (2001), Shugart (1993)

Remarks: From the Beck, *et al.* (2007) data set, I use the variable 'system': "Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no prime minister, receive a 0. In systems with both a prime minister and a president, we consider the following factors to categorize the system: a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament

needs a supermajority to override the veto. b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and dismiss prime minister and/or other ministers. c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more often than the PM then this serves as an additional indicator to call the system presidential. The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are true. If no information or ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then (d). Consult Appendix for specific country examples.

Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary (2), with the following exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall him (if they need a 2/3 vote to impeach, or must dissolve themselves while forcing him out) then the system gets a 1." (Keefer 2002:5)

Based on this coding scheme, the following changes in codes occurred over time:

Bulgaria: 1991–1992: 1, then 0
Czechoslovakia: 1991–1992: 1, then 2
Greece: 1975–1986: 1, then 2
Honduras: 1982–1989: 2, then 0
Mongolia: 1991–1993: 1, then 0
Latvia: 1992–1993: 1, then 2

Latvia and Estonia receive a fuzzy membership score of 0.8 because of continuing struggle by their the presidents for more de facto and de jure power (Norgaard, *et al.* 1996).

PARFRAHI

Fuzzy set: democracy with high number of effective parties in legislative chamber(s)

Direct method of calibration based on the following thresholds for the qualitative anchors:

$$EFPAHI = \begin{cases} \text{fs} > 0.95 \text{ when partynumber} > 5.9 \\ \text{fs} > 0.5 \text{ when partynumber} < 2.65 \\ \text{fs} < 0.05 \text{ when partynumber} < 1.39 \end{cases}$$

Data sources for variable 'partynumber':

General information: Przeworski, *et al.* (2000)

For Latin America: Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Payne *et al.* (2002), Coppedge (1998) (http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/LAPSdata.xls)

For Central and Eastern Europe: Zielonka and Pravda (2001), Frye (1999)

For Southern Europe: Morlino (1998)

Remarks: The scores for 'partynumber' reflect the mean number of effective parties over each country-specific democratic time period. These are: Bulgaria: 1990–1994–1997, Czech: 1992–1996–1998, Poland: (last one: 1997), Romania: 1990–1992–1996, Slovakia: 1992–1994–1998, Slovenia: 1992–1996, Estonia: 1992–1995, Latvia: 1993–1995, Lithuania: 1992–1996, Argentina: 1983–1985–1987–1989–1991–1993–1994–1995, Bolivia: 1979–1980–1985–1989–1993, Brazil: 1986–1990–1994, Chile: 1989–1993, Ecuador: 1979–1984–1986–1988–1990–1992–1994–1996, Mexico: 1996, Peru: 1978–1980–1985–1990–1992–1995, Uruguay: 1984–1990–1994, Turkey: 1983–1986 and 1987–1990, Mongolia 1990, Greece: 1974–1977–1981–1985–1988–1993–1996, Portugal: 1975–1976–1980–1983–1985–1987–1991–1995, Spain: 1977–1979–1982–1986–1989–1993–1996.

In the case of two legislative chambers, the mean score of the number of parties in both houses is taken where data was available.

DECENT

Fuzzy Set: decentralized political system

Indirect method of calibration (see 'Remarks' below)

Data sources for variable 'decentralization':

Schneider 2003 and Daniel Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles, who kindly made his data set available for me.

Remarks: Following the template for the indirect method of calibration (Ragin forthcoming), first some preliminary fuzzy set membership scores are assigned based on the following information. Cases with factor loadings higher than 0.5 in all three decentralization dimensions identified by Schneider 2003 – fiscal, administrative, and political – obtain a preliminary fuzzy set score of 1 in the fuzzy set 'fsdecent'; those with factor loadings higher than 0.5 in two dimensions receive a score of 0.6; those with a factor loading higher than 0.5 in one dimension get a fuzzy set membership of 0.4; and those with no factor loading higher than 0.5 get a fuzzy membership score of 0. In a second step, a fractional polynomial regression is run with fsdecent as the dependent variable and the average of the three factor loadings as the independent variable. The predicted values of this analysis are the fuzzy set membership scores in the set of 'decentralized political systems'.

The fuzzy set membership scores for some countries were adjusted based on more detailed country-specific data. Information for Ecuador, Estonia, Greece, Honduras, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uruguay is taken from Treisman's data and/or country-specific sources.

COD

Fuzzy Set: consolidated democracies

Direct method of calibration based on the following thresholds for the qualitative anchors:

$$COD = \begin{cases} \text{fs>0.95 when codpercentage>83} \\ \text{fs>0.5 when codpercentage>55} \\ \text{fs<0.05 when codpercentage<10} \end{cases}$$

Data source for variable 'codpercentage':

Democratization Data Set, see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this book for a detailed description of the definition, conceptualization, operationalization, and measuring of CoD.

Remarks:

The scores for Mexico and Brazil are distorted by the way the data on CoD is aggregated over time. Both cases are assigned a fuzzy set membership score in the set of consolidated democracies of 0.7

For those cases that are not included in the Scalogram data set, fuzzy set membership scores are assigned based on case knowledge: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania receive a membership score of 0.65; Albania, Ecuador, and Honduras of 0.35; and Paraguay of 0.15.

Table A4 Fuzzy set membership scores in sufficient paths towards CoD

Country	label	CoD	p1[a]	p2	p3	p4	p5	p6	p7	p8	p9	p10	p11	p12	p13	p14	p15	p_all[b]
Albania	AL																	
Argentina	AR	0.84[c]												0.54				0.54
Belarus	BE																	
Bolivia	BO																	
Brazil	BR	0.65											0.66					0.66
Bulgaria	BU	0.82								0.57								0.57
Chile	CH	0.69													0.54			0.54
Czech Rep.	CR	0.85				0.61												0.61
Ecuador	EC																	
Estonia	EST	0.65						0.54										0.54
Georgia	GE																	
Greece	GR	0.93									0.65							0.65
Guatemala	GUA																	
Honduras	HO																	
Hungary	HU	0.76				0.66												0.66
Latvia	LAT	0.65							0.54									0.54
Lithuania	LIT	0.65															0.53	0.53
Mexico	MX	0.65										0.52						0.52
Mongolia	MO	0.78																
Nicaragua	NI																	

(continued)

Table A4 Fuzzy set membership scores in sufficient paths towards CoD (*continued*)

Country	label	CoD	p1[a]	p2	p3	p4	p5	p6	p7	p8	p9	p10	p11	p12	p13	p14	p15	p_all[b]
Paraguay	PA																	
Peru	PE																	
Poland	PL	0.84[c]														0.53		0.53
Portugal	PO	0.93			0.55													0.55
Romania	RO	0.75					0.53											0.53
Russia	RU																	
Slovakia	SK	0.81		0.61														0.61
Slovenia	SL	0.94				0.66												0.66
Spain	SP	0.95	0.51															0.51
Turkey	TU																	
Ukraine	UA																	
Uruguay	UR	0.96										0.52						0.52

Notes:
a   For the meaning of p1 – 15 consult Table 6.7
b   P_all indicates the maximum membership of each case over p1 – 15
c   Only fuzzy set membership scores higher than 0.5 are displayed.

Table A5 Fuzzy set membership scores in sufficient paths towards not-CoD

Country	Label	not-CoD	n1[a]	n2	n3	n4	n_all[b]
Argentina	AR						
Belarus	BE	0.94[c]	0.63				0.63
Bolivia	BO	0.59				0.58	0.58
Brazil	BR						
Bulgaria	BU						
Chile	CH						
Czech Rep.	CR						
Georgia	GE	0.87	0.77				0.77
Greece	GR						
Guatemala	GUA	0.81				0.62	0.62
Hungary	HU						
Mexico	MX						
Mongolia	MO						
Nicaragua	NI	0.51					
Peru	PE	0.68				0.75	0.75
Poland	PL						
Portugal	PO						
Romania	RO						
Russia	RU	0.87			0.56		0.56
Slovakia	SK						
Slovenia	SL						
Spain	SP						
Turkey	TU	0.74		0.58			0.58
Ukraine	UA	0.6	0.6				0.6
Uruguay	UR						
Albania	AL	0.65					
Ecuador	EC	0.65				0.65	0.65
Estonia	EST						
Honduras	HO	0.65					
Latvia	LAT						
Lithuania	LIT						
Paraguay	PA	0.85					

Notes:
a   For the meaning of n1 – n4 consult Table 6.7
b   n_ all indicates the maximum membership of each case over n1 – n4
c   Only membership scores higher than 0.5 are displayed.

Appendix B   Method

Linguistic qualifiers

One of the appeals of fuzzy sets is that linguistic qualifiers can be attached to each fuzzy membership score. By assigning fuzzy set membership scores to cases and then linguistic qualifiers to fuzzy set membership scores, a close correspondence between the researcher's theoretical understanding of the concept, its translation into numerical values, and a (common language) verbal expression of the meaning

Table B1 Linguistic qualifiers for different fuzzy-sets

Crisp set	Three-value fuzzy set	Four-value fuzzy set	Six-value fuzzy set	'Continuous' fuzzy set
1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in
			0.9 = mostly but not fully in	Degree of membership is 'more in than out': $0.5 < X_i < 1$
		0.67 = more in than out		
			0.6 = more or less in	
	0.5 = crossover: neither in nor out			0.5 = cross-over: neither in nor out
			0.4 = more or less out	
		0.33 = more out than in		Degree of membership is 'more out than in': $0 < X_i < 0.5$
			0.1 = mostly but not fully out	
0 = fully out	0 = fully out	0 = fully out	0 = fully out	0 = fully out

Source: Ragin (2008a: table 5.1)

of these scores and operations can be achieved. Table B1 lists the linguistic qualifiers attached to the membership scores of differently fine-grained fuzzy sets.

Linking numbers to words with a semantic meaning is an important feature and sets fsQCA apart from concerns prevalent in formal modeling, where not too much importance is given to translating mathematical operations into words that not only help to digest the mathematical operations, but also to give them a real world meaning. But "[m]athematical expressions are meaningless if they cannot be translated into prose." (Gerring 2001: 13).

Consistency and coverage for necessary conditions

Necessity requires that the condition X is a superset of the outcome Y. The formula for consistency of a necessary condition expresses the degree of deviation from this set relation and looks like this:

$$\text{Consistency}_{\text{ necessary condition}}(X_i \geq Y_i) = \frac{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{I} \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{I} X_i}$$

where X_i and Y_i denote the fuzzy set membership scores of the ith case in the condition and the outcome. The numerator is identical to the formula for calculating the consistency of sufficient conditions. In the denominator we find the sum of membership scores in the outcome rather than the sum in the condition. If all X-values exceed the Y-values, X is a superset of Y and the formula for consistency of X as a necessary condition takes on the value of 1, indicating that, indeed, X is a fully consistent necessary condition for Y.

Conceptually, the coverage of a necessary condition expresses whether or not a given condition is a trivial or a non-trivial necessary condition (Ragin 2006b and Goertz 2006a). As an example, think of 'oxygen' as a necessary condition for the occurrence of a dispute in parliament. Since all disputes that ever happened in any parliament around the world saw the presence of oxygen, the latter easily passes the test for consistency as a necessary condition for disputes in parliament. However, oxygen is almost everywhere, regardless of whether disputes occur or not. In other words, the set of cases with oxygen is far greater than the set of disputes in parliament. The greater the imbalance between a huge set representing the necessary condition and a small set representing the outcome, the more trivial becomes this factor as a necessary condition. The formula for assessing the relevance of a necessary condition is as follows.

$$\text{Coverage/Relevance}_{\text{ necessary condition}}(X_i \geq Y_i) = \frac{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{I} \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{I} X_i}$$

Mathematically, the formulae for consistency of sufficient conditions and for coverage of necessary conditions are identical but they carry different conceptual meanings. The same is true for the formulae for coverage of sufficient conditions and consistency of necessary conditions. As a rule, one first needs to assess consistency. Only for those conditions that pass the threshold for consistency does it make sense to calculate their coverage.

Link between parsimony, complexity, consistency, and coverage of solution terms

Common sense already tells us that the conjunction 'ABC' is a more complex and precise description of case characteristics than is conjunction 'AB', which, in turn, is more complex and precise than the term 'A'. Parallel to the dimension of complexity, or precision, of a solution term runs a dimension of consistency. Complexity and parsimony, on the one hand, and consistency and coverage of solution terms, on the other, are directly linked: the more complex a solution term is, the more precise, more consistent, and less encompassing it is. Inversely, the more parsimonious a solution term, the less precise and less consistent it is, but it applies to more cases and thus has a higher coverage. Figure B1 summarizes the argument.

The fuzzy set theoretical reason for this correspondence is straightforward. In order to calculate the membership of a case in the conjunction ABC, the minimum of its membership over A, B, and C is taken (this is the Boolean operation *'and'* which corresponds to the logic of the 'weakest link', see Chapter 5). Hence, the membership in ABC over all cases will always be the same or lower than the membership over all cases in A, B, or C alone or any bivariate combination of these.

Reduction of limited diversity through the two-step QCA approach

Apart from being based on the epistemology of remote and proximate conditions, the two-step QCA approach also helps to tackle the problem of limited diversity. Compared to a simple one-step approach, it drastically reduces the amount of logical remainders. This becomes readily visible if we consider the highest possible number of simplifying assumptions (z) about which the researcher has to decide.

Solution Terms:	A	AB	ABC
	parsimonious imprecise low consistency high coverage		complex precise high consistency low coverage

Figure B1 Link between parsimony, complexity, consistency and coverage of solution terms

Figure B2 Number of logical remainders in one and two-step QCA approaches

Their number can be computed as $z_{max} = 2^k - 1$ (Ragin 1987), where k is the number of causal conditions. It is straightforward to see that the maximum number of logical remainders increases exponentially with the number of conditions used. Consequently, z_{max} will be considerably lower if the parameter k can be split up into k_1 and k_2 (with $k_1 + k_2 = k$). This is exactly what the two-step QCA approach does.

If, say, $k = 8$, a rather common scenario in comparative research , the maximum number of logical remainders is $2^8 - 1 = 255$. If the two analytical steps can be modeled into two sub-sets of equal size holding four variables each ($k_1 = k_2 = 4$), then the maximum number of logical remainders becomes $2^4 - 1 + 2^4 - 1 = 30$ and is, obviously, considerably reduced. Even if the researcher only succeeds in splitting the eight original conditions into two remote and six proximate factors (a kind of 'worst case scenario' in the case of eight variables), the maximum number of logical remainders becomes $2^2 - 1 + 2^6 - 1 = 66$. Thus, given a set of 8 conditions, at least 189 less logical remainders – in the best case even 225 – are produced with the two-step approach compared to a one-step approach.

Figure B2 depicts the comparison between the one-step and the two-step approach for other numbers of conditions. The upper line represents the maximum number of logical remainders in a one-step approach ($2^k - 1$). The medium line represents the maximum number of logical remainders in a two-step approach, where one category consists of only two variables and the other of the rest ('worst case' scenario, where $2^2 - 1 + 2^{k-2} - 1$, or, simply, $2 + 2^{k-2}$). The lower line represents the maximum number of logical remainders in a two-step approach, where the set of variables is equally distributed amongst the categories ('best case' scenario).[1]

In sum, Figure B2 nicely demonstrates the virtues of the two-step approach and the (often overlooked) vices of the one-step approach in dealing with limited diversity – no matter whether in QCA or in other data analysis techniques used in comparative social sciences. A two-step approach reduces the amount of limited diversity and, by doing so, diminishes the amount of simplifying assumptions to be made to a degree that they can be dealt with using conscious theory-based decisions.

Appendix C   Analyses

Testing the dimensionality of the data on LoA and CoD

One statistical technique for testing whether the indicators for LoA and CoD, respectively, can be aggregated into one-dimensional indices without overtly distorting the information in the disaggregated data is reliability analysis (McIver and Carmines 1981; Pennings, *et al*. 1999). The coefficient used is Cronbach's alpha, which varies from 0 to 1. The higher the value, the closer the data comes to being one-dimensional. In general, a value above 0.7 is considered sufficient to validate the claim of uni-dimensionality in the data (Pennings, *et al*. 1999: 97; Santos 1999). If the data meet this test, they can be reliably aggregated into a single scalar indicator without committing the reification error. Table C1 displays the results of various reliability tests. Concerning the LoA and CoD items measured over the time period 1974–1999, all values for Cronbach's alpha easily exceed the 0.7 benchmark. This critical test for uni-dimensionality also holds when the data are split into each of the six sub-regions. These results can be taken as a first (and strong) hint that the data measures a single underlying dimension for each of the two concepts of regime change.

However, these impressive results are based on time-series data. This means that the different data points for one and the same variable, measured in different years, are not independent of each other and, consequently, are likely to correlate. The high values for Cronbach's alpha may thus be mere artifacts of the serial

Table C1 Cronbach's alpha, CoD and LoA (base: all years)

	N	*CoD*	*LoA*
All countries	772	0.9571	0.9807
Southern Europe	81	0.8882	0.9317
South America	162	0.9361	0.9725
Central America	81	0.9476	0.9719
Central & Eastern Europe	183	0.9689	0.9906
Former Soviet Republics	108	0.9117	0.9759
Middle East & Northern Africa	157	0.8777	0.9344

Table C2 Cronbach's alpha, CoD and LoA (base: different points in time)

	CoD	LoA
All countries (N = 30)		
1976	0.9101	0.9610
1980	0.9286	0.9705
1985	0.9491	0.9764
1990	0.9207	0.9495
1995	0.9129	0.9590
1999	0.9265	0.9610

correlation in the time-series data. In order to control for this, Cronbach's alpha is re-calculated using different points in time. The results are displayed in Table C2. As can be seen, even when data at different points in time are analyzed, all values are still higher than 0.7.[2]

Notice that the coefficients for CoD are consistently lower (but still well above the 0.7 threshold) than those for LoA. This is surprising since the value of Cronbach's alpha tends to increase with the number of indicators, as errors become more likely to cancel each other out. Given that there are twelve CoD items compared with only seven LoA items, the lower Cronbach's alpha values held by CoD may indicate that there is a disturbance in the measure. Such a disturbance of one-dimensionality can emerge either from countries or single items that do not fit. In substantive terms, countries vary more in terms of CoD than they do in terms of LoA.[3] Yet, based on these empirical findings there is sufficient evidence to assume that the data on LoA and CoD respectively, have one-dimensional structures.

Juxtaposing correlational and set-theoretic approaches to testing the pact hypothesis

Figure C1 reproduces the logic of a multiple regression with CoD as the dependent variable and pacts as the independent variable while controlling for the effect of CoD-enhancing societal context conditions summarized into one variable. With all variables being dichotomies, this yields a matrix with 8 cells. In a correlational approach, the variable 'pact' would turn out to be a strong (and potentially significant) predictor of CoD – net of the effect of societal context variable – if the cases distribute in the way indicated in italics in Figure C1. In both 2x2 tables on the left and right side of Figure C1, if many cases fall into the upper right and the lower left cells and if, at the same time, no cases with pacts are found in the upper left and the lower right cells, then the variable pact correlates highly with the variable CoD – even when holding constant the effect of societal conditions.

Now, let us juxtapose this with the distribution of cases as expected based on a set-theoretic reading of the pact hypothesis. These expectations are in bold. In the 2x2 table in the left half of Figure C1 (i.e. for all cases without a CoD-enhancing context), the pact hypothesis claims that many cases fall into the upper right cell

		CoD-enhancing context			
		No		Yes	
		Pacts		Pacts	
		No	Yes	No	Yes
CoD	Yes	**no cases**	**many cases**	**irrelevant**	**irrelevant**
		no cases	*many cases*	*no cases*	*many cases*
	No	**irrelevant**	**irrelevant**	**many cases**	**no cases**
		many cases	*no cases*	*many cases*	*no cases*

Figure C1 Juxtaposing correlational and set-theoretic approach to testing the pact hypothesis

Bold: distribution of cases expected under set theory based test of pact hypothesis

Italics: distribution of cases expected under correlation based test of pact hypothesis

and no case falls into the upper left cell, just as a correlational reading of the hypothesis. The expectations for the two cells in the bottom row are different, though. In my reading of the pact hypothesis, these cells are irrelevant for the test and the distribution of cases in these cells does not matter. In stark contrast to this, in the correlational approach it is possible to increase the significance of the pact variable if we include a high number of cases that fall into the lower left cell, i.e. if cases are included in our study that are neither consolidated democracies, nor display pacts or a CoD-enhancing context. Along the same lines, if the number of cases in the lower right cell is high, statistical significance goes down and a correlational approach would lead us to infer that pacts do not matter while I claim that cases in the lower right cell are not directly relevant. It is thus possible that there is a perfect subset relation that does not result in any strong correlation. This might be why correlation-based methods tend to fail to detect significant relations between pacts and other social phenomena.

A similar pattern holds for the 2x2 table on the right side of Figure C1, that is, all cases that display a CoD-enhancing context. For the two cells in the bottom row, the expected distribution of cases in the correlational and in the set theoretic approach coincides. For the other two cells, however, the interpretation of case distribution again diverges.

Analyzing the data with a one-step fsQCA approach

In a one-step fsQCA analysis of CoD, all nine remote and proximate conditions are analyzed simultaneously. This yields a truth table with 512 logically possible combinations. Only 29 of these 512 combinations contain empirical evidence, i.e. there are 483 logical remainders. Following the standards of good practice, three different solution terms are produced: the most complex solution term based on no simplifying assumptions about the logical remainders; the most parsimonious

solution term based on simplifying assumptions on all logical remainders for which a computer algorithm sees fit; and an intermediate solution based on simplifying assumptions only for those logical remainders for which strong expectations about the outcome value exist, so-called 'easy counterfactuals' (Ragin and Sonnett 2004).

The most complex solution term yields 13 different sufficient conditions for CoD (results are available upon request). All conjunctions contain either eight or nine conditions, meaning that not much logical minimization has taken place. The highest raw coverage of a single path is 21 percent but for the majority of paths it does not exceed 15 percent. As the values for the unique coverage indicate, though, there is a lot of overlap between the different paths. None of the paths has a unique coverage of higher than 8 percent and for most of them it is close to zero. Together, the 13 paths cover 68 percent. While these numerical criteria of fit are not manifestly worse than those for the results from the two-step approach, the problem is how to theoretically interpret them, especially from the perspective of a fit between the societal context and political institutions. The 13 paths include 13 different societal contexts and for each of them one would have to formulate whether it concentrates or disperses power in the horizontal and the vertical dimension. In addition, some paths contain only two of the three political institutions. In the two-step approach, in contrast, no logical minimization of the institutional configurations has been allowed for because maintaining the full information on the institutional configuration is crucial for classifying the democracy type as power dispersing or concentrating.

The most parsimonious solution yields four different paths towards CoD. None of them achieves full consistency as sufficient conditions for CoD. Compared to the most complex solution term, both raw and unique coverage are higher. Together, these four conjunctions cover more than 90 percent of the empirical evidence on CoD. While the result obtained seems acceptable, two crucial drawbacks have to be kept in mind. Both drawbacks are arguments in favor of the two-step fsQCA approach. First of all, the most parsimonious solution rests on literally hundreds of simplifying assumptions that are generated by a computer algorithm whose only aim is to produce a minimal logical expression of the empirical information contained in the truth table without contradicting it. Unavoidably, many of these computer-generated simplifying assumptions lack any theoretical sense. Second, while in the case of the most complex solution term, it was the high complexity that made any theoretically meaningful interpretation difficult, in the case of the most parsimonious solution it is the extreme parsimony that allows for hardly any theoretically informed interpretation from the perspective of a fit between institutions and societal context. Two sufficient paths contain only context conditions, another one only political institutions, and a last contains both, stating that the combination of an educated society with a low number of parties is sufficient for CoD.

Finally, applying the easy counterfactual strategy produces ten sufficient paths towards CoD and covers about 68 percent of the outcome at a consistency value of 0.98. As with the most complex solution term, though, the combinations of

context conditions contained in these paths are too heterogeneous to be properly classified with regard to their power concentrating and dispersing properties. More generally, within the framework of a fit between contexts and institutions, the easy-counterfactual approach is problematic in two ways. First, the theoretical expectation is that one and the same institution has different effects on CoD depending on the institutional and societal context it is embedded in. It is thus impossible to formulate directional expectation for single institutional features that are valid regardless of the value of the other conditions. Second, for societal features in isolation we can formulate directional expectations. Any of these conditions should produce CoD when it is present, not when it is absent. However, directional expectations produce a solution term in which none of the paths towards CoD includes the absence of at least one societal context condition. As shown in this book, though, there are cases that manage to achieve CoD in the absence of CoD-fostering societal features, and it is precisely in these unexpected success stories of CoD where much theoretical insight can be gained. This possibility for insight gets lost in the easy-counterfactual approach.

In sum, the two-step fsQCA approach the way it is applied in this book avoids most of the pitfalls of the one-step fsQCA approach. It reduces the amount of limited diversity and the number of simplifying assumptions that need to be made. It makes use of the theoretical distinction between remote and proximate conditions of CoD. A one-step fsQCA approach is less preferable given the relatively high number of conditions analyzed, the phenomenon of limited diversity this produces, the theory-driven distinction between remote and proximate factors for CoD, and the attempt to test a theoretical claim that postulates that a match between different types of contexts and democracies is the driving force behind CoD.

Analyzing the data with multivariate regression

Multivariate regression analysis is the ultimate standard against which QCA is most commonly assessed (e.g. Berg-Schlosser 2002; Seawright 2004; Ragin and Rihoux 2004; Ragin 2006a; Grendstad 2007; and Schneider 2007 for comparison with logistic regression). The aim of the following section is limited to a demonstration of what a regression analysis of CoD factors would produce and how these results can be used as partial support for my findings generated with QCA. The analysis also reveals that the epistemologies of QCA and regression analysis are quite different. The results obtained with both methods differ greatly in the degree of complexity that can be modeled. From this, I conclude that if theory specifies causal complexity, QCA is an adequate method, especially under the constraints of a limited number of cases.

For the remote factors of CoD, clear expectations in which direction they exert their impact can be formulated. National wealth, ethnic homogeneity, educated citizenry, previous democratic experience, closeness to the West, and no communist past, should all be positively related to CoD. I thus expect the remote conditions to correlate significantly with CoD. Due to the coding of the variables, I expect positive signs for ECONDEV, EDUC, CLOSE, and DEMEX and negative

signs for ETHLIHOM and NOCOM. For the proximate factors, in contrast, the point I have made is that no clear expectations for any of these in *isolation* can be made. Hence, none of the institutional conditions is expected to have a strong or significant effect on CoD. [4]

Table C3 summarizes four different regression models. The signs of most variables indicate in the expected directions, with the exception of two variables – the number of years of experience with democracy, and previous communist rule – which both change signs in different specifications (negative sign in the fully specified model and positive in other models). Only socioeconomic development and the number of effective parties are significant across all model specifications. Especially the finding that socioeconomic development fosters the consolidation of democracy is in line with findings from other statistical analyses. All four models are highly significant but most of the coefficients are not. This is a warning sign that multicollinearity is affecting the estimation of coefficients. And, in fact, the variance inflation factor (VIF), especially for the fully specified model, is rather high. VIF for individual variables (not reported here) reveal that it is the number

Table C3 Regressions models, dependent variable CoD

	Model			
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*
Constant	–0.239 (0.504)	0.051 (0.448)	0.368 (0.140)	0.320 (0.169)
ECONDEV/1000	0.019* (0.0173)	0.034** (0.009)		0.027* (0.016)
EDUC	0.007** (0.009)	0.004** (0.008)		
ETHLIHOM	–0.204 (0.257)	–0.308 (0.170)		–0.127 (0.148)
DISTANCE/1000	0.028 (0.028)	0.017* (0.033)		
DEMYEARS/100	–0.039 (0.261)	0.057 (0.260)		
COMYEARS/100	–0.010 (0.461)	0.025 0.376		0.031 (0.400)
PARLSYS	0.253 (0.304)		0.326 (0.093)	0.126 (0.269)
PARFRAHI	–0.018* (0.024)		–0.021* (0.0126)	–0.021* (0.024)
DECENT	0.206 (0.231)		0.388 (0.221)	0.262 (0.213)
R2	0.665	0.510	0.46	0.62
Sig.	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Mean VIF	2.74	2.34	1.06	1.94
Std. Res >–2	RU	BE, RU	RU, TU	RU
CoD pred.	0.58	0.55, 0.58	0.65, 0.78	0.64

Notes: OLS regression, dependent variable: CoD, unstandardized b, robust standard error in parentheses.

VIF = variance inflation factor; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, n = 32

of communist years and socioeconomic development which contribute most to multicollinearity with VIF factors higher than 4.[5] Furthermore, the inspection of the scatterplot of the residuals and the fitted values shows some signs of heteroskedasticity.[7] This is why robust standard errors are used.

Model 1 is the saturated model in which all six remote and the three proximate factors are used. The r-square is 0.665, indicating that about two-thirds of the variation in the dependent variable CoD can be accounted for. The model is significant but only three of the nine independent variables are. Besides the usual suspect of socioeconomic development, also education and the number of parties are significant predictors of CoD. This, as mentioned, indicates some problems with multicollinearity, which is not surprising given the nature of the variables used here.

One way to deal with the problem of multicollinearity is to reduce the number of variables used in the model. Therefore, model 2 includes only the six *remote* context factors. The model still explains more than half of the variation in CoD. In addition to socioeconomic development and education, the distance to the West also achieves statistical significance. All three statistically significant variables have a substantive impact on CoD. For instance, each 1000 km one gets closer to the West, the value in CoD increases by 0.017 (on a scale from 0 to 1). Similarly, an increase of $1,000 in GDP leads to an increase of 0.034 on the CoD scale and every 1 percent more of citizens with higher education is connected to a 4 percent increase in CoD.

In model 3, the number of independent variables is further reduced and includes only the three *proximate* institutional features as predictors for CoD. The explanatory power of this model is considerably lower (r-square 0.46), that is, less than half of the variation can be accounted for if we only look at political-institutional features that define democracy types. Furthermore, while the model is significant, only the number of effective parties is.

Model 4 includes all three CoD-enhancing contexts identified in the fsQCA analysis and the three proximate conditions. The R^2 is 0.62 and the model is significant. Only the level of socioeconomic development and the number of parties achieve statistical significance. Somewhat counter-intuitively, as the number of parties goes up, the value for CoD goes down. One more effective party in the political system is related to a decrease of 0.021 on the CoD scale ranging from 0 to 1.

While some aspects of the regression results are in line with general expectations in the literature, other features clearly cast doubts on the usefulness of a method that imposes a linear, additive, and unifinal world view in studying CoD. Many of the models generate predicted values for cases at the lower end of my CoD scale that exceed those predicted values of cases that are among the best CoD performers on my scale. Take, for instance, model 3: it predicts higher CoD scores for Russia (0.63) or Turkey (0.78) than for Uruguay (0.59) or Portugal (0.58), despite the fact that Uruguay and Portugal have high fuzzy set membership scores in CoD of 0.96 and 0.93, respectively, while Russia and Turkey have only 0.13 and 0.26, respectively. If we take the cross-over point of 0.5 on the fuzzy set

CoD scale seriously, it means that cases that are clearly more out than in the set of consolidated democracies are assigned predicted CoD values that make them appear as cases that are more in than out of the set of CoD.

In general, it is interesting to note that regardless of the model specification, Russia is almost always identified as an outlier. Its actual CoD score is consistently off the regression line by more than two standard residuals. This nicely demonstrates that outliers in regression analysis are conceptually and empirically different from those cases that are not well covered with a fsQCA solution term. Russia does not fit well into any of the linear models specified above. In contrast, in the fsQCA analysis above, Albania, Honduras, Mongolia, Nicaragua, and Lithuania were not well covered. They showed configurations of remote and proximate conditions that were neither sufficient for CoD, nor for not-CoD. While there is no clear indication in the regression results of which characteristics make Russia different from the rest, in fsQCA we can directly identify the conjunction of conditions that describe a country's difference to the other cases. Knowing more about those cases that are exceptional in their *combination* of causal conditions can be of great value in subsequent in-depth case studies.

The broad patterns that can be revealed with regression analysis are in line with general knowledge on CoD: the richer a society, the more likely it is that democracy consolidates. Also in the fsQCA we found that many sufficient paths towards CoD depart from socioeconomically developed societies. However, not all cases of successful CoD are also socioeconomically developed societies. While in the regression analyses these deviations from the general pattern are delegated into the error term, in fsQCA the assumption of equifinality allows the specification of sufficient paths towards CoD that do not include socioeconomic development. In addition, rather than assuming that socioeconomic development has an independent effect on CoD, the assumption of conjunctural causation in fsQCA helps to unravel with which other factors socioeconomic development needs to be combined in order to exert its impact on CoD. Of course, more complex statistical analyses could be performed, mimicking some, but most likely not all aspects of causal complexity built into fsQCA. Especially the relatively small number of cases do not leave much room for more sophisticated statistical analyses. Even if some further refinements, such as non-linear transformations of specific variables or interaction terms, were introduced, such models would still lag behind not only the complex causal relations unraveled with fsQCA, but also, and more importantly, behind the complexity and subtlety of the theoretical arguments in the literature on CoD. The most intractable hurdles for statistical analysis seem to be those of equifinality, conjunctural causation, and asymmetry.

Notes

1 Introduction

1 See, for instance, Bunce (1999: 7), Ekiert (2003), Gasiorowski and Power (1998), Karl (1990), Kitschelt (1992 and 2003), Lipset (1993: 16ff.), Mahoney and Snyder (1999), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Remmer (1991), or Zhang (1994), to mention but a few.

2 Meaning and measure of the consolidation of democracy

1 See Collier and Mahon (1993), Collier and Levitzky (1997), Collier and Mahoney (1996), Collier and Adcock (1999), Adcock and Collier (2001), and Collier and Gerring (2008), and also Gerring (2001) and Goertz (2006b).

2 "The intension of a word is the collection of properties which determine the things to which the word applies." (Sartori 1970: 1041), or "The intension (or connotation) of a term consists of all the characteristics or properties of that term, that is, assignable to a term under the constraints of a given linguistic-semantic system." (Sartori 1984: 24).

3 For the inclusion of horizontal accountability in the meaning of democracy, see, for instance, O'Donnell (1999); for stateness, e.g. Linz and Stepan (1996), or for rule of law e.g. Mendez, *et al*. (1999). For an interesting attempt to measure a thicker concept of democracy for a large set of countries, see Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006).

4 For an extensive collection of CoD definitions, see the appendix in Waldrauch (1996: 88ff.).

5 See, for instance, Schedler (1996), Baker and Koesel (2001), Altman and Pérez-Linán (2002), O'Donnell, *et al*. (2004), Diamond and Morlino (2005), Bühlmann, *et al*. (2007), or Landman, *et al*. (2008).

6 Expressions are common like the 'risk of an authoritarian regression' (O'Donnell 1992: 17), or the reduced 'probability of breakdown' (Waldrauch 1996), 'resilience' (Gunther, *et al*. 1995: 21), or 'crisis resistance' (Przeworski, *et al*. 1996).

7 In fact, the very nature of the topic lends itself to probabilism because the subjects under study are themselves developing, thus allowing an open-ended script instead of monuments of the past (Schedler 1997: 3).

8 Thus, when it comes to the specification of CoD scores, a measurement device that has

a theoretical endpoint, which is empirically impossible, will be needed. This issue will be discussed below.

9 Furthermore, different types of actors are sometimes chosen – most commonly elites and masses – adding in yet more different combinations of conceptual dimensions of CoD.

10 Linz and Stepan's (1996) book is rightly seen as seminal. One of the few persistent critiques (e.g. Munck 1997 and Kullberg 1998), though, is that the application of the same indicators across all cases could be more rigorous.

11 I am indebted to Gerry Munck for the intensive and highly insightful email discussion in summer 2003, which forced me to think through several of the following issues in greater detail. I am, of course, fully responsible for all remaining flaws in the argumentation.

12 Authors such as Gasiorowski and Power (1998) and Lijphart (1984) employ thresholds of 12 and 25 years, respectively, to distinguish between consolidated and unconsolidated democracies.

13 For similar arguments, see Di Palma (1990b: 144–55) or Huntington (1991: 278f.): "Many factors will influence the consolidation of democracy in third world countries and their relative importance is not at all clear. It does seem most likely, however, that whether democracy in fact falters or is sustained will depend primarily on the extent to which political leaders wish to maintain it and are willing to pay the costs of doing so instead of giving priority to other goals."

14 See also Di Palma (1990a: 34) or McFaul (2002: 218f.).

15 For similar concepts of CoD, see Gunther, *et al.* (1996: 7) and Przeworski (1991: 26).

16 Expressions like 'politically significant actors', 'all relevant actors', or 'politically relevant actors' (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004) build into the conceptual definition a degree of flexibility, which is necessary for ideal type concepts (Gunther, *et al.* 1996: 152f). Hence, talking about key actors does not necessarily imply that I make any elitist assumptions. Who the relevant actors are depends on context and, thus, can also comprise collective actors like trade unions, mobilized masses, or ethnic minorities.

17 In theory, it is possible that institutions shape their environment and, thus, that they are not just the echo of societal forces (March and Olsen 1989: 159). I do not contest this claim, but the type of institutions I am looking at subsequently (the governmental format, party system, and territorial distribution of competencies) and, more importantly, the time frame I take into account (one or two decades) do make such a transforming effect of institutions on society minor in relation to the inverse impact. Before a given type of democracy can deeply shape entrenched social structures, such as ethnic composition or level of development, it needs to become consolidated and it will only become so if it reflects the most important social features at least to a certain extent.

18 The data is available from: http://www.personal.ceu.hu/departs/personal/Carsten_Schneider/

19 Whilst the exclusive reference to observable behavior may remain unclear in Table 2.1, it has been made clear to the country coders through the specific coding rules and oral instructions given to them.

20 To a certain extent, partial regimes are a similar but more specific concept than that of the so-called arenas proposed by Linz and Stepan (1996).

3 The consolidation of democracy across time and space

1 Notice that one-dimensionality does not exclude the possibility that there are differences in the difficulty of achieving specific items across regions over time. For an empirical assessment of these region-specific patterns of item difficulty, see Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 71–7).

2 For a more detailed discussion of the LoA and MoT items, see Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 6ff.).

3 Such rights might be included into the list of indicators of the quality of democracy.

4 For an insightful discussion, see Bogaards (2007 and forthcoming).

5 Schneider and Schmitter (2004) infer the degree of item difficulty based on the mean value per item and region over the time period 1974–2000.

6 Clearly, one of the shortcomings of the Democratization Data Set is that it only starts in the year 1974 and, thus, does not capture pre-1974 LoA developments, especially in the case of the early democratizers. The beginning of the LoA process in some of the countries thus lies outside the temporal scope of this data set.

7 The disaggregated data is available from: http://www.personal.ceu.hu/departs/personal/Carsten_Schneider/scalogram/Scalogram.XLS.

8 The achievement of a 0.5 score on item L6 in Slovenia is explained by the fact that in the former Yugoslavia, semi-free trade unions existed from the late 1960s onwards. However, truly independent trade unions only emerged in Slovenia after the gradual movement for independence of the Slovenian communist party from the Yugoslavian communist party in 1989.

9 For the following section, see also Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 79f.).

10 Between 1984 and 1989, Greece attains a score of only 6.5 due to a controversial law banning 'unwarranted' publicity for terrorists in the media.

11 As mentioned previously, Chile does achieve full LoA only *after* democracy had been established. This is because Chile had an exceptionally short period of transition, triggered by the unexpected defeat of General Pinochet in a constitutional referendum in 1988.

12 The reader is reminded that this 'perfect liberalization' is only based on the seven generic items selected. It is quite possible that on other criteria – for example, minority rights or toleration of sexual freedom – these countries differ considerably.

13 Turkey achieves a consistently low score for all of the 1990s – despite the fact that it had previously attained a score of 4.5 from 1984 to 1990. Considering that Turkey is presently a candidate for full EU membership, its liberalization score is far below those of the new EU member states from CEE. Right up to 2000, Turkey continued to score 0 on items L1 (human rights), L2 (political prisoners) and L3 (lack of tolerance for dissent) – all of which are related to the efforts to suppress the political aspirations of the Kurdish minority.

14 See Chapter 2 for the list of CoD items.

15 The reason for the decrease to 11.5 is a slight decline in item C11 (agreement on the territorial division of competencies) from 1997 onwards, the year in which the Greek government planned to transform municipalities into local administration areas, which created some discontent among certain minority groups.

16 It might be claimed that the political crisis that Argentina experienced in 2001 and 2002 invalidates the statement that Argentina has a consolidated democracy. I argue against this by pointing to the fact that Argentinean democracy still exists and has even gained strength under the rule of the successful elected president Kirchner (first Mr. and since 2008, Mrs. Kirchner). In order to gain some understanding of the extent of consolidation of Argentinean democracy, one should imagine an economic and social crisis with similarly catastrophic dimensions in any of the most consolidated democracies of Western Europe and the kind of political upheavals such circumstances would have produced. In other words, the political reactions to the social and economic crisis in Argentina should be seen as a positive sign of CoD (Schamis 2002) rather than as evidence of low CoD.

17 Not everybody subscribed to this pessimistic outlook because more positive effects for CoD were expected to come from the comparatively advantageous socio-structural conditions, most importantly the high levels of education and high socioeconomic equality present in CEE, especially if compared to cases from Latin America (e.g. Merkel 2008).

18 As shown previously, there is some intra-regional heterogeneity in terms of when single countries started and how well they perform in terms of CoD. Hence, using the regional average as an indicator for CoD developments in entire regions implies a considerable loss of information. However, in most cases the regional homogeneity is surprisingly high.

19 A cursory look at other third wave democratizers from Asia and Africa that are not contained in the data set can lead to the tentative conclusion that the CEE democracies might even be the global CoD champions in terms of tempo, consistency, and irreversibility.

20 Exceptions are the three Baltic States, which are not included in the Democratization Data Set but which will form part of the analysis in Chapter 4.

21 On this point, see e.g. Pevehouse 2005, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, or Vachudova 2005.

22 Notice that the rosy picture for CEE does only refer to CoD, that is, the expected persistence of democracy in this part of Europe. It is perfectly possible that the democracies that have become consolidated are of low quality, a concept that is analytically different from that of CoD (O'Donnell, *et al*. 2004, Diamond and Morlino 2005).

23 In addition, the high values for Cronbach's alpha in the dimensionality analysis (see Appendix C) suggest that the loss of information by aggregating CoD scores over time remains within acceptable limits.

24 See also Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 85f.).

25 In 2004, Slovenia joined the European Union and in 2007 it adopted the Euro currency by joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). These are clear indications that Slovenia has quickly become similar to old Western European democracies. In addition, Slovenes like to point out that the capital Ljubljana is further west than Vienna and further north than Milano and that therefore there are also good geographical reasons to classify their country as Western European.

26 The reader is reminded that due to the probabilistic nature of the concept of CoD, a low level of CoD does not automatically imply the breakdown of democracy. In order

for a democratic political regime to pass from being unconsolidated to breaking down, additional, more contingent factors must join in. For an insightful discussion on the breakdown of democracy, see Juan Linz' (1978) classical work.

27   One possibility to mitigate this bias against long democratizers would be to employ the number of years that democracy has been in place (instead of the number of years since the first CoD trait was achieved) as our standardization criteria for the CoD index. The respective formula is:

$$CoD = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I}(X_i)}{d}$$

where d is the number of years since founding elections took place until the year 2000. Doing this would shift Brazil to the highest clusters joining most of the CEE countries, Argentina, and Chile. Mexico would also rank much higher (results not reported here). There is a drawback, though. Replacing the denominator t with the denominator d means the bias against quick democratizers is replaced with one in favor of slower democratizers. In addition, this alternative formula produces values higher than 100, rendering the substantive interpretation and comparison of the aggregated scores of cases more difficult.

4   Theories of CoD – the fit of political institutions to societal contexts

1   Theorizing the effect of different combinations of remote and proximate factors is fundamental to many, if not most approaches in empirical research. The institutionalist literature has worked out a number of factors which set the frame for economic actors and policy processes in political economy (Crouch 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Streeck 1992 and 1997); political sociology models the arena(s) within which political parties and interest groups interact (Lehmbruch 1979); and the cleavage approach presents the institutional contexts which lead to the (notably divergent) evolution of party systems (Rokkan and Lipset 1967), to mention but a few. The numerous variants of neo-institutionalism (see Hall and Taylor 1996, for a categorization of the 'historical', 'rational choice' and 'sociological' variants) differ in many respects. However, they hold in common the fact that they are responses to pure behavioralist views of policy making, and that they all emphasize some kind of institutions within which social action is embedded (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 2, 5; Hall and Taylor 1996: 937; Hollingsworth 2000: 615; Kato 1996: 556; Shepsle 1989: 133; Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 1).

2   Following Kitschelt (2003), explanations that rely exclusively on remote (structural) factors provide for causal depth but fall short of demonstrating the causal mechanisms that link deep, distant causes with an outcome. In contrast, explanations based on proximate factors display causal mechanisms, often, but not necessarily, at the micro-level. Most of the time, the latter type of explanation is too shallow because it runs the risk of leading to tautological statements in regarding part of what should belong

to the *explanandum* as the *explanans*. Consequently, a good causal statement consists in finding the right balance between the two core features: causal depth and causal mechanisms.

3 The precise conceptualisation of remote and proximate conditions depends on various factors specific to each research project. This is why the remote-proximate dichotomy is not a synonym for the micro-macro divide. In the following empirical example, both remote and proximate factors are measured at the macro level. In a different research setting, however, proximate factors could be perceived as actor-based and process-oriented events located at the micro-level, as is common in structure-agency approaches (e.g. Mahoney and Snyder 1999; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995).

4 See, for instance, Bunce (1999: 7), Ekiert (2003), Gasiorowski and Power (1998), Karl (1990), Kitschelt (1992 and 2003), Lipset (1993:16ff.), Mahoney and Snyder (1999), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Remmer (1991), Rustow (1970), or Zhang (1994).

5 In the literature, it is often left unclear whether a variable under investigation is hypothesized to foster the emergence of democracy, CoD, or both. It was Rustow (1970) in his seminal article who first pointed out that factors enhancing the transition to democracy are not necessarily the same as for the consolidation of democracy. In fact, they can even have opposite effects. Nowadays, it has become common wisdom that the transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy have to be treated separately (e.g. Huntington 1991: 270; Shin 1994: 151; Muller 1995: 995; Plasser, *et al.* 1997: 26; Mayer 1998: 4f.). Schmitter and Guilhot (2000) call this an 'epistemological shift' in perspective that takes place when moving from transition studies and their focus on choices to consolidation studies and their analysis of rules.

6 Vertical and horizontal power dispersion partly overlap with but are still different from Lijphart's (1999) executive-party and federal-unitary dimension. Because I use different indicators than Lijphart, I find it more appropriate to stick to the descriptive labels of vertical and horizontal power dispersion rather than using his terminology.

7 The term 'path' is used in order to refer to the causal conjunctions that combine remote and proximate factors; it is not strictly related to any sequence of events in the sense used in path dependence models.

8 Figure 4.1 provides a stylized account of my claim that institutions and context should match in order to produce CoD. In the empirical analysis in Chapter 5, several modifications to Figure 4.1 are implemented. For instance, some context conditions are power neutral, that is, they require neither the dispersion nor the concentration of power (e.g. having an ethno-linguistically homogeneous society). Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapter 5, none of the societal conditions that are identified as CoD-enhancing requires the concentration of power both in the vertical and the horizontal dimension. As a consequence of this, the modified expectation will be that CoD occurs when there is a fit of power dispersion both in the vertical and the horizontal dimension or when institutions and context match in one of these dimensions and in the other the context is power neutral. The expectation for non-CoD remains and is that it occurs when institutions and context mis-match both in the vertical and in the horizontal dimension.

9 Among the many refinements of the crude statement that economic development is positively related to democracy in a linear fashion, the issue of (income) inequality has

received much attention. See e.g. Lipset (1959) or Smith Jr (1969) for older analyses, Diamond (1992) and Coppedge (1997) for reassessments, Muller (1995), and Bollen and Jackman (1995) for refinements of the argument. The equality hypothesis – which goes back to Aristotle (see Dahl 1971: 81–104) – claims that economic growth does lead to CoD only if it is distributed in a fairly even manner. Based on this approach, the relation between growth and democracy is transformed into an s-shaped curvilinear relation, with intermediate stages of economic development being related to less, rather than more, democracy. Similar deviations from the linear relationship between development and democracy are postulated by Huntington's (1968) view on social disorder induced by too rapid social modernization, O'Donnell's (1973) notion of bureaucratic authoritarianism, or the literature on dependency theory (e.g. Cardoso and Faletto 1976).

10 Over the last few decades, strong probabilistic associations between wealth and democracy have been empirically confirmed with ever-more sophisticated statistical techniques and ever larger databases. For revisions of the empirical material gathered and further theoretical diversifications within the modernization paradigm, see, for instance, Diamond (1992), Lipset, *et al.* (1993), Slater, *et al.* (1993), Przeworski, *et al.* (1996), Coppedge (1997), Przeworki *et al.* (2000) Lane and Ersson (2003), Welzel, *et al.* (2003), Inglehart and Welzel (2005), or Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008).

11 The link between a power concentrating democracy type within a low economically developed society and CoD is mediated though the supposed effectiveness of strong executives taking measures to induce growth and to withstand counterproductive populist measures in times of economic crisis. This view prevailed in the early 1990s (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1992, 1995) but was subsequently challenged with the argument that power concentration is likely to create political systems more vulnerable to being captured by private interest groups. As a remedy against this, some suggested power dispersing 'heterachies' (Bruszt 2002) while others drew the opposite conclusion and argued for an effective isolating of the government from private interest groups and rendering the decision-making process more transparent, thus enabling the governments to carry out the necessary reforms still pending (Hellman 1998).

12 Especially when education is conceptualized not in terms of the basic literacy skills, but, more demandingly, in terms of higher education (as is done here, see Appendix A), there is considerable variation among countries that otherwise display the same levels of economic development.

13 Of course, whether or not horizontal power dispersion is also important depends to some degree on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups and the degree of ethnic mixing in the same areas.

14 "Soviet type regimes, to a greater extent than other types of authoritarianism, destroyed political and civil society, leaving behind what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have called a 'flattened landscape', a condition that creates problems for political representation in the post-Soviet period." (Fish 2002: 9).

15 Elster, *et al.* (1998) point out that the lack of institutional constraints made the transition in former communist countries easier, but also that, by and large, it was the case that the actors involved in the transition were not the same as in the subsequent consolidation process. Hence, once the transition is over and the focus is on CoD, the situation is not

one of institutional tabula rasa but of more or less well designed institutions that affect the chances for CoD.

16 In order to get a grasp on whether CEE and the former Soviet Republics form a distinct subgroup within the third wave of democratization, in the empirical analysis I introduce a distinction between non-communist cases, former communist cases (roughly 45 years of communism), and former Soviet Republics (roughly 70 years of communism).

17 In his analysis of societies undergoing rapid economic and social changes, Huntington (1968) postulates the existence of effective governments as the primary function of political institutions. Nothing in Huntington's argument necessarily implies the establishment of a dictatorship as an extreme form of power concentration, nor do I argue for non-democratic forms of power concentration. Instead, there is enough room within the democratic spectrum to concentrate power in the hands of democratically legitimate and accountable governments and, thus, to remain in the sphere of liberal democracy.

18 Different from the argument that historical experiences foster CoD is the hypothesis that *present* democratic experiences matter. The plausible but somewhat obvious claim is made that the better a democracy's democratic and systemic performance, the more likely CoD will occur (Easton 1965, Fuchs 1996). Key to connecting both types of performances to the likelihood of CoD is the concept of legitimacy.

19 I abstain from entering too deeply into the hotly discussed question of whether democratic values (have to) come prior to the emergence of democracy or whether they are the result of the presence and the performance of such institutions (see e.g. Schmitter and Karl 1991:82–3 for the democracy-prior-to-attitudes hypothesis; Almond and Verba 1963 for the attitudes-prior-to-democracy hypothesis; and Muller and Seligson 1994 for a reciprocal-relation hypothesis).

20 Przeworski *et al*. make the important observation that if the previous experiences with democracy have been frequently interrupted by many *coup d'etats*, then anti-democratic forces can draw on practical skills and knowledge of how to make a democratic regime fall in an effective way. This is clearly the case for the military in Latin America while the attempted military *coup d'état* in the Soviet Republic in 1991 resembled more a *coup de théâtre* (Przeworski, *et al*. 1996: 43f.). It is, thus, not the sheer number of years a country has experienced democracy, but also that these experiences came *en bloc*.

21 In most cases of re-democratization, the same, or similar, type of democracy is re-established. This seems to have a CoD fostering effect in that beyond a general democratic tradition, actors can recur to more specific practices, norms, and conventions (Dowding 1994) enshrined in specific democracy types.

22 For an assessment of international factors in third wave democratization processes, see, for instance, Whitehead (1996), Pridham (1997), Zielonka and Pravda (2001), or Levitzky and Way (2005).

23 Gasiorowski and Power (1998) and Przeworski *et al*. (1996: 43) use the democratization rate in a world region as a proxy for testing the demonstration effect hypothesis. They find that "the more democratic neighbors, and the more democracies in the world, the more likely existing democracies survive." (Przeworski, *et al*. 1996: 43). For similar findings, see Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

24 The fact that different types of democracy (the proximate factor for CoD in this book's terminology) disperse power to different degrees is at the heart of the vast literature

on federalism and decentralization, or parliamentary versus presidential systems. Few would contest the claim that decentralized, parliamentary democracies with many parties disperse political power more than unitary states with presidential systems and few parties.

25 See, for instance, Lijphart and Grofman (1984), Lijphart (1994), Nohlen (1986), Reeve and Ware (1992), or Taagepera (2007).

26 For a slightly different definition, see Elazar (1968).

27 Depending on the data source used, six to eight out of my 32 countries can be classified as federal systems.

28 In the context of ethno-linguistically heterogeneous societies, federal structures are often seen as a necessary condition for securing the survival of the state. While cases such as Switzerland, India, or the US seem to provide evidence for this claim, failed federal states such as the USSR, Yugoslavia, or Pakistan in the 1970s draw the attention to the danger of ethnically motivated violence and secession inherent with federal approaches to accommodating ethno-linguistic conflicts.

29 Not all of the hypotheses on the positive features of decentralization find empirical confirmation. Apart from the often thin operationalization of the concept in cross-national research, negative results are often due to the fact that the hypothesis to be tested implies the effect of a *specific* dimension of decentralization (fiscal, political, or administrative) and not all of them (Rodden 2004: 481).

30 In other research settings, decentralization can also be defined as the process that leads to a more decentralized exercise of public authority (Treisman 2002: 3).

31 At least in the way they are operationalized here, see Appendix A.

32 Several, mutually non-exclusive mechanisms were spelled out. First, parliamentary systems are better in representing minorities, especially when combined with a proportional representation type of electoral system. Second, parliamentary systems are more flexible and adapt to changing environments more easily than presidential systems. Presidents have a fixed term in office and, thus, are hard to remove even if they lose all political support (Mainwaring 1993b: 209). Third, presidential systems are prone to lead to situations of deadlock between the two branches of government – the president and the parliament – both of which enjoy the same democratic legitimacy through direct elections. Fourth, in presidential systems politically inexperienced outsiders can become the most important national political actor (Mainwaring 1993b: 209).

33 The common denominator of most definitions of presidentialism is that both parliament and president hold democratic legitimization and that conflicts between them cannot be resolved by the dissolution of the parliament or the removal of the president (Sartori 1994, Thibaut 1993).

34 The gist of this debate is that presidential systems perform worse than parliamentary systems when confronted with a fragmented party system (Przeworski *et al.* 1996). At the same time, Sartori (1994) points out that parliamentary systems also work badly if the parties are unfit for this type of governmental system, regardless of their number.

35 Of course, how power is dispersed in the different types of democracy depends on other features as well, and can be refined (perhaps *ad infinitum*). For instance, features of presidential powers (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Lucky 1994; O'Donnell 1994; Baylis 1996; Frye 1997, 1999; Fish 1999; Metcalf 2000), the ministerial appointment

rights of the prime minister, immunity for the president and the prime minister, etc. all make a difference in how powerful the executive is (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 463–469). Taking all these aspects – and their different configurations – into account would lead into intractable research practical problems.

36 The veto points approach (Tsebelis 2002) is another, more formalized version of the same underlying idea: democracies differ as to who and how many can participate in the process of making collectively binding decisions. Using his approach, Tsebelis (2002) also concludes that presidential systems contain more veto points than this type of parliamentary system. Consequently, they disperse power to a greater extent, especially when combined with a high number of effective parties.

37 In fact, a democracy characterized by a parliamentary system with few parties and no decentralization is in line with what has become labeled as the Westminster model of democracy (Lijphart 1984 and 1999).

5 Casual complexity and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis

1 See, e.g. Bennett (1999), Braumoeller (1999, 2003), Braumoeller and Goertz (2000, 2002), Cioffi-Revilla (1981), Dion (1998), George and Bennett (2005), Mahoney (2000b, 2008), Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008b), Western (2001), or Political Analysis, Special Issue 'Casual Complexity and Qualitative Methods' Volume 14, Number 3, Summer 2006.

2 Mill (1970) uses the term 'chemical causation' to express a similar idea.

3 "In systems theory, [equifinality is] a property present in any system in which similar ends can be achieved via different means. In the social science literature, this term is sometimes used […], though 'causal complexity' is more common. The philosophy of science literature refers to 'causal chains' or 'causal ropes', both of which have a prominent and well-established lineage dating back at least to Venn" (Braumoeller 2003).

4 In contrast, if X is said to be necessary for Y, then the set of cases with X is a superset of the set of cases with Y (Ragin 2000). The arguments about the asymmetry of expected data patterns are therefore similar to those described for sufficiency claims and will not be spelled out in further detail here (for more details, see Ragin 2000 and 2008b or Schneider and Wagemann 2007).

5 Goertz (2003) counts more than 150 hypotheses about necessary conditions formulated in recent social science literature, many of which do not explicitly use the term necessity but mean it.

6 Obviously, there are more advanced statistical techniques that circumvent many, but not all of these assumptions, such as structural equation models or generalized linear models. Also, attempts at overcoming the assumption of additivity by modeling interaction terms are certainly welcome. The practical feasibility of these more advanced techniques in macro-comparative social research is severely limited, though. With often not more than a dozen cases, which, in addition, show characteristics that greatly co-vary, any estimation of interaction effects creates serious difficulties and the power of probability theory and inferential statistics cannot be brought to bear, especially

if third, or even higher-order interaction effects are specified (Ragin 2008b: ch. 6; Mahoney 2008: 14).

7 Rather than seeking methodological approaches that can deal with complex causation, many scholars deny the relevance of such causation or simply show no interest in it as there is no easy way of tackling it within their methodological paradigm. For this reason, a vicious circle can be observed in which the use of simplifying methods leads to complexity-reduced theorizing, which, in turn, justifies the application of those methods that can only deal with simple causation. Bear F. Braumoeller puts it aptly:

"the premise of parsimony becomes a conclusion [...]. A methodology designed to deal with a world of simple causal mechanisms can only describe that world in simple terms, and the proliferation of simple descriptions blinds us to the possibility of richer theoretical processes that would require more complex methodology. The result is a vicious circle between the twin evils of theoretical poverty and methodological rigidity. The primary danger inherent in such a situation is that theoretical complexity in statistical studies will dwindle until theories are no more nuanced than the techniques that are brought to bear in testing them" (Braumoeller 1999: 3).

8 An increasing number of scholars argue, however, that the burden of proof should be on the shoulders of those who assume causal simplicity and not on those who assume causal complexity (Coppedge 2002b: 3).

9 For methodological rather than substantive reasons, scholars often succumb to a 'general linear reality' (Andrew Abbott, cited in McKeown 1999) in situations where it is not appropriate (also Shalev 2007).

10 While both assumptions – that of causal simplicity and that of complexity – have their own merits, there are research practical arguments in favor of the latter because "[i]f we assume a more complex model than the reality requires, the data may allow us to reduce our model back to a simpler form, but if we assume a simple model for a complex phenomenon, we may be less likely to recognize our mistake" (Bennett 1999: 8).

11 Path dependency approaches, critical juncture arguments, or accounts based on contingent events are not (necessarily) based on set relations (see below) and thus, fsQCA may not be the appropriate method for testing such hypotheses (see Bennett and George 1997 or Mahoney 2000a, 2003: 363ff). For some formalized attempts at introducing the time dimension into QCA, see Caren and Panofsky (2005) and Ragin and Strand (2008) for a critical reply.

12 Fuzzy set theory is a mathematical system developed by Lofti A. Zadeh (1965, 1968).

13 This is not an exclusive OR in the sense of an 'either … or', but the alternatives do not exclude each other. Ancient Latin differentiates better between these two 'ors', using 'aut' (exclusive or) or 'vel' (inclusive or).

14 The use of the '+' sign might be confusing, since linear algebra, as we were taught at school, uses the same symbol for arithmetic addition. However, in the algebras on which QCA techniques are based, namely, Boolean and fuzzy algebra, it is interpreted as a logical OR (see Ragin 1987, 2000; Ragin and Rihoux 2004; Schneider and Grofman 2006; and Schneider and Wagemann 2007 for notation in QCA and potential sources of confusion).

15 Let us suppose that condition D ('a functioning state') was necessary but not sufficient for democracy (Y). This could be expressed in the formal notation: $X \leftarrow Y$. The inverse

arrow represents a logical implication, that is, it says that, wherever we find Y, we will also find X, or, X is a superset of Y.

16 Such INUS conditions are particularly difficult, if not impossible, to detect with standard statistical techniques, especially if the number of cases is limited.

17 Fuzzy sets reflect not only each case's position in relation to the others (the type of information contained in quantitative indicators), but also in relation to the ideal type embodied in the definition of the concept and represented by the fuzzy membership scores of 0 and 1. In a sense, fuzzy sets combine qualitative statements (fully in, fully out, neither nor) with quantitative features (gradations of membership in a concept with equal intervals) and, thus, challenge conventional thinking about 'levels of measurement' (Ragin 2000: 154, 2008b: ch. 4 and 5).

18 In csQCA it is a common mistake to calibrate sets by simply dichotomizing variables at their mean. The mean value is a property of the data but not of any substantive argument about set membership (Schneider and Wagemann forthcoming).

19 The technical details of the direct and the indirect calibration methods are explained in Ragin (2008b: ch. 5 and forthcoming). The direct calibration procedure can be performed within the fsQCA 2.0 software. For the indirect method any statistical software package capable of performing a fractional polynomial regression analysis can be used. The direct calibration method is preferable and is used for the calibrations of all but one fuzzy set used in the empirical analysis (see Appendix A). The indirect method can have advantages if more than one interval level variable is available and all are equally relevant for calibrating the fuzzy set.

20 For a broader introduction, see e.g. Ragin (1987 and 2000), Klir, *et al.* (1997), or Smithson and Verkuilen (2006).

21 Formally: not-$A(x) = 1 - A(x)$.

22 Formally: $(A*B)(x) = \min (A(x),B(x))$.

23 Formally: $(A + B)(x) = \max (A(x),B(x))$.

24 On the process of logical minimization, see Ragin (1987) and Schneider and Wagemann (2007).

25 By and large, these options are: (a) do not make any assumptions on the outcome value of logical remainders; (b) make theoretically guided assumptions – preferably 'easy counterfactuals' (Ragin and Sonnett 2004); and (c) allow the computer to make assumptions guided by mathematically rather than substantive considerations. See Ragin (1987: 104ff.); Ragin and Sonnett (2004) ; or Schneider and Wagemann (2007: 101–112) for more details.

26 Notice that this is different from saying that these contexts are necessary. Necessity implies that whenever the outcome is present, the cause is also present. Following the idea of equifinality, there are, however, different contexts in which the outcome is possible. Thus, these contexts are not the same as necessary conditions for CoD.

27 This first analytic step is exclusively based on remote factors, whilst the whole set of proximate factors is deliberately left out, despite the fact that they are known to influence the outcome. Therefore, the model is deliberately mis-specified, or, the property space (Lazarsfeld 1937) requires further specification.

28 Allowing for more parsimonious solutions in the first of the two fsQCA steps implies that *less precise* and *less consistent* but *more encompassing* accounts of

the outcome will be produced. This is fully in line with the logic of the two-step approach which rests on the assumption that remote factors alone do not provide a satisfactory account for CoD and that proximate factors must be added to the picture in a subsequent step. As a general rule, complexity and consistency of solution terms are inversely related: the less complex and precise a solution term, the lower its consistency but the higher its coverage will be (see Appendix B for a more extensive discussion on this point).

29 Following Przeworski and Teune (1970), comparative studies are defined by the fact that they proceed simultaneously at two levels: the system level and the within-system level. In their view, a study should be labeled as comparative if it aims at explaining variation across systems in within-system relationships (Ragin 1987: 4). The two-step approach that I suggest here, and the conceptual distinction between remote and proximate factors, is an adequate tool for achieving this core goal of the comparative approach. Remote conditions are the system level factors that define the setting that conditions the relationship of proximate factors – or within-system level factors – and their impact on the outcome. Applied to the research question pursued here, this means the following. Rather than asking whether a certain institutional configuration has a negative or positive impact on CoD (or rather than estimating the net effect of each institution separately), the two-step approach explicitly puts these proximate factor combinations (institutions) into context and asks: in conjunction with which societal features (system level) does a given combination of institutions fail or succeed in fostering CoD?

30 The two-step approach is a methodological tool for analyzing data and therefore does not privilege any of the possible links between remote and proximate factors as they are spelled out in Goertz and Mahoney's (2005) idea of two-level theories. It depends on the theory that is tested with the two-step approach whether remote and proximate factors are in a causal, ontological, or substitutable relation.

31 For the sake of clarity and space, only the parameters for sufficient conditions are discussed. The basic logic for calculating consistency and coverage for necessary conditions is identical and the mathematical formulas very similar (see Ragin 2006b and Appendix B).

32 The calculation of consistency scores for conjunctions of conditions is straightforward: simply calculate each case's membership score in the conjunction using the weakest link rule (that is, the smallest value across all conditions to be joint through logical AND) and use these as the X-values in the formula.

33 See Ragin (2000), Braumoeller and Goertz (2000), Dion (2003), or Eliason and Stryker forthcoming. Attempts to develop statistical tools for dealing with the kind of set theory-based causal complexity show (a) that, in principle, it is possible to come up with such statistical procedures but also that such procedures (b) will look much different from current dominant practices and (c) will not escape the need for a (very) large N (see Braumoeller (2003), Braumoeller and Goertz (2003), or Tsebelis (2003)).

34 In applied fsQCA, this algorithm has been replaced by the inclusion algorithm presented in Ragin (2000).

35 The exception to this rule occurs if a case has a fuzzy set membership score of exactly 0.5 in one or more of the single conditions. In this situation, the respective case

has no fuzzy set membership higher than 0.5 in any of the 2^k combinations (Ragin 2000: 184ff.).

36 The fsQCA software package contains a fuzzy-set truth table algorithm routine.

37 In fact, dichotomizing fuzzy data by using 0.5 or any other fuzzy value as the cut-off is always an inferior strategy. It not only throws away more fine-grained fuzzy information but also relaxes the criteria for subset relationships. Hence, with dichotomous data in csQCA some conjunctions pass the consistency test of sufficiency which, based on fuzzy set scores in fsQCA, would not pass (for more details on this point, see Ragin 2008b: ch. 7; Schneider and Wagemann 2007: 225–8).

38 If all cases fall below or on the main diagonal, the respective causal condition can be interpreted as being necessary for the outcome.

6 CoD and the fit of institutions to contexts

1 The raw data sources and calibration rules for all fuzzy sets are documented in detail in Appendix A.

2 Although the Baltic republics were under Soviet domination only slightly longer than the countries in CEE, that Soviet domination was more intrusive and intense because, unlike CEE cases, the Baltic states became formally part of the Soviet Union. This justifies the Baltic republics receiving a membership score of 0 and the CEE cases a score of 0.2 in the set of countries without communist past (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A).

3 Unlike in the search for sufficient conditions, tests of necessity look first at single conditions because if no single condition passes the consistency threshold none of the logical AND combinations can be necessary (Ragin 2000: 210–22; Schneider and Wagemann 2007).

4 Sixty-six percent of the fuzzy set membership scores contradict the statement that the set of socioeconomically developed societies is necessary for CoD. This relatively high proportion is even more remarkable if we take into account that the fuzzy membership function for translating the level of GDP into membership scores in the fuzzy set of economically developed countries uses rather relaxed criteria (see Appendix A).

5 In the case of the set of *not* socioeconomically developed societies, only three cases in the set of not-CoD show membership scores in the outcome and the condition that slightly deviate from a perfect subset relation of necessity: Russia, Belarus, and Turkey.

6 Another reason for opting for high consistency values is the following. Unlike with crisp sets, with fuzzy sets, one and the same combination of conditions can simultaneously be a subset of both the outcome and the non-outcome. Such condition should not be interpreted as sufficient for any of the two outcomes, though. This is why I interpret only those conjunctions as sufficient conditions where the consistency value exceeds 0.9 only for one of the two outcomes.

7 Appendix A displays the exact maximum fuzzy set membership scores of cases in these paths, thus allowing for a more precise assessment of how good a description a path is for each country.

8 The reader is reminded that the time period to which this refers is the 1990s. Thus,

all measures implemented during the presidency of Vladimir Putin aiming at severely concentrating political power through re-centralizing the political system and banning political parties are not captured by this classification of Russia.

9 In fact, if all cases fall on the main diagonal, consistency and coverage would equal 1 and the solution term found would be both necessary and sufficient – a rather uncommon finding in empirical social research.

10 The same holds true for Nicaragua in truth table row 17 but its combination of remote and proximate conditions does not pass the test criteria for being a sufficient condition for not-CoD.

11 CoD-fostering is defined as the match of context and institutions in both dimensions or in one dimension with the vertical context dimension being neutral. Non-CD-fostering, is defined as the mis-match of context and institutions in both dimensions. A fit in one dimension but a mis-fit in another dimension does not create any strong expectations about the value of CoD.

12 This denotes a former communist society that is not socioeconomically developed, and not ethno-linguistically homogeneous.

13 This denotes a non-parliamentary democracy with high party fragmentation and no decentralization.

14 The reader is reminded that in this book the conceptual meaning of CoD is the consensus of the relevant actors on the democratic rules of the game (see Chapter 1).

15 In Chapter 7, I deal with the question why some countries chose the appropriate institutions while others apparently did not.

7 Choosing institutions – some notes on how to study the impact of transition modes on CoD

1 Debates center around questions such as: (a) how to conceptualize different modes of transitions; (b) how to classify countries into the different modes; (c) what the consequences of the different modes are on such important phenomena as (d) the choice of a specific institutional configuration and (e) the consolidation of democracy; and (f) whether such effects of transition modes are observable across different world regions or, instead, bound to specific contexts. Only some of the debates are addressed in this chapter.

2 See, for instance, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Stepan (1986), Karl (1990), Huntington (1991: 109–63), Karl and Schmitter (1991), Linz and Stepan (1996), or Munck and Skalnik Leff (1997).

3 For instance, what Huntington (1991) labels transformation corresponds to Linz and Stepan's (1996) reforma-pactada, yet others call it transaction. In the same line, replacement, rupture, breakdown, and collapse seem to be conceptually equivalent, and transplacement and extrication seem to refer to the same phenomenon. No doubt, the variety of types and the lack of coherent language have not contributed either to the classification of cases, or to the clarification of the impact of transition modes on CoD.

4 Given the focus on this particular aspect of pacts, one should perhaps avoid conceptual

disorder and use a qualifier such as 'democracy-constituting pact' as opposed to 'autocracy-extricating pact' or even to drop the term 'pact' altogether and use the label of 'consensual (or negotiated) institutional choice', instead.

5 O'Donnell and Schmitter have put it cogently: "Where the underlying distribution of de facto power in classes, groups, and institutions differs from the de jure authority, such arrangements [pacts; CQS] permit a polity to change its institutional structure without violent confrontation" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 37).

6 This common understanding of the pact hypothesis is summarized by McFaul (2002: 216, Fn 11): "Though a pact is not a necessary condition for successful democratic transition, it enhances the probability of success". This position is also taken by the many core exponents of the pact hypothesis (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Karl 1990, Przeworski 1991, or Colomer 2000).

Along the same lines, O'Donnell and Schmitter argue: "While we are not claiming that such arrangements [pacts; CQS] are necessary features of a successful transition, we believe that they *can* play an important role in any regime change based on gradual installment rather than on a dramatic event" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 37) and "we do not regard pacts as a necessary element in all transitions from authoritarian rule – even in those which are gradual and continual" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 39).

7 Appendix C shows an extended cross-tabular approach, which unravels in more detail how standard correlational approaches to testing the pact hypothesis run the risk of drawing inferences based on cases that should not be counted as evidence in favor or against the pact hypothesis.

8 More generally, the empirical patterns in Figure 7.2 are in line with what Bermeo (1997) calls the 'moderation argument' which prevails in the literature on transitions and which holds that mass-guided transitions hamper the prospects for CoD. This position is expressed by scholars as diverse as Huntington (1984), Kaufman (1986), Weiner (1987), or Karl (1990).

9 McFaul's (2002: 227, Figure 1) non-cooperative model of transitions, designed as a counter-model to the pact approach, correctly predicts Lithuania but also fails to explain Romania's success despite the fact that he categorizes cases' transition types based on the outcome of the first democratic elections and thus on information much closer (both in time and causal mechanism) to the outcome to be explained.

10 Karatnycky and Ackerman (2006) come to a similar conclusion based on an analysis of new data on transition violence and durable democracy.

8 Reframing debates – looking back and looking ahead

1 Expressed in operational terms, in order to achieve the 'higher order construct' (Ragin 2000: 321–8) of power dispersion, I create 'master variables' (Rokkan 1999) or 'macro-variables' (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1997).

2 It might be unfair to hold Lipset responsible for the precondition argument. His famous quote reads: "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy". Hence, he states the relation between economic development and

democratic CoD in probabilistic terms and, thus, leaves open the possibility that there are democracies that consolidate for reasons other than economic development.

3 The difficulty of classifying cases seems to be caused by the lack of conceptual guidelines for identifying the core events during a transition. In Poland, for instance, it is not clear which of the events should be used for classifying the transition in this country as either a pacted or some other form of transition: are the negotiations between *Solidarnosc* and the communist regime crucial, in which case, Poland should be seen as a pacted transition. Or are the successive confrontations after the sweeping electoral victory of *Solidarnosc* the most defining feature, which led to the break-up of the previous negotiated pact? Even Spain, commonly referred to as the *locus classicus* of pacted transition, is sometimes interpreted by certain scholars as an incident of a transition driven by mass mobilization (see Perez-Diaz 1993; Bermeo 1997).

4 In Spain, for example, the path-breaking and often-referred to *Pacto de Moncloa* was followed by several other pacts focusing on social, economic, and political issues (Encarnación 2005).

5 Again, Spain is an example of a wide range of ideological forces included in pacts, ranging from communists to *franquistas*.

6 See, for instance, Deegan (1993), Hamladji (2002), Diamond, *et al.* (2003), Brumberg (2002, 2003), Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004), Perthes (2004), or Carothers and Ottaway (2005).

7 Personal communication with Thomas Carothers and Philippe C. Schmitter, Budapest 16 June 2007.

8 See, for instance, Shugart and Carey (1992), Lucky (1994), O'Donnell (1994), Baylis (1996), Frye (1997, 1999), Fish (1999), or Metcalf (2000).

Appendix C

1 The formula is $2^{k/2} - 1 + 2^{k/2} - 1$ or, more simply, $2 \times 2^{k/2} - 2$ in the case of an even number of variables, and $2^{k/2 - 0.5} - 1 + 2^{k/2 + 0.5} - 1$, or, slightly more simply, $2^{k/2 - 0.5} + 2^{k/2 + 0.5} - 2$ in the case of an odd number of variables.

2 Unfortunately, the same reliability analyses cannot be performed for each region separately. The combination of a relatively low N (3–7) and many items to scale (7 and 12, respectively), plus the different democratization timings and tempos of the countries, renders the results of such an analysis meaningless.

3 Categorical principal component analysis (CatPCA) – roughly speaking an equivalent to factor analysis for categorical data (Meulman and Heiser 1999) – shows, however, that if the extraction of two dimensions is requested, the first dimension accounts for almost 70 percent of the variance (not reported here). Furthermore, *all* items show a high loading on this first dimension. It is only item C8 which, in addition to a high loading on dimension 1, displays an even higher loading on a second dimension. Results of factor analyses (also not reported here) yield substantively similar results.

4 Raw data is used for the societal conditions while for the outcome and the institutional conditions fuzzy set membership scores (Appendix A) are used.

5 The reader is reminded that in fsQCA, multicollinearity is not a problem but the starting

assumption. Conditions are expected to exert their effects jointly and the outcome is expected to be the result of equifinal structures.

6 In most models, the magnitude of the residual increases with higher predicted values.

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